# Meeting of the CDEM Coordinating Executive Group

**Date:** Monday 30 April 2018

**Time:** 10.00am

**Venue:** Council Chamber
Hawke's Bay Regional Council
159 Dalton Street
NAPIER

## Attachments Excluded From Agenda

GROUP

HAWKE'S BAY
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

**GROUP PLAN**
**2014-2019**

HAWKE'S BAY CIVIL DEFENCE
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

TE RĀKAU WHAKAMARUMARU
KI TE MATAU A MĀUI

READY

This plan aims to build resilience and you will see this as an emphasis throughout. Resilience is how we withstand, adapt and 'bounce back' in response to a disaster.

A resilient community is one which expects and is well prepared for an adverse event; they can cope well with the disruption and recover quickly. Everyone has a role to play in creating a resilient community.

**Item 7**

**Attachment 1**

**GROUP PLAN**
2014-2019

# Contents

3

**Item 7**

**Attachment 1**

**PART ONE**

# INTRODUCTION ANDRISK PROFILE

HAWKE'S BAY
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
GROUP

INTRODUCTIO

## STRUCTURE OF THE PLAN

| Part 1: Introduction & Risk Profile | Introduces the Group Plan. Provides information on our environment and a description of Hawke's Bay hazards and their implications. |
|---|---|
| Part 2: Strategy | An overview of the 4R's of emergency management: Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery. The strategic policy framework, principles and objectives in relation to these. |
| Part 3: Activities | An overview of the core activities which enable the Group to achieve comprehensive emergency management. These activities are: <br>• Governance, Management & Finance <br>• Risk Reduction <br>• Building and Maintaining Capability <br>• Volunteer Management <br>• Community Engagement and Education <br>• Public Information Management <br>• Welfare <br>• Emergency Operations <br>• Recovery Operations <br>• Lifelines <br>• Monitoring and Evaluation. <br>Covers the principles and specific objectives in relation to these which will guide our work programme over the term of this plan. |
| Part 4: Appendices including | Includes additional information which supports the plan <br><br>a Glossary and a list of supporting plans and procedures. |

6        Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group l Te Rākau Whakamarumaru ki Te

INTRODUCTIO

# INTRODUCTION

This is the Civil Defence Emergency Management Group Plan for Hawke's Bay, covering the areas contained within Central Hawke's Bay District Council, Hastings District Council, Napier City Council and Wairoa District Council. This is the second plan prepared by the Hawke's Bay CDEM group to meet the requirements of the CDEM Act 2002.

## HAWKE'S BAY: TERRITORIAL AUTHORITIES

The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group Plan (the Group Plan) has been primarily written to guide and inform the agencies involved in CDEM (local government, emergency services, non- government organisations).

It also gives the Hawke's Bay community an overview of how hazards and risks in the region will be managed. We encourage people to find out more on local hazards and what individuals and communities can do to prepare.

See **www.hbemergency.govt.nz**

or follow us on Facebook:
**www.facebook.com/hbemergency**

and Twitter:
**www.twitter.com/hbemergency**

The Group Plan was approved by the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group to take effect from 20 June 2014.

A review of this plan will commence no later than five years from this date.

Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group I Te Rākau Whakamarumaru ki Te                    7

INTRODUCTIO

# THE GROUP PLAN VISION AND GOALS

## OUR VISION

A Resilient Hawke's Bay Community He
Aumangea Hapori ki Te Matau a Māui

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

## GOALS

Communities and organisations are capable of recovering from an emergency in an effective and efficient manner.

Local communities work together to reduce the risk of hazards.

RECOVERY

REDUCTION

READINESS

RESPONSE

Response agencies prepared to provide a timely, well coordinated and effective response to an emergency.

People and communities provide for their own safety and well-being.

INTRODUCTIO

To meet this Resilience Vision, Hawke's Bay will need to achieve the following outcomes:

| Outcome | Goal |
| --- | --- |
| Everyone understands the risks they face and accepts responsibility for reducing risk and being prepared. | Reduction |
| Sound integrated planning, which has resulted in risks being reduced to acceptable levels. | |
| A strong community spirit, which helps people to pull together to ensure their safety. | Readiness |
| Businesses and response organisations with well-rehearsed business continuity plans that safeguard both people and business income. | |
| Community and response organisations with the capability to deal with unexpected events. | |
| Community recognises the critical role Civil Defence Emergency Management plays in ensuring their safety and prosperity. | |
| People know what to do and to help each other in the event of an emergency. | Response |
| A rapid, well coordinated and effective response to an emergency. | |
| Organisations and agencies are aware and prepared for the role they may play in recovery. | Recovery |
| A responsive, well coordinated and efficient recovery from an emergency. | |

Achieving the CDEM Group's vision also contributes to the high level community outcomes identified as part of Hawke's Bay councils' Long Term Plans in 2012. These are:

- A strong, prosperous, and growing economy
- Communities that value and promote their unique culture and heritage
- Strong regional leadership and a sense of belonging
- Supportive, caring and inclusive communities
- Safe and secure communities
- An environment that is appreciated, protected, and sustained for future generations.

Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group I Te Rākau Whakamarumaru ki Te

**Item 7**

**Attachment 1**

INTRODUCTIO

## PURPOSE OF THE PLAN

The Group Plan is a strategic document that outlines our vision and goals for CDEM, how we will achieve them; and how we will monitor the outcomes sought by these goals.

The Plan provides for effective risk reduction, readiness, response and recovery (4Rs) through:

- Defining the vision, goals, principles and objectives for providing comprehensive CDEM within the Hawke's Bay CDEM group

- Strengthening the relationships between all the agencies involved in CDEM

- Cooperative planning and actions between the various agencies and the Hawke's Bay community.

The Group Plan is supported by a number of processes, procedures, work plans and other documents which provide the detail to our CDEM partners and communities about how and why we operate. All documents referenced in this Plan are periodically reviewed or will be developed by the Group Office and key partners as provided by the Group Work Plan.

## COMPREHENSIVE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Comprehensive emergency management in Hawke's Bay is defined as "achieving our vision and goals by undertaking activities or actions cooperatively with our stakeholders that consider all hazards and risks facing the community, within the framework of the 4Rs".

**Item 7**

**Attachment 1**

10    Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group I Te Rākau Whakamarumaru ki Te

INTRODUCTIO

## OUR VISION: A RESILIENT HAWKE'S BAY COMMUNITY

**STRATEGIC GOALS**
Where we want to go

**ACTIVITIES**
How we will get there



REDUCTION

RECOVERY

READINESS

RESPONSE

- Governance, Management &
- Risk Reduction
- Building & Maintaining
- Volunteer
- Community Engagement &
- Public Information Management
- Welfare
- Emergency
- Recovery Operations
- Lifelines
- Monitoring and

Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group I Te Rākau Whakamarumaru ki Te                    11

INTRODUCTIO

## HAWKE'S BAY PLANNING FRAMEWORK AND RELATIONSHIP TO THE NATIONAL CDEM STRATEGY AND PLAN

The Group Plan is consistent with the National CDEM Strategy (2007) and National CDEM Plan (2006) and ensures Hawke's Bay's operational arrangements link to national planning

arrangements for managing nationally/ regionally significant hazards and risks along with national/ regional emergencies. The plan takes into account other guidelines, codes, regulations and technical standards issued by the Director of Civil Defence Emergency Management.

>

12    Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group I Te Rākau Whakamarumaru ki Te

INTRODUCTIO

**Strategic Plan**
Developed and
impemented by

*Guides development of strategy*

**Strategic Plan**
**5 year life, 10 year focus**
Developed and implemented
by HB CDEM Group and

*Informs ach other*

*Guides strategy and activity around Civil Defence*

Objectives and activities
developed and
implemented by HBCDEM

Agencies,
NGOs

Objectives and activities
developed and
implemented by local

INTRODUCTIO

## DEVELOPMENT PROCESS AND CONSULTATION

This Group Plan was developed from the first Group Plan, completed in 2005. The following process was used to ensure all interested parties have participated in its development:

- The development of this plan started in late 2011.
- Draft content for sections was developed by working parties made up of representatives from the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group and partners with particular knowledge and experience in the field. They reviewed current practice for each section, what we were doing well, the gaps and opportunities (see Appendix 3 for current practice review). This guided the development of objectives.

- During 2012/13 all Hawke's Bay CDEM partners were invited to participate in workshops focused on key elements of the plan. The facilitated workshops enabled participants to test the draft sections, identify gaps and add value to the plan. At key points, governance guidance and input was provided by the Hawke's Bay CDEM Joint Committee and Coordinating Executive Group.
- In late 2013, the public were given an opportunity to provide input into the plan.
- The plan was publically notified on 9th November 2013 and subsequent submissions were heard and decided upon by the Joint Committee on 11th April 2014.

INTRODUCTIO

# RISK PROFILE

It is important to have a good understanding of the Hawke's Bay's community and environment so we can develop a risk profile which is the context this Group Plan operates within.

This section identifies the hazards that require Hawke's Bay CDEM Group's management. It assesses the risk and assigns a level of priority to each. This guides the allocation of resources and effort for the treatment of risk across the four phases of civil defence emergency management: Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery.

This section summarises Hawke's Bay's risk profile which replaces a review of the profile contained in the first Group Plan, and references the regional profile in Hawke's Bay Regional Council's Long Term Plan.

## SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

### Population

Approximately 155,300 people live in Hawke's Bay. This is projected to increase by only 2% over the next decade but with an increasing proportion of Maori, which is currently 24% of the population.

The age profile of the population is 0-14 years (22% of the population), 15-39 years (29%), 40-64 years (33%) and 65+ years (16%). Over the next decade the 65+ share is projected to increase to 21%.

### Income

Hawke's Bay is in the lower quartile for national salaries. Pockets of extreme social and economic disadvantage are found throughout the region.

### Preparation for an Emergency

Research indicates 56% of residents in Hawke's Bay have an emergency plan for their household, but food, water and cooking preparedness levels are higher. While individual readiness is good, there are variable levels of community and organisational readiness across the region.

**Risk implications for Hawke's Bay's SOCIAL environment include:**

• The high number of young and elderly, and below-average family incomes indicate that large sections of the community may have difficulty providing for their own safety. Welfare services will be necessary following any major emergency.

• Hawke's Bay's aging population will require attention following the impact of some hazards, such as those requiring evacuation and welfare needs.

• With a known history of hazards such as the 1931 earthquake and on-going risks, there could be significant numbers of people and financial capital leaving the region after a major disaster.

• Variable levels of community and organisational preparedness means higher levels of welfare may be required in some areas, while ensuring other areas are not overlooked during a prolonged response.

• Hawke's Bay has significant numbers of tourists who are unfamiliar with the local natural hazard environment.

INTRODUCTIO

## NATURAL ENVIRONMENT

Hawke's Bay's total land area of 12,770km² accounts for 5% of New Zealand's land area.

### Geology

Hawke's Bay is located on a zone of high deformation on the Australian Plate, about 150km west of the Hikurangi Trough, which marks the subduction boundary between the Pacific and Australian Plates. This means the region has many fault lines and earthquakes. The region can also be impacted by ash fall, being downwind from major active volcanic zones.

Weathered, faulted rocks and comparatively shallow soils on short, steep catchments means the region has frequent landslides triggered by rainfall and earthquakes.

Hawke's Bay contains 24 river catchments comprising 7 major rivers (the Wairoa, Mohaka, Esk, Tutaekuri, Ngaruroro, Tukituki and Waipawa) with flat river plains (Heretaunga, Ruataniwha and Takapau) containing rich alluvial soils which support the important primary production sector. Large aquifer systems under the Heretaunga/ Ruataniwha Plains and smaller systems in other parts of the region provide relatively clean groundwater.

### Weather

The Hawke's Bay climate is generally dry and temperate. The region has one of the highest percentage variations in rainfall across New Zealand – there are periods of both drought and major rainfall, and there is much higher rainfall in the mountain ranges compared to coastal areas. Cyclonic storms periodically impact the region. Climate change predictions for Hawke's Bay indicate increased variability in our climate. This means we will have a drier climate, particularly in the north, but an increase in extreme events such as storms and intense rainfall.

### Coastal Areas

Hawke's Bay faces the Pacific Ocean with 353km of coastline. The various coastal landscapes include low-lying sandy or gravel beaches, steep cliffs, lagoons and sandy beaches. Consequently there are existing and potential erosion and inundation hazards for some coastal communities and landowners. The Hikurangi Trough runs parallel to our coastline about 150km away and has been a source of local tsunami over the centuries.

### Risk implications for Hawke's Bay's NATURAL environment include:

- A high number of natural hazards (see list on page 20) which can affect populations, infrastructure and economic prosperity.

- The majority of Hawke's Bay people live on flood plains where, despite extensive flood control works, flooding is still a significant risk.

- Landslides pose an on-going risk to transportation links, property and long term economic productivity.

- Coastal areas require greater controls on development to minimise people's exposure to the natural hazards of storms, inundation and erosion and potential sea level rise.

- The impacts of climate change mean an increased variability in events over a shorter time – droughts to storms. This may increase the overall risk to the community and may test the ability of people to be well-prepared, and increase risks to economic productivity.

- There are significant areas of existing development located on potentially liquefiable soils and liquefaction has the potential to affect new urban development.

INTRODUCTIO

## BUILT ENVIRONMENT

The main cities are Napier and Hastings, and the main towns are Wairoa, Havelock North, Waipawa and Waipukurau. There are numerous small country and coastal communities. The Napier- Hastings urban area is the fifth largest in the country with a population of over 131,000. Napier is recognised as architecturally important, being acknowledged as one of the best-preserved Art Deco cities internationally.

### Residential Dwellings

Household dwellings in Hawke's Bay are estimated at 61,340 (2012). Home ownership is around 53% of private occupied dwellings, with or without a mortgage.

### Infrastructure

Hawke's Bay has a well established infrastructure network which support communities and commercial/ industrial activity.

The road network totals 4,583km. There are 511km (11%) of state highways, and the remaining 4,072 km are District and City Council roads of which approximately 36% are unsealed.

Key transportation hubs and links are Hawke's Bay Airport in Napier, Port of Napier (5th largest in New Zealand), and the Palmerston North – Napier railway line.

Energy networks are: electricity (mostly from Wairakei to Redclyffe, via Whirinaki); natural gas (from Taranaki via Manawatu in a single pipeline), and oil (supply terminals in Napier from Whangarei via the port).

Telecommunication networks rely on a public switched telephone network which now includes high-speed broadband, satellite services, cellular networks, paging, data and other dispatch systems such as Fleetlink and VHF landmobile.

Public drinking water and wastewater networks are operated by district and city councils mainly in urban areas and some small rural communities.

Many rural settlements are not fully reticulated and rely on electric/ diesel powered water pumps and domestic waste water systems or older septic tanks.

### Risk implications for Hawke's Bay's BUILT environment include:

- Smaller, relatively isolated communities (Wairoa, Mahia, Frasertown, Nuhaka, Tuai, Waimarama and Porangahau) particularly coastal communities with single road access

- Infrastructure networks, especially transportation structures such as roads, bridges and wharves, are vulnerable to a range of hazards.

- Major transportation hubs (port and airport) are close to each other and located in the coastal environment increasing their likelihood of being similarly impacted by the same event, especially storm or coastal events.

- Vulnerable road transport links are essential to enable access for other infrastructure networks to undertake repair and maintenance.

- Supply of both electric power and gas to Hawke's Bay is limited by the capacity of single main transmission routes. Alternative supply routes for electricity could maintain only a very restricted supply. Gas/ electricity supplies to the region may also be disrupted by events outside of the area.

- Earthquake prone buildings have been identified within the region's main cities & towns and although residential dwellings are considered a low risk, damage may be widespread requiring re-housing.

- Regional infrastructure is at risk from the associated perils of earthquakes, including liquefaction, lateral spread, the rupture of surface and buried faults.

- The two major population centres in Hawke's Bay are close together and could be impacted by the same event.

INTRODUCTIO

## ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

### Business & Employment

Hawke's Bay contributes an estimated 3.4% of the total national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) with Services sector 67%, manufacturing sector 16% and primary production sector 17%.

There is a high use of agrichemicals and other hazardous substances, associated with the extensive horticultural production, food-processing industries and cool stores in Hawke's Bay.

In September 2011, the unemployment rate in Hawke's Bay stood at 6.7% (compared to the national rate of 6.4%).

### Visitor Industry

There is a strong tourism focus, with total visitor numbers estimated at 1.1 million. Many visitors are staying with Hawke's Bay family and friends, with a smaller proportion in tourist accommodation and cruise ships. The cruise ship sector using the port is increasing.

### Risk implications for Hawke's Bay's ECONOMIC environment include:

- The majority of business and industry is built on flood plains in the area, and is close to the coast.
- The accidental release of any hazardous substances, either on site or during transportation poses a risk to transportation, human health and the economy.
- Population swells during summer months with visitors from other regions and tourists from overseas. This increases the potential need
for welfare and evacuation with any event occurring between October and April.
- As a primary production focused economy Hawke's Bay depends on transportation links for distribution.
- Food processing industries are energy dependant.

INTRODUCTIO

## HAZARDS

A hazard is something that may cause or aggravate an emergency, creating risks to people, property or the environment. Hazards can be natural, technological or biological. Natural hazards
occur when environmental processes such as earthquakes, flooding, landslides or tsunami interact with a community. Technological hazards result from human activities, such as infrastructure failure, fire or hazardous substance spills. An assessment of probability and impacts of major Hawke's Bay Hazards was carried out with Civil Defence Emergency Management partners in June 2012. Table 1 identifies the Top 10 hazards
in Hawke's Bay that require management by the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group.

## RISK ASSESSMENT & ANALYSIS

Risk is the chance of an emergency happening that will have an impact on either the community or the environment. In general terms, risk is measured by reviewing the consequences and likelihood of an event.

Risk = Likelihood x Consequences

Hawke's Bay's risks were assessed based on the likelihood of a hazard occurring and its
likely consequences. This assessment process is summarised in this section.

Table 2 records the results of the risk analysis conducted to complete this plan. It lists Hawke's Bay's hazards with the assessed likelihood and consequences. The final column states the risk rating given to each hazard based on this assessment.

### TABLE 1: Top 10 hazards in Hawke's Bay

| # | Hazards |
|---|---------|
| 1 | Earthquake |
| 2 | Tsunami |
| 3 | Volcanic (ashfall) |
| 4 | Human Pandemic |
| 5 | Flood/Storm Event |
| 6 | Animal Epidemic, Plant & Animal Pests |
| 7 | Urban Fire (Multiple) |
| 8 | Lifeline Failure |
| 9 | Rural Fire |
| 10 | Hazardous Substances Event |

INTRODUCTIO

**Item 7**

**Attachment 1**

## HAWKE'S BAY HAZARDS

INTRODUCTIO

**TABLE 2:** Hazard and Risks Summary of Analysis, Evaluation and Prioritisation

| Hazard Identification | Risk Analysis | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | **Likelihood** | **Consequence** | **Rating** |
| **Natural** | | | |
| Earthquake MMIX | Rare | Catastrophic | High |
| Tsunami (Large 500 years 5m) | Unlikely | Catastrophic | Very High |
| Volcanic Ash (Heavy 5-100mm) | Unlikely | Major | High |
| Earthquake MMVIII | Unlikely | Catastrophic | Very High |
| Flood (Large >1 in 100 AEP) | Possible | Major | High |
| Tsunami (Moderate 100 years, 1-2 m) | Possible | Major | High |
| Earthquake MMVII | Likely | Major | Very High |
| Volcanic Ash (Light 1-5mm) | Possible | Major | High |
| Flood (Average) | Almost Certain | Moderate | Very High |
| Rural Fire | Likely | Moderate | High |
| Earthquake MMVI | Almost Certain | Moderate | Very High |
| Coastal Inundation | Almost Certain | Minor | High |
| Drought | Almost Certain | Minor | High |
| Landslide (Very Large) | Rare | Major | Moderate |
| Coastal erosion | Almost Certain | Minor | High |
| Landslide (Large) | Likely | Moderate | High |
| Strong Wind | Almost Certain | Moderate | Very High |
| Extreme Temperature | Unlikely | Moderate | Moderate |
| Volcanic Ash (Trace <1mm) | Likely | Minor | Moderate |
| Snow | Possible | Minor | Moderate |
| Hail | Possible | Minor | Moderate |
| Frost | Almost Certain | Minor | High |
| Landslide (Small) | Almost Certain | Minor | High |
| **Technological** | | | |
| Urban Fire (Multiple) | Possible | Moderate | Moderate |
| Lifeline failure Electric | Likely | Moderate | High |
| Lifeline failure Water | Possible | Major | High |
| Hazardous substances event | Almost Certain | Minor | High |
| Pollution over unconfined aquifer | Possible | Moderate | Moderate |
| Lifeline failure Telecommunications | Rare | Major | Moderate |
| Civil Unrest/Terrorism | Unlikely | Minor | Low |
| Major transport accident Marine | Possible | Major | High |
| Lifeline failure Gas | Unlikely | Moderate | Moderate |
| Lifeline failure Waste Water & Sewage | Likely | Moderate | High |
| Major transport accident Air | Unlikely | Moderate | Moderate |
| Dam Failure | Rare | Minor | Very Low |
| Major transport accident Road/Rail | Possible | Minor | Moderate |
| **Biological** | | | |
| Human Pandemic | Likely | Major | Very High |
| Animal Epidemic, Plant & Animal Pests | Likely | Major | Very High |

INTRODUCTIO

## RISK EVALUATION

The risk analysis generates a 'Risk Rating' to prioritise hazards. A higher priority means that more resources should be assigned to the management of that hazard. Prioritisation is based on an analysis of both consequence and likelihood. Therefore, a major hazard that is very unlikely may be a lower priority than a frequently occurring minor hazard. The next stage in risk analysis is to take the information gathered in Table 2 and assess the 'Risk Rating' against being able to manage the risk effectively. It summarises three factors:

• Seriousness: the relative consequences in terms of human life and well-being, the built environment, economic damage and the natural environment.

• Manageability: the degree of difficulty in managing the hazard, and the degree of effort being applied across the 4Rs.

• Growth: the potential of the hazard risk to increase over time, such as the impacts of climate change or rising sea levels, or growth of community.

This evaluation process produces a prioritisation of risk with values assigned to each hazard which can be seen in Appendix 2. These have been used to determine the Top 10 hazards for Hawke's Bay in Table 1. Table 3 shows these values in a risk matrix supporting likelihood against consequences of the different hazard events based on the CDEM 'SMG' model and the Australia/New Zealand Risk Management Standard 31000/20094.

**TABLE 3:** Simple likelihood versus consequence risk matrix showing risk evaluation scores in brackets for various hazards.

| | | LIKELIHOOD | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | **Rare** | **Unlikely** | **Possible** | **Likely** | **Almost Certain** |
| **IMPACT** | **Catastrophic** | Earthquake MMIX **(15.8)** | Tsumani Large **(14.3)** Earthquake MMVIII **(13.5)** | | | |
| | **Major** | Landslide Very Large **(7.8)** | Volcanic Ash Heavy **(14.3)** | Flood Large **(13.3)** Tsunami Moderate **(13.1)** Volcanic Ash Light **(10.4)** | Human Pandemic **(13.7)** Animal Epidemic, Plant & Pests **(11.8)** Earthquake MMVII **(11.0)** | |
| | **Moderate** | | Extreme Temperature **(6.3)** | Urban Fire Multiple **(10.6)** Pollution Over Unconfined Aquifer **(9.3)** | Rural Fire **(9.6)** Landslide Large **(7.3)** Lifeline Failure **(10.6)** | Flood Average **(10.1)** Earthquake MMVI **(8.4)** Strong Wind **(7.1)** |
| | **Minor** | Dam Failure **(6.2)** | Civil Unrest / Terrorism **(7.8)** | Major Transport Accident Road/ Rail **(6.1)** Snow **(6.1)** Hail **(5.8)** Frost **(4.6)** | Volcano Trace **(6.1)** | Hazardous Substance Event **(9.3)** Coastal inundation **(7.8)** Drought **(7.8)** Coastal Erosion **(7.3)** Landslide Small **(4.3)** |
| | **Insignificant** | | | | | |

**Item 7**

**Attachment 1**

**PART TWO**

# STRATEGY

# REDUCTION

Resilience means individuals and communities understand the risks they face and do what they can to reduce their impacts.

**Item 7**

**Attachment 1**

REDUCTION

## REDUCTION

This section describes how Hawke's Bay will reduce the risks posed by natural, technological and biological hazards.

Reduction is identifying and analysing long-term risks to human life and property from hazards; taking steps to eliminate these risks if practicable; and, if not, reducing the magnitude of the impact of those risks and the likelihood of their occurrence.

### Risk reduction measures include:

- Educating people about hazards so individuals, families and organisations can understand and reduce the risks they face

- Increasing our knowledge of natural hazards through research and investigation

- Incorporating risk reduction measures in land-use planning and development processes

- Incorporating risk reduction measures during preparation and implementation of asset and infrastructure management plans

- Ensuring capital works programmes work toward increasing the **resilience** of critical infrastructure

- Monitoring the long term trends and changes in how communities understand and reduce risk.

- Incorporating reduction of ongoing risk into the Group Recovery Strategy and plans.

## STATUTORY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

The policy framework for strategic risk management in New Zealand is set by a number of statutory and non-statutory instruments. The key legislation is:

**Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002** mandates and requires the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group to identify, assess and manage the region's hazards and risks, and involves many other stakeholders, including central government organisations, emergency services and lifeline utilities, as well as individuals and communities.

**Local Government Act 2002** requires local authorities to prepare Long Term Plans (LTPs) to describe the activities and strategic direction of the local authority over a 10-year period including the management of natural hazards.

**Resource Management Act (RMA) 1991** provides tools for managing natural hazards including provisions in the Regional Policy Statement and District Plans.

**Building Act 2004** provides for building work on land subject to natural hazards and sets building construction standards.

**Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act 1941** makes provision for the conservation of soil resources, the prevention of damage by erosion and to make better provision for the protection of property from damage by floods.

There are also numerous non-statutory instruments such as regional and local growth strategies, and hazard and risk management guidelines and plans.

This section relates directly to Goal Two of the National CDEM Strategy:

**GOAL TWO:** Reducing the risks from hazards to New Zealand.

Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group | Te Rōpū Whakamarumaru ki Te Matau a Māui   25

REDUCTION

## REDUCTION PRINCIPLES

The following principles underpin the reduction activities outlined in the Group Plan:

* A balanced approach to risk reduction that takes into account the hazard risk along with the need for communities to provide for their economic and social development will result in the sustainable reduction of the impacts of hazards in Hawke's Bay

* Prioritisation and coordination of reduction activities will ensure that the best value is achieved for the resources available

* Human life and safety takes precedence over all other risk priorities

* Risks that have the potential to cause severe economic losses, substantial damage to buildings, infrastructure or lifeline utilities have a high priority

* Risks with a high likelihood and high consequence will be given priority

* Hawke's Bay Group members will work together to reduce risk

* Community resilience is improved by providing communities with access to information about the hazards that may affect them so they make informed decisions.

### Reduction Objectives

The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group has agreed the following objectives to guide the work programme development for the term of this plan.

| | |
|---|---|
| **RED1:** | Improve our understanding of hazards in Hawke's Bay and the associated risks and consequences. |
| **RED2:** | Undertake long term strategic reduction of the risks from hazards through collaborative planning with stakeholders. |
| **RED3:** | Communities and individuals are aware of the hazards they face. |
| **RED4:** | Continue to identify, document and share current best practices and identify methods of improving and measuring Hawke's Bay community resilience through hazard reduction. |

Photo: Kirsteen Redshaw

Item 7

Attachment 1

**Item 7**

**Attachment 1**

# READINESS

Resilience means individuals and communities are ready and prepared to react when an event occurs.

READINESS

**Item 7**

**Attachment 1**

## READINESS

This section describes how Hawke's Bay CDEM will work with the community to plan and prepare both individually and collectively for emergencies.

Readiness means Hawke's Bay individuals and organisations develop systems and capability to respond and recover from an emergency before it happens.

......................................................

## POLICY FRAMEWORK

Local authorities and some central government agencies are involved in community development processes which usually aim to improve the overall resilience of a community. This is further enhanced when individuals/families and businesses are prepared for an emergency. Opportunities exist to coordinate community development and CDEM community preparedness planning processes.

This section relates directly to Goals One and Three of the National CDEM Strategy:

> **GOAL ONE:** Increasing Community Awareness, understanding, preparedness and participation in civil defence emergency management
>
> **GOAL THREE:** Enhancing New Zealand's capability to manage civil defence

## READINESS PRINCIPLES

The following principles underpin the readiness activities outlined in the Group Plan:

- A coordinated approach by Hawke's Bay CDEM agencies, with the community development activities conducted by local authorities and other agencies will better provide for individual and community preparedness and therefore improved overall community resilience

- The development of Community Response Plans will be an essential part of increasing community readiness

- The ability of CDEM response and recovery staff and volunteers to work well together across the various organisations is essential to increase the capacity and capability of Hawke's Bay to deal with a CDEM emergency

- Coordinated public education is essential to prepare the Hawke's Bay community – both people and business – to deal with an emergency

- A business community that is prepared before an emergency occurs will significantly increase the resilience of Hawke's Bay.

READINESS

**Item 7**

**Attachment 1**

| Readiness Objectives |
| --- |
| The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group has agreed the following objectives to guide the work programme development for the term of this plan. |

**CDEM Agencies Readiness**

**REA1:** Align all CDEM readiness activities with the hazard risk priorities identified in this Plan.

**REA2:** Ensure CDEM Group members have the capability to respond to and recover from emergencies in their area and promote the need for this capability within emergency services and other partners.

**REA3:** Continue to improve coordinated and integrated emergency management between local authorities and with other CDEM partners.

**REA4:** Enhance the capability and interoperability of the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group through well planned, needs-based professional development.

**Community Readiness**

**REA5:** Improve community preparedness through strong leadership and commitment to CDEM at political and executive levels.

**REA6:** Work with communities to develop Community Response Plans to improve community preparedness.

**REA7:** Improve the level of awareness and preparedness of business to enable them to respond and recover from an emergency as quickly as possible.

**Individual Readiness**

**REA8:** Continue to improve awareness and preparedness through consistent and relevant public education, messages and engagement.

**REA9:** Identify and prioritise vulnerable sections of the Hawke's Bay community and improve their preparedness for an emergency.

**Item 7**

**Attachment 1**

# RESPONSE

Resilience means individuals,
communities and organisations react
and take appropriate action during an
emergency.

RESPONSE

## RESPONSE

Response describes the actions taken immediately before, during, or directly after an emergency
to save lives, protect property and support the ongoing efforts of communities to recover.

The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group's response arrangements are established to ensure that all available resources are effectively applied to emergencies within Hawke's Bay and, where
appropriate, in support of emergencies in other parts of New Zealand.

## POLICY FRAMEWORK

The key legislation in terms of managing the response to an emergency is the CDEM Act 2002. The Act establishes a framework for managing all emergencies, and defines the responsibilities of the CDEM Group and its members during an emergency. However many of the powers under this Act are only brought into force through the formal declaration of a State of Emergency.

The National CDEM plan and a number of Director's Guidelines also contribute to the framework for responding to a civil defence emergency.

**Goal Three:** Enhancing New Zealand's capability to manage civil defence emergencies.

## RESPONSE PRINCIPLES

The following principles underpin the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group's response to an event:

- The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group will lead and coordinate the response to an emergency in accordance with the principles of integrated Emergency Management

- The priorities for response for the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group are those set out in the National CDEM Plan:
  - Preservation of life
  - Prevention of escalation of the emergency
  - Maintenance of law and order
  - Care of sick, injured and provision of welfare services
  - Provision of essential services
  - Preservation of government
  - Asset protection
  - Protection of natural and physical resources
  - Preservation of economic activity

- In the build up or initial response to an emergency, emergency services, welfare agencies and lifeline utilities will respond by activating their own plans and coordinating with the lead agency

- Emergency Services, welfare agencies and lifeline utilities will assess the effects of an event and communicate this information and their actions with the lead agency

- During the response to an emergency, the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group members and partners will collaborate and operate within the governance and management arrangements agreed to in this Plan.

RESPONSE

## Response Objectives

The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group has agreed the following objectives to guide the work programme development for the term of this plan.

| | |
|---|---|
| **RES1:** | Develop levels of activation and their trigger points to guide the transition of the management of an event from an incident to a complex emergency. |
| **RES2:** | Develop response plans in accordance with the hazard risk priorities identified in this Plan and that these are implemented effectively during an emergency. |
| **RES3:** | Develop, maintain and implement appropriate Group Standard Operating Procedures to enable CDEM agencies to effectively respond and recover from the priority hazards identified in this Plan. |
| **RES4:** | Ensure the CDEM Group warning system is relevant and effective for all Group members and partners. |
| **RES5:** | Ensure that the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group maintains and where appropriate practices a coordinated, mass public alerting system. |
| **RES6:** | The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group will provide coordinated support to the response of individual members during a local emergency. |
| **RES7:** | Ensure the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group will be capable of providing support to other CDEM Groups in the country if required. |

34    Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group I Te Rākau Whakamarumaru ki Te Matau a Māui

**Item 7**

**Attachment 1**

# RECOVERY

Resilience means individuals and communities get back to ~~normal~~ acceptable quality of life as soon as possible.

RECOVERY

## RECOVERY

Recovery is defined as the coordinated efforts and processes to re-establish the an appropriate community's normal quality of life while taking the opportunity to meet future community needs and reducing the risk of exposure to future hazards. The recovery phase can take an extended period of time and utilise significant financial, material and human resources.

Effective risk mitigation during the reduction, readiness and response phases, along with effective recovery planning will increase the speed at which Hawke's Bay communities can resume business as usual and normal daily activitiesre-establish an acceptable quality of life.

The special relationship that the Crown and local government have with Tangata Whenua will be recognised during recovery planning.

The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group's recovery arrangements are established to ensure that all available resources are effectively applied to emergencies within Hawke's Bay, and where appropriate in support of the rest of New Zealand.

## POLICY FRAMEWORK

The CDEM Act 2002 and National CDEM Plan establish a broad framework for managing recovery from an emergency. Depending upon the scale of recovery operations the LGA 2002 is

likely to be a key piece of legislation in this process. Recovery management should be guided by a CDEM Group Recovery Plan, and the Director's Guideline for Recovery Management provides the framework for developing this.

The National CDEM plan and a number of other Directors Guidelines also contribute to the framework for recovery operations.

As the bulk of recovery operations occur after the emergency response, the existing functions of local government across a number of other enactments also needs to be considered. These include:

- The LGA 2002 and associated asset management plans
- The RMA 1991
- The Building Act 2004
- The Health Act 1956.

This section relates directly to Goal Four of the National CDEM Strategy:

**Goal Four:** Enhancing New Zealand's capability to recover from civil defence emergencies.

RECOVERY

**Item 7**

**Attachment 1**

## RECOVERY PRINCIPLES

The following principles underpin the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group's approach to strategic recovery planning and recovery operations after an event:

- Effort in developing recovery capability and planning before an event will benefit the recovery post event.

- By seeking to minimise the consequences of an event as quickly as possible the CDEM Group will improve the ability of Hawke's Bay to recover from an event

- Comprehensive community recovery is facilitated by recovery operations that address the emotional, social and economic wellbeing of individuals and communities

- The CDEM Group's support of the Hawke's Bay Welfare Coordination and the Hawke's Bay Engineering Lifelines Groups will increase the community's ability to quickly and effectively recover from an event

- Standardisation (as appropriate) of individual local recovery operations across the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group will provide for more effective recovery from an event

- During the recovery from an event, consideration of future exposure to hazards and associated risks will promote the long term community sustainability

- Recovery is best embedded within Reduction and Readiness and needs to occur alongside the Response

- Effective communication with all stakeholders will enhance the recovery process

- To be effective, recovery planning needs to commence as soon as possible after the response is underway.

- Prioritising the transition from formal recovery to 'business-as-usual' activities in recovery planning will provide for a quick recovery from an event

- Recognising and providing for the political contribution to the recovery process will ensure recovery actions are targeted and relevant to local communities

- During local emergencies, recovery operations are best lead by the local authority with the support of the CDEM Group if required

- Where recovery operations are necessary across two or more local authorities, the CDEM Group is best positioned to coordinate and, if necessary, prioritise resourcing

- Consideration of the heritage and culture of Hawke's Bay during the recovery to an emergency will support the long term recovery of the community.

| Recovery Objectives | |
|---|---|
| The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group has agreed the following objectives to guide the work programme development for strategic recovery planning for the term of this plan. | |
| **REC1:** | Recovery capability and capacity will be strengthened across Hawke's Bay CDEM members and partners. |
| **REC2:** | Resources and funding for the recovery will be allocated in a timely manner. |
| **REC3:** | Recovery is integrated into the other 3Rs of Reduction, Readiness and Response. |
| **REC4:** | Recovery planning and operations are integrated across the social, economic, natural and built environments. |

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
**Item 7**

**PART THREE**

ACTIVITIES

**Attachment 1**

# GOVERNANCE & MANAGEMENT

Resilience means governance that represents local communities while being united under a common vision.

## GOVERNANCE & MANAGEMENT

This section clarifies governance and management arrangements to ensure the collective understanding of roles and responsibilities, and to encourage cooperative action between CDEM Group members and Partners with CDEM Group responsibilities.

Taking a comprehensive approach to emergency management requires that CDEM activities must encompass the 4Rs. Under the CDEM Act 2002 the governance and management of CDEM activities is vested with local government through the Joint Committee and Coordinating Executive Group (CEG).

The Joint Committee and CEG are therefore primarily responsible for overseeing the governance and management of CDEM activities during reduction, readiness and recovery. Both the Joint Committee and the CEG are responsible for ensuring that the Group is prepared and capable of responding to and recovering from an emergency. However primary responsibility for managing and implementing the response to an emergency is placed with the Group and local controllers. Controllers are appointed by the Joint Committee.

## PRINCIPLES

These define how the Group will operate and work together to achieve CDEM outcomes for the Hawke's Bay community:

- All Group members will actively participate in CDEM activities
- Comprehensive CDEM in Hawke's Bay will be successfully delivered through local knowledge and delivery with region wide coordination
- The Group members will cooperate to achieve interoperability across organisations to facilitate the support of each other across the 4Rs
- The Group will support its individual members in achieving comprehensive CDEM outcomes appropriate to their communities.

## GROUP STRUCTURE AND MEMBERSHIP

Each of the following local authorities is a member of the Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group:

- Central Hawke's Bay District Council
- Hastings District Council
- Hawke's Bay Regional Council
- Napier City Council
- Wairoa District Council.

Partners such as the emergency services, central government agencies and NGOs have a key role in providing input and guidance for achieving the vision and objectives set by the Joint Committee.

Key partners such as the emergency services, central government agencies, non-governmental welfare organisations and lifeline utility operators also have a vital part to play in the response and recovery to an emergency or disaster.

### CDEM Group Structure

## JOINT COMMITTEE

### Membership

The Joint Committee is made up of the Chair of the Regional Council and Mayor (or their representative who has delegated authority and is also an elected member) from each of the territorial local authorities.

| Member | Representative |
|---|---|
| Hastings District Council | Mayor |
| Napier City Council | Mayor |
| Wairoa District Council | Mayor |
| Central Hawke's Bay District Council | Mayor |
| Hawke's Bay Regional Council | Chair |

### Meeting Arrangements

Meeting arrangements for the Joint Committee are set out in the Terms of Reference for the HB CDEM Group. These will be reviewed at the beginning of each electoral cycle or as agreed by the Joint Committee.

The CDEM Group shall hold all meetings at such frequency, times and place(s) as agreed for the performance of the functions, duties and powers delegated under the Terms of Reference. However there will be at least two meetings per year.



Governed by:
**Joint Committee**

Managed by:
**Coordinating Executive Group**

Service coordinated by:
**Group Emergency Management Office**
Regional level

Service delivered by:
**Local Authorities**

*Supported by:*
*Sub-committes and key partners*
- *Welfare Coordination Group (WCG)*
- *Hawke's Bay Engineering Lifelines Group*
- *Emergency Services Coordinating*

*Supported by:*
- *Emergency services*
- *Volunteer groups*
- *Communities*
- *Public utilities*

Civil Defence Emergency Management Group I Te Rākau Whakamarumaru ki Te          43

ACTIVITIE

ACTIVITIES

**Item 7**

**Attachment 1**

## Responsibilities

The functions, powers and duties of the CDEM Group are specified in the Act (s16, 17, 18). To assist the CDEM Group meet the requirements of the Act, the Group has adopted the following objectives:

- Ensure that hazards are assessed (as defined in the Act) and the consequential risks are identified and considered
- Ensure there is an effective and efficient region- wide civil defence emergency management capability to respond to and recover from emergencies (as defined in the Act)
- Facilitate effective and efficient emergency management through partnership and co-ordination amongst the organisations represented on the Co-ordinating Executive Group and the utility organisations that operate within the region
- Promote appropriate mitigation of the risks
- Appoint Group and Local controllers and Recovery Managers.

## COORDINATING EXECUTIVE GROUP (CEG)

### Membership

The membership consists of statutory and co-opted members. Members can be co-opted on as necessary by the CDEM Group.

Voting rights – all members have voting rights unless a conflict of interest is declared.

Sub Committees can be set up to support CEG where a need has been determined. Currently there are two groups:

- Welfare Coordination Group (WCG)
- Hawke's Bay Engineering Lifelines Group.

### Responsibilities

The functions, powers and duties of the CEG are specified in the Act (s20) and the Terms of Reference for the HB CEG.

### Meeting Arrangements

Meeting arrangements for CEG are set out in the Terms of Reference for HB CEG.

| Member / Member Type | | Representative |
|---|---|---|
| Central Hawke's Bay District Council | Statutory | Chief Executive Officer |
| Fire Service Eastern Region | Statutory | Regional Commander |
| Hastings District Council | Statutory | Chief Executive Officer |
| Hawke's Bay District Health Board | Statutory | Chief Executive Officer |
| Hawke's Bay Regional Council | Statutory | Chief Executive Officer |
| Napier City Council | Statutory | Chief Executive Officer |
| Police Eastern District | Statutory | Hawke's Bay Police Commander |
| St John Ambulance | Co-opted | District Operations Manager |
| Wairoa District Council | Statutory | Chief Executive Officer |
| CDEM Group | Co-opted | Group Controllers (less the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group Manager if appointed as a Group Controller) |
| Group Recovery Manager | Co-opted | |
| Welfare Coordination Group | Co-opted | Chair |
| Medical Officer of Health | Co-opted | |
| Hawke's Bay Engineering Lifeline Group | Co-opted | Chair |

Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group I Te Rākau Whakamarumaru ki Te            45

ACTIVITIE

## GROUP EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT OFFICE (GEMO)

The GEMO is located at 311 Lyndon Road Hastings and is administered by a Group Manager and their support staff based either at this office or in Emergency Operations Centres (EOC) in each of the local authorities.

## Management Arrangements and Structure

The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group will shape the management and structure of the Group Office to achieve comprehensive and coordinated emergency management outcomes. The structure of the Group will reflect geographical and social needs to provide for an appropriate level of local response.

## Functions of the Group Office

- Advice and technical support to the CEG and the CDEM Group
- Project coordination and management, including the ongoing development, implementation, monitoring and review of the CDEM Group Plan and supporting documentation
- Coordination of regional CDEM policy and implementation
- Management of contracts entered into on behalf of the CDEM Group or CEG
- External liaison with the CDEM sector
- Maintaining the Group ECC
- Assisting with recovery operations on behalf of the CDEM Group
- Monitoring and responding to, the adverse effects of emergencies on behalf of the CDEM Group and disseminating warnings
- Representing the CDEM Group on national bodies and projects
- Preparation in consultation with CEG, of the annual report of the CDEM Group's activities, budget and performance to the CDEM Group for adoption

- Coordination of the integrated professional development of key personnel for CDEM
- Providing monitoring and evaluation reports on the capability of the Group and its members to the Joint Committee and CEG.

## DELEGATED AUTHORITIES, FUNCTIONS AND POWERS

### Authority to Declare a State of Emergency or give Notice of a Transitional Period

Pursuant to Section 2568 of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group has delegated the power to declare or extend a state of local emergency or Transitional Period within Hawke's Bay as follows:

- The Chairman of the Regional Council and Mayors are delegated authority to declare for any ward or district within the Group area
- Elected members of the city and district councils are delegated authority to declare for their city/ district or any ward within their city/ district.

The CDEM Group requires that a declaration of a state of local emergency or Transitional Period in any one city/ district or ward be made by the following list in hierarchal order. If the first person on the list is unavailable or unable to be contacted, then the second person on the list is able to make the declaration, and so on:

1. The Mayor of the affected district or city council
2. The Chairman of the Hawke's Bay Regional Council
3. An elected member of the affected district or city council
4. Another Mayor from within the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group
5. A HBRC elected representative for that district, city or ward.

The CDEM Group requires that a declaration of a state of local emergency or Transitional Period in more than one council be made by the following list in hierarchal order. If the first person on the

46    Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group I Te Rākau Whakamarumaru ki Te

ACTIVITIE

list is unavailable or unable to be contacted, then the second person on the list is able to make the declaration, and so on:

1. The Chairman of the Hawke's Bay Regional Council
2. A Mayor of one of the district or city councils affected
3. Any other Mayor.

In the event of a local state of emergency being declared, the CDEM Group is able, pursuant to section 18(1) of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act, to delegate any of its functions to members of the CDEM Group, the Group Controller, or any other person. Refer to Appendix 5 for the list of key appointments.

As provided for by the Act, the CDEM Group retains the right to remove or replace a Controller or Recovery Manager or any person appointed as alternate Controller or Recovery Manager.

## COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WITH OTHER CDEM GROUPS

The CDEM Group will provide support and assistance when requested by NCMC and other CDEM Groups with respect to their civil defence emergency management functions. This will include, but not necessarily be limited to:

- Assistance in the event of an emergency in their area
- Sharing relevant hazards information and planning
- Mechanisms to help develop a common understanding and approach to civil defence and emergency management, including the development and implementation of CDEM Group Plans
- Seeking and promoting mutual operational arrangements such as training opportunities and standard operating procedures.

## FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS

### Administrating Authority

In accordance with section 23 of the CDEM Act 2001, the Hawke's Bay Regional Council is the Administering Authority for the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group.

Unless otherwise agreed, section 24 of the Act requires that the funding of the Group be split equally between its members. With the agreement of the CDEM Group, the Hawke's Bay Regional Council has established a targeted rate for each property in Hawke's Bay to collectively fund the activities of the CDEM Group. The work programme for the CDEM Group will be funded from this targeted rate.

As the Administrating Authority the Hawke's Bay Regional Council is responsible for the following:

- The employment of Group Office staff
- The provision of related services to the Group Office
- The provision of hazard research and advice to the CDEM Group
- The collection of the CDEM target rate from the region's ratepayers and its administration.

ACTIVITIE

### Emergency Expenditure

All CDEM related expenditure during an emergency is incurred by the territorial authority in which the expenditure occurs. Certain expenditure can then be claimed from central government, such as welfare related expenditure.

During an emergency, controllers who are council employees may use the delegations that they hold for their local authority. However there may be occasions where controllers are not council

employees or have been deployed from other local authorities. Financial delegations are therefore required to cover this situation and provide for an effective response to an emergency.

The following financial delegations shall apply for persons appointed to the position of group or local controller, where appropriate local authority

delegations have not been approved previously for the area concerned:

**Local Controllers:** Within the area they are local controller for, any one item of expenditure of up to $100,000.

**Group Controllers:** Any one item of expenditure of up to $100,000.

### Relief Fund

The CDEM Group will establish a charitable trust called the Hawke's Bay Disaster Relief Fund. The Joint Committee of the CDEM Group will be trustees of this account. A designated individual who will be accountable for its operation to the Recovery Manager will administer the fund during an emergency.

The fund will operate as the single focus for the collection of donations of money made to assist people affected by any civil defence emergency that may happen in Hawke's Bay.

### Recovery Funding

Recovery will be funded through individual local authorities as part of business as usual activities.

### WORK PROGRAMME

The 5 year work programme is a set of tasks which once achieved will bring us closer to realising our vision of a 'Resilient Hawke's Bay'. The tasks are based on the objectives in this plan and have clear targets and assigned responsibilities.

This programme should be used to drive CDEM resourcing through council LTPs and annual plans. Refer to Monitoring & Evaluation, page 72, for an outline plan.

The work programme will be implemented via an annual business plan which will be recommended by CEG for the approval of the Joint Committee.

ACTIVITIE

# RISK REDUCTION

**Resilience means individuals and organisations acknowledge and confront the risks they face.**

## RISK REDUCTION

The purpose of this section is to identify the actions to be taken in reducing the risks of hazards to the Hawke's Bay community. The Risk Profile for Hawke's Bay, page 14, analysed the risks faced and the consequences of hazards occurring. This comprehensive assessment guides the ongoing development of hazard information while helping to identify the actions to be taken to avoid or mitigate their impacts.

## PRINCIPLES

- A balanced approach to risk reduction that takes into account the hazard risk, along with the need for communities to provide for their economic and social development will sustainably reduce the impacts of hazards in Hawke's Bay

- Prioritising and coordinating reduction activities between councils and research agencies will achieve the best value for the resources available

- Addressing risks that may impact on human life and safety are a priority for the Hawke's Bay community

- Risks that have the potential to cause severe economic losses, substantial damage to buildings, infrastructure or lifeline utilities have a high priority

- Risks assessed as having a high likelihood and high consequence will also be given priority

- Hawke's Bay Group members will work together to reduce risk to the community

- Community resilience is improved by providing communities access to information about the hazards that affect them.

ay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group I Te Rākau Whakamarumaru ki Te        49

**Item 7**

**Attachment 1**

ACTIVITIE

## OBJECTIVES

These objectives will form the basis of the work programme for the term of this plan.

**RR1.** **Commission research projects every year based on Hazard Research Plan and priorities set out in this Plan.**

- Hazard research plan reviewed 5 yearly or following Group Plan review
- Support student research which will further develop understanding of HB hazards.

**RR2.** **Advocate for changes to local authority RMA plans that reflect the integrated approach of the Joint Hazard Strategy.**

- Continue to work with the HB Planner's Forum on risk reduction initiatives in land use planning
- Support Local Authorities and planning professionals in the consideration and inclusion of hazard information and risk analysis as part of their land use planning functions by ensuring satisfaction with quality, format and relevance of hazard information.
- Advocate and support member councils in considering hazard reduction and risk implications in making decisions on land use.

**RR3.** **By the term of the Group Plan, develop a publicly accessible Geographic Information System (GIS) regional web-based 'home of hazards' as a platform for both public and inter- organisational sharing.**

- Group partners to contribute hazard and risk information to a shared database supporting a 'home of hazards'.

**RR4.** **Facilitate activities which ensure the public & professionals are informed of relevant regional hazards and risks including promotion of hazard awareness such as:**

- Support workshops to promote hazard awareness and resilience
- Maintenance of public hazard displays.
- Production of hazard educational material.
- Providing hazard risk assessment support to communities carrying out response planning.

### SUPPORTING INFORMATION
National CDEM Plan, Hawke's Bay Risk Profile

# BUILDING AND MAINTAINING CAPABILITY

*Resilience means organisations actively identify gaps in their capability and resource the development needed to address them.*

## BUILDING AND MAINTAINING CAPABILITY

The Hawke's Bay community has high expectations of the performance of both individuals and organisations involved in CDEM. Due to the nature of emergency management only a small number of full time emergency management staff are employed in the Hawke's Bay Group.

Considerable reliance is therefore placed on other local authority staff, partner agency staff and volunteers. For these people emergency management is only a small part of their job or life. A significant challenge for these people is that the working environment during an emergency is significantly different to that of their 'business as usual' roles.

There is a need to ensure that the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group can show that it is prepared for, and can respond and recover, from emergencies. The community needs to be confident that the CDEM response to an event is professional and competent in order to contribute to the vision of "A Resilient Hawke's Bay".

Training and exercises complement each other to ensure that individuals are competent in the CDEM role they hold, and individuals and organisations are practiced and tested to provide a timely and effective response to an emergency.

Training should be based on the needs of the individual and organisation, and be aligned with the National Competency Framework. This helps to provide for interoperability which is an important outcome of CDEM training.

Exercising is a core part of readiness as it assists in identifying gaps and issues in the emergency response and recovery. Any lessons identified are then integrated into future training and updated plans and procedures to improve this ability to respond to and recover.

ACTIVITIE

**Item 7**

**Attachment 1**

## PRINCIPLES

- To make best use of scarce training resources, training needs to be developed in conjunction with a training needs analysis

- A comprehensive training programme which identifies training objectives, and synchronises individual, organisational and collective training with exercises will, over time, significantly increase the capability and performance of the CDEM Group to respond and recover from an emergency

- Nationally consistent training that links to the competency framework across the CDEM

  Group and partner agencies will help to ensure interoperability and consistency across skill sets and to develop relationships and understanding across organisations.

## SUPPORTING INFORMATION

CDEM Exercises: Director's Guidelines for Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups [DGL 10/09], 2009

Civil Defence Emergency Management Competency Framework: Technical Standard [TS 02/09], 2009

Development Needs Analysis: Best Practice Guideline for Civil Defence Emergency Management Sector [BPG 5/10], 2010

| OBJECTIVES |
| --- |
| These objectives will form the basis of the work programme for the term of this plan. |

| | |
| --- | --- |
| **BMC1.** | **Set capability requirements for the Group.** <br> • Empower and resource the Training Advisory Group. <br> • Align to the national competency framework. <br> • Align to group operational structures. <br> • Develop a capability matrix with targets. |
| **BMC2.** | **Identify capability gaps and needs.** <br> • Identify gaps in the capability matrix. <br> • Complete a material and literature review of existing training resources. <br> • Identify professional development needs both for individuals and positions. <br> • Set priorities for filling capability gaps. |
| **BMC3.** | **Develop and deliver a Group wide training and exercising plan.** <br> • Develop the plan. <br> • Develop a delivery programme. <br> • Deliver and maintain the programme. |
| **BMC4.** | **Monitoring and evaluation** <br> • Review success of objectives. <br> • Identify and implement opportunities for improvement. |
| **BMC5.** | **Resource the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group to manage training records and provide coordination for Group wide training and exercising.** |

# VOLUNTEER MANAGEMENT

*Resilience means providing opportunities for people to serve their community during times of need.*

## VOLUNTEER MANAGEMENT

Due to the infrequent nature of emergencies, the community will depend upon volunteers to assist with the response to and recovery from an emergency. Local authorities and partner agencies do not employ large numbers of full-time professional emergency management staff; therefore volunteer management is the key to successful response and recovery.

In an event, people will volunteer as individuals, collectively or through an existing network (e.g. student association, rugby club and now Facebook). These people play an invaluable role in community resilience, although they are not specifically identified as CDEM volunteers (although they may transition to become registered CDEM volunteers).

Volunteers generally fall into two categories - established volunteers (who are known before an event) and spontaneous volunteers (who volunteer during or after an event).

**Established volunteers** identify themselves before an emergency and are therefore able to be recruited; their skill sets identified, trained and put to work within an operational framework as required. Many of the established volunteers are affiliated with non-governmental groups such as Red Cross, St John's Ambulance, and the Salvation Army, as well as those registered as CD or emergency service volunteers. During an event, established volunteers will usually work in response-focused roles in emergency operations centres, community response teams, and civil defence centres. They may also be involved in other activities across the four R's.

**Spontaneous volunteers** are community minded people who are generally not affiliated to any CDEM or partner organisation nor specifically trained in CDEM skills. Spontaneous volunteers will have a wide range of intrinsic skills and experience and this will require more input in terms of direction, management and leadership. The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group expects to enlist spontaneous volunteers during an emergency and will have a plan in place to make best use of these people in a safe and effective manner.

ACTIVITIE

**Item 7**

**Attachment 1**

### PRINCIPLES

- Established volunteer teams that are well led, motivated and trained will enhance activities across the four R's of emergency management

- Providing for the interoperability of established volunteers to work together across the Group will increase the overall resilience of Hawke's Bay

- It is expected that people will spontaneously volunteer during and after an event. Planning that provides for the flexible deployment of these volunteers will help to ensure the effective and safe use of these volunteers in support of the response/recovery effort.

### SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Volunteer Coordination in CDEM - Director's Guideline for Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups (DGL 15/13)

## OBJECTIVES

These objectives will form the basis of the work programme for the term of this plan.

| | |
|---|---|
| **VM1.** | **Ensure CDEM Volunteers and their training needs are considered as part of the development of the Hawke's Bay CDEM training needs analysis.** |
| **VM2.** | **Create an all encompassing and consistent structure for volunteering in HB CDEM Group.**<br><br>*The structure is to include:*<br>• A description of different categories of volunteers.<br>• Clarification of roles and responsibilities, legal requirements e.g. CDEM, Rural Fire.<br>• Common volunteer resources and identification e.g. cards, equipment, protective clothing.<br>• Responsibility for volunteers including their health and safety.<br>• Employment protection and employer compensation issues.<br>• Adaptability between rural and urban situations. |
| **VM3.** | **Create a Group wide recruitment, training and progression framework which ensures the retention of motivated and valued volunteers.**<br>• Bring together and build on the existing frameworks.<br>• Enhance the framework and fill gaps.<br>• Implement across the Group.<br>• CDEM Group will be responsible for managing and monitoring the framework. |
| **VM4.** | **Develop a flexible coordination plan for spontaneous volunteers.**<br>• Investigate models from other areas.<br>• Refine the best model to fit the Hawke's Bay situation.<br>• Put in place agreements with partner agencies where appropriate. |

Item 7

Attachment 1

# COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT & EDUCATION

Resilience means communities plan their own response to an emergency and react.

## COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT & EDUCATION

Community engagement and education are vital components in making Hawke's Bay a more resilient community. The resilience of Hawke's Bay will, to a large extent, be due to the level of risk reduction and readiness planning achieved before an emergency. However it is a significant challenge to get individuals and communities to prepare for an emergency before one occurs.

**Community engagement**, from a CDEM perspective, is the process whereby people and communities come together to decide how to deal with any emergencies that may affect them. As community resilience is multidisciplinary, it also includes the many activities carried out by local authorities and partner agencies, such as Fire and Police, in their normal roles.

The **Community Response Plan** process is a key element for community engagement in Hawke's Bay. This allows communities to develop their own plans for when an emergency occurs, with the support of CDEM. This provides better information on the risks a community faces and the appropriate response actions for individuals and families. Education programmes should complement the community engagement processes by consistently increasing the awareness and knowledge of our communities. There are also specific education opportunities for informing individuals and communities, for example supporting the school curriculum with 'What's the Plan Stan?' and national programmes such as 'Exercise Shakeout'.

## PRINCIPLES

- A broad approach to the definition of what constitutes a community or community of interest will result in a more resilient Hawke's Bay

- An engaged community will participate actively in managing its risks and creating a community that has the capacity to manage a crisis when it occurs

- An engaged community will be prepared and better able to absorb the effects of an emergency, reducing the impact and aiding recovery

- Coordinated community response plans and education programmes which are relevant, simple and achievable will provide for better community resilience outcomes

- A risk based approach to setting priorities for community response planning across the Group area will result in a more resilient Hawke's Bay

- CDEM Community Response Planning will be accepted if it compliments other related community programmes run by them and other CDEM partners both lo

FOR COMPETITION DETAILS AND HOW TO ENTER
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DO **YOU** HAVE AN EMERGENCY PLAN?

Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group I Te Rākau Whakamarumaru ki Te      55

**ACTIVITIES**

## OBJECTIVES

These objectives will form the basis of the work programme for the term of this plan.

**CEE1.** **Consistent and sustainable community response plans (CRP's) are developed for all priority communities.**

- Development of a CRP delivery programme that identifies relevant communities in Hawke's Bay and prioritise them.
- CRPs that identify and engage with vulnerable communities and groups
- Finalise a CRP template to be applied across the group.
- Develop and resource work programmes across HBCDEM to create and maintain CRP's for priority communities over the term of this plan.
- Develop and implement a programme to provide an increase of businesses with business continuity plans.

**CEE2.** **Increase the uptake of CDEM education in Hawke's Bay schools**

- Investigate ways to make CDEM education more accessible to schools including working in with other agencies, understanding schools' needs and how to support them.
- In conjunction with Hawke's Bay schools, develop a plan for providing for CDEM education.

**CEE3.** **Develop a Public Education Programme that achieves the objectives of this plan**

- Develop a targeted programme that achieves the objectives and priorities of this plan including awareness of HB hazards.
- Include in the programme opportunities to increase visibility through established community events.
- Implement a Public Education Programme that is coordinated across the Group.

**CEE4.** **Community engagement is coordinated and prioritised with other organisations delivering a more efficient and effective result.**

- Identify existing networks and forums which would be beneficial for the CDEM Group to engage with.
- Identify opportunities to work with CDEM partners on Community Engagement and Education initiatives.
- Develop agreed protocols and a programme for coordinated community engagement with CDEM partners.

**CEE5.** **Community engagement is measured to determine effectiveness of strategies and guide future planning.**

- Set indicators to measure long term changes in community resilience.
- Determine sustainable methods and tools to measure these indicators.
- Measure current level of engagement and resilience to establish a baseline.
- Develop and deliver a sustainable monitoring plan which provides an annual picture of community engagement and resilience

### SUPPORTING INFORMATION

- The Guide to the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan 2006: Section 15 Public Education
- Community Engagement in the CDEM Context: Civil Defence Emergency Management Best Practice Guide [BPG 4/10]

56      Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group I Te Rākau Whakamarumaru ki Te

# PUBLIC INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

Resilience means the provision of timely, appropriate and consistent information to communities before, ~~and~~ during and after an emergency.

## PUBLIC INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

Public Information Management (PIM) is vital during and after an emergency to support the management of an event and enable people to understand what is happening and what they need to do to look after themselves, their families and property.

Public information management involves the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information to the public. It transitions from community engagement and education activities in the lead up to an event and during any associated response and recovery.

For PIM to be effective, significant time and resources need to be used for planning before an emergency.

The methods and breadth of public communication have grown over recent years. Recent events have emphasised the increasing importance of social media as a rapid yet demanding form of communicating with the public and other media. To be effective, PIM prior to and during an emergency must embrace these new ways of communicating with the public.

During an event the Hawke's Bay CDEM public information management complements and must be consistent with national messaging.

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## PRINCIPLES

- Efficient and effective PIM during and after an emergency will save lives, positively influence public behaviour and help people provide for their wellbeing and recovery

- The delivery of timely, coordinated and consistent key messages and information during an event will help create strong public confidence in the emergency response

- Effective public information management is best achieved through collaboration between government agencies, local CDEM, emergency services, lifeline utilities, the media, and the public

- Public information managed by experienced professionals with knowledge of media planning, social media, timelines, and messaging will ensure comprehensive and effective public messaging in managing an emergency.

57

ACTIVITIE

| OBJECTIVES |
| --- |
| These objectives will form the basis of the work programme for the term of this plan. |

**PIM1.** **Maintain positive relationships with the media using a Group wide coordinated approach.**

- Further Development and implementation of existing Public Information Handbooks as a Group resource.
- Take a coordinated approach involving CDEM Group members to maintaining relationships with the Hawke's Bay media.
- Development and implementation of the existing NCC Public Information Handbook as a Group resource.

**PIM2.** **Clarify responsibilities to improve coordination and integration within the Group.**

- Formalise a framework for an integrated PIM & Community Engagement and Education structure in Hawke's Bay.
- Take a collaborative approach between Group members to improve consistency and integration in developing the PIM capability.
- Develop a single Hawke's Bay PIM team for activation during significant emergencies.

**PIM3.** **More efficient use of existing resources (personnel, tools, training and guidelines).**

- Develop a pool of consistent Group resources to support PIM teams.
- Establish a standardised mobile resource of contacts, templates and guidelines ('go bag') available to all PIM personnel across the group.
- Complete an annual stock take of communications technology to ensure communication methods continue to be relevant and effective.
- Implement a duty system for PIM.

**PIM4.** **Continue to develop organisational capability to enhance social media as a communications and intelligence gathering tool.**

- Ensure a consistent approach to engaging the people through social media.
- Ensure that a consistent approach is taken to using the CDEM website as a key information centre before, during and after an emergency.

**SUPPORTING INFORMATION**

- Public Information Handbook
- Working from the same page - consistent messages for CDEM
- Consistent messages folder (localised version of above)
- Public Information Management: Director's Guideline for Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups [DGL 14/13]
- Get Ready Get Thru - www.getthru.govt.nz

**Item 7**

**Attachment 1**

**HAWKE'S BAY EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT GROUP**

CIVIL DEFENCE

# WELFARE

Resilience means an all of government / organisation approach to preparing and ensuring the wellbeing of the individuals and community during and after an emergency.

## WELFARE

In this plan Welfare is defined as:

*The coordinated welfare response that the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group and its partner agencies will deliver to its people and communities adversely affected by an emergency. This includes the core functions of provision of food, shelter, clothing, emergency accommodation, psychosocial support, financial assistance, and other support necessary to ensure the wellbeing of individuals and communities.*

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In Hawke's Bay, welfare activities encompass the 4R's of reduction, readiness, response and recovery, and recognise that the wellbeing of individuals, families and communities is essential in the response to an emergency.

The integration of welfare planning between local authorities, the wider CDEM Group, partner agencies and national welfare providers is fundamental to providing for welfare needs.

However, delivery on the day needs to occur at a local level with coordination at a Group or national level if required. This forms an 'all of government' approach to delivering welfare support to communities during an emergency.

The Hawke's Bay Welfare Coordination Group (WCG) has been established to coordinate the planning of the delivery of welfare activities of a number of local/ central government and non-government agencies to the community during an emergency. The WCG is managed and lead by the Ministry of Social Development. During an emergency, the WCG provides advice to the Group and Local Controllers on welfare matters.

The Group Welfare function provides for advice and coordination at a local level in preparing for an emergency. During any response Group Welfare will provide coordination and assistance; and engage with national welfare providers as appropriate. Local authorities plan and retain a welfare capability which is focused on delivering local level wellbeing support to individuals and their communities. There is a strong volunteer component to this capability.

Individual welfare providers are responsible for ensuring they have the operational capability to integrate with the wider welfare response, and deliver their services during an emergency.

## PRINCIPLES

- The wellbeing of people and communities is essential to the successful response to and recovery from an emergency

- Integrated planning between all of government and all of sector agencies involved in the delivery of social services will provide for the wider wellbeing of people and communities during an emergency

- The effective delivery of welfare during an emergency will best be achieved locally through local government while being integrated within the wider response to an event

- Providing for the wellbeing needs of people and communities in a manner that supports people remaining, where possible, in their normal residence, will increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the recovery process

- Communities with ownership over the provision of welfare during an emergency will be more resilient and be better able to respond and recover from an event

- Permanent and appropriate resourcing of the group welfare function will help to ensure that welfare planning and response provides for the wellbeing of people and communities during and after an event.

60     Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group I Te Rākau Whakamarumaru ki Te

**Item 7**

**Attachment 1**

## OBJECTIVES

These objectives will form the basis of the work programme for the term of this plan.

### WEL1. Develop and maintain welfare planning tools.

- Identify and map existing welfare provider resources required in an emergency.
- Develop a matrix listing welfare provider roles and responsibilities.
- Establish and document a process to ensure planning tools are regularly maintained.

### WEL2. Review the welfare structure

**Considerations:**

- Ensure welfare delivery mechanisms are appropriate for geographic situation e.g. rural, urban, population density.
- Standardise practice across TLA's and agencies.
- Establish scaled response planning structure.
- Determine where the need is for local welfare committees.

### WEL3. Review the Group Welfare Plan

- Develop project plan and identify resourcing required.

*As part of the review*

- Review WCG terms of reference
- Define WCG boundaries.
- Determine common language and definitions, e.g. welfare premise types.
- Incorporate best practice and lessons learnt from recent events.

### WEL4. Revise the Community Response Plan template for welfare provision

*Include:*

- All types of Hawke's Bay communities.
- Business continuance planning: engage with businesses regarding the provision of welfare to their staff and possibly the wider community.

### WEL5. Provide welfare training and exercises

- Complete a needs analysis and identify priorities for training.
- Develop a training plan.
- Incorporate a robust debriefing process into training and exercising.
- Ensure evaluation and continuous improvement.

### SUPPORTING INFORMATION

- Welfare in an Emergency Director's Guideline for Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups [DGL 11/10]
- HB CDEM Group Welfare Plan 2006

**EMERGENCY OPERATIONS**

**Resilience means CDEM and partner organisations are ready to take action during an emergency.**

## EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

The purpose of this section is to ensure that, during an emergency, all available resources are efficiently and effectively used in support of the Hawke's Bay community.

This will be achieved by planning for and facilitating the actions to be taken immediately prior to, during and after an emergency or disaster to; save lives, protect property and support the ongoing efforts of communities to return to normal.

This section focuses on identifying and establishing the strategic considerations and directions that will enable the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group and partner agencies to collectively plan and deliver their response to an emergency.

This section also identifies arrangements that need to be established prior to an emergency to minimise the immediate effects of the event and ensure early support is available to communities.

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## PRINCIPLES

- In planning and implementing emergency operations in the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group the following key principles apply:
  - Identification and maintenance of the 'mission'
  - Flexibility
  - Cooperation
  - Sustainability
  - Economy of effort
  - Decisive actions.
- While plans and SOPs provide a framework to encourage best practice in emergency management, the effective management of the response to an emergency will be dependent upon the leadership, skills and capability of individuals and organisations
- Appropriate integrated planning will help to ensure that an initial response is timely and comprehensive
- The response to an emergency will be more effective if a comprehensive approach to emergency management is taken across the 4Rs

**Item 7**

**Attachment 1**

ACTIVITIE

- Integrating the actions of all agencies will result in an efficient and effective CDEM response to and recovery from an emergency
- Well led, trained and practiced emergency coordination and operation centres will provide a significant contribution to the success of the response to, and recovery from an emergency
- Flexible processes and structures will provide a response that can react to the unpredictable nature of hazards and emergencies
- Planning for realistic worst case scenarios will help to ensure that the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group is prepared for the full continuum of an event
- Recovery planning needs to commence while the response is underway to enable communities to re-establish their normal quality of life as soon as possible

An effective response will be underpinned by a robust training and exercising programme and involvement in low level events ensuring a culture of continual improvement. **OBJECTIVES**

These objectives will form the basis of the work programme for the term of this plan.

| **EO1.** | **Complete Consequence planning against risk and impact assessments for the top 10 hazards.** |
|---|---|
| | • Identify priorities for shared plans, e.g. mass evacuation, group reconnaissance, public alerting and welfare. |
| | • Identify roles and responsibilities of CDEM and partner agencies. |
| | • Ensure SOPs are relevant and up to date. |
| **EO2.** | **Identify capability, capacity and compatibility of EOCs and implement recommendations to fill gaps.** |
| | • Assess against national criteria. |
| | • Identify capability and capacity gaps and link these to training and exercising programmes. |
| **EO3.** | **Monitor and make best use of existing and evolving technology to support emergency operations.** |
| | • Establish a GIS Portal that is accessible and maintained by partner agencies. |
| | • Ensure the implications of other group and partner agencies systems are understood. |
| | • Ensure GECC and EOCs use EMIS to support the management of emergencies. |
| | • Maintain a resilient operational communications system. |

**ACTIVITIES**

## SUPPORTING INFORMATION

### Roles, Functions and Responsibilities during Emergency Operations

The role of the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group during emergency operations is to coordinate the activities of its members, the community and others to ensure that response to any emergency in Hawke's Bay is:

- Coordinated
- Timely, effective and makes best use of all available resources
- In accordance with the priority of saving lives, protecting property and supporting the ongoing efforts of communities to return to normal.

To facilitate this, the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group will appoint suitable, qualified and experienced Group and Local Controllers who can exercise powers to direct and co-ordinate operations during an emergency in accordance with the CDEM Act 2002.[1] Refer to Appendix 5: Key Appointments.

The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group maintains a Group Emergency Coordination Centre (GECC) that allows all agencies to work together to coordinate and plan emergency operations across the Group area. In an emergency, the GECC works closely with the National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC) and GECCs in neighbouring regions, reporting and coordinating activities with central government.

Each territorial authority member of the Group maintains an Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) to plan and implement local emergency operations.

**Emergency Services** (Fire, Police, and Health) are responsible for responding to incidents. Where appropriate they are responsible for taking on the role of lead agency in managing incidents in accordance with the relevant legislation under which they operate.

During a civil defence emergency, partner organisations and stakeholders will carry out the roles and responsibilities for their organisation as outlined in the National CDEM Plan and the Guide to the National CDEM Plan. This can be found at www.civildefence.govt.nz.

### Organisational Structure

During an emergency the GECC, EOCs and some ICPs [Incident Control Points] structures will be based on the CIMS model. The general GECC/EOC structure will not change, but the numbers of people in the ECC will vary depending on the emergency. Details of ECC activation, structure and operational process are recorded in various SOPs (see Appendix 4).

### Lead Agencies

The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group and Emergency Services have agreed upon a *SOP Adverse Events Standard Operating Procedure* that provides a cooperative process for identifying a Lead Agency where an event is complex and involves a number of agencies, or where there is uncertainty over the identification of a Lead Agency.

CIMS identifies a 'Lead Agency' as:

- The agency with a legislative responsibility to manage the type of event occurring; or
- If there is uncertainty about responsibility, the agency with the subject matter expertise and technical capability and agreed amongst the responding organisations; or
- Where the event may have a significant widespread community impact or displacement of residents, local government may become the lead agency using its CDEM arrangements to ensure full coordination and communication without necessarily using the powers of the CDEM Act.

### Transition from Event to State of Emergency

The *Adverse Events Standard Operating Procedure* demonstrates the process of transitioning from 'business as usual' to a declared emergency. It is essential that during any response the recovery manager is involved as early as possible and, in

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[1] Sections 26 Appointment of Group Controllers, 27 Appointment of Local Controller, 28 Functions of Group Controllers, Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002.

ACTIVITIE

**Item 7**

**Attachment 1**

agreement with the Group Controller, establishes parallel priorities to enable seamless transition from the response phase to recovery.

### Warning System/Procedures

The CDEM Group Office maintains an interagency warning and communication system, with the assistance of the administrating authority. This System is used frequently and reviewed regularly to confirm its effectiveness. Ref SOP #1 Warning System and Contact Procedure.

Territorial local authorities maintain warning systems to alert their residents; the Group support these processes by co-ordinating media and broadcast message consistency.

### Activation and Modes of Response

The National Plan Appendix 2 provides a framework and explanation of the NCMC activation modes. The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group will develop an SOP for activation and modes of response consistent with the National Plan.

Each member of the Group will maintain their own consistent procedures setting out their activation process. The Group will use the interagency warning and communication system to inform partner organisations.

### Declaration Process and Delegations

*Refer to Governance and Management p42.*

### Controller and Other Delegations

Most organisations maintain policies associating appointees with decision making and financial

delegated authorities for 'business as usual'. However policies are also needed to support and enable staff where staff roles change or staff secondments occur between organisations during an adverse event or declared emergency, and when staff are expected to make decisions of a different nature or commit higher levels of expenditure. This is provided for in the Governance and Management section of this plan.

### National and Other CDEM Groups Support

Where appropriate the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group will align its structures and processes to conform to National Guidelines to help ensure interoperability with other CDEM Groups. Where possible the CDEM Group will provide assistance to other CDEM Groups in New Zealand where requested.

An emergency in Hawke's Bay may require additional resources from other CDEM Groups and nationally through Government departments and organisations. Although some organisations will have internal procedures to facilitate this, coordination through the GECC if activated or via the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group office provides an efficient and effective approach.

Response to a major emergency in Hawke's Bay is likely to be very heavily supported by national resources *that may be coordinated nationally by*:

- The Cabinet Committee for Domestic and External Security (DES);
- The Official's Domestic and External Security Committee (ODESC) that reports to DES;
- The National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC);
- The National Welfare Coordination Group (NWCG).

# RECOVERY OPERATIONS

Resilience means CDEM and partner agencies guide and support communities and individuals to get back to ~~normal~~ an acceptable quality of life as soon as possible.

## RECOVERY OPERATIONS

This section outlines how the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group will help facilitate recovery prior to, during and after an emergency event. In this plan Recovery is defined as:

The means the co-ordinated efforts and processes used to bring about the immediate, medium-term, and long-term holistic regeneration and enhancement

of a community following an emergency~~coordinated efforts and processes to effect the immediate, medium and long term holistic regeneration of a community following an emergency~~.

Ideally, recovery strategies and possible recovery needs for a range of emergency events will be identified by TLAs, lifelines utilities and partner agencies and organisations well before an event. These strategies and needs will be incorporated as part of business as usual in reduction and readiness planning to:

- Reduce the impact of an event,
- To restore the community in the response and recovery phases of any emergency,
- To reduce any impact of future events.

Effective post response recovery can be resource intensive and can carry on for an extended period of time after a large event.

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## PRINCIPLES

- Effective and efficient Recovery occurs when recovery operations is embedded within the remaining 3Rs of Reduction, Readiness and Response;
- Effective and efficient Recovery occurs when it begins as soon as possible after the response is underway
- The consequences of an event will be minimised as quickly as possible
- Effective communication with all CDEM partners and Lifeline operators is essential
- Community engagement, including recognising the diverse needs of groups within the community, is integral to recovery planning for an event
- The emotional, social, economic and physical wellbeing of individuals and communities will be considered and addressed
- Options for better or safer development of the affected community will be analysed and considered before and after events
- The potential future exposure to hazards and associated risks will be reduced
- The value of political input in relation to communities needs is recognised and planned for
- The transition from recovery activity to 'business as usual' will be a priority in the recovery planning for a specific event

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## OBJECTIVES

These objectives will form the basis of the work programme for the term of this plan.

| | |
|---|---|
| **RO1.** | ~~Develop~~ Maintain a scalable Group Recovery Strategy and Plan.<br>• Identify capability and capacity requirements.<br>• Implement a group recovery structure. |
| **RO2.** | Develop and maintain recovery tools to support decision making during the recovery phase. |
| **RO3.** | Embed recovery training and exercising in the Group Training and Exercise programme. |

## SUPPORTING INFORMATION

### Roles of the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group during Recovery Operations

The role of the HBCDEM Group in facilitating the recovery from any emergency event is to:

‣ Provide all possible assistance to affected TLAs

‣ Coordinate best use of all available resources

‣ Inform and advise the public

‣ Inform and advise government departments and agencies.

### The Recovery ~~Plan~~Strategy

One of the priority objectives of this Group Plan is to ~~develop~~ maintain the ~~a~~ Group Recovery ~~Plan~~Strategy. The Recovery ~~Plan~~ Strategy ~~will~~ provides a strategic framework and outlines the detailed arrangements for recovery including structure ~~and~~ The strategy ~~was~~will be developed in accordance with recovery good practice and

in consultation with partner agencies and lifeline utility operators.

### Transition to Recovery

The planning for the recovery from an emergency will commence as soon as possible

response to recovery is to maintain continuity of coordination. In the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group this will be achieved by:

• Integrating recovery with response preplanning and contingency planning

• ~~The development of a~~Maintaining the Group Recovery ~~Plan~~ Strategy which establishes recovery structures and processes pre-event

• Controllers and the Recovery Manager working closely together throughout the readiness and response phases to jointly plan an integrated approach to the response and recovery.

The formal transition from response to recovery will be planned prior to any declaration of a state of local emergency ending and will involve:

• A briefing of the Joint Committee and Coordinating Executive Group

• The Joint Committee and Coordinating Executive Group confirming the Terms of Reference for the Recovery Manager, including delegations and authorities

• The termination of the response, including termination of any declarations still in force.

### Consideration of Cultural Sites and Heritage Buildings

The Recovery Plan will make provision for the management of heritage buildings after an event consistent with the following guiding principle.

The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group is committed to the preservation of heritage buildings and cultural sites wherever possible. Historic buildings would only be demolished where they are a threat to the safety of people and the stability of nearby buildings and where there is no reasonable way of reducing the risk. Where the risk can be reduced, but in the future, demolition or deconstruction still needs to occur, consideration should be given to techniques that retain as much heritage value as possible.

The Recovery Plan will make provision for the identification, treatment and where possible protection of sites of cultural significance within the area affected by the emergency.

# LIFELINES

*Resilience means Lifelines operators develop and maintain their services to survive.*

## LIFELINES

Lifeline utilities provide essential services to communities and as such have a vital role to play in providing for a more resilient Hawke's Bay.

Lifeline utilities are defined either by name or by function in the CDEM Act 2002 and includes the operators/ distributors of radio, television, roads, rail, water, sewerage, stormwater, airports, ports, telecommunications, electricity, gas and petroleum products[2]. Under the Act, a lifeline utility must ensure that it is able to function to the fullest possible extent during and after an emergency[3].

To achieve this lifeline utilities are responsible for strengthening relationships within and across lifeline sectors, and individually committing to actions that ensure continuity of their operation and delivery of services during and after an emergency event.

The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group supports the Hawke's Bay Engineering Lifelines Group in achieving these goals and in particular will support collaborative planning to reduce the risk of natural hazards and increase the readiness of lifeline utilities.

The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group also provides for the integration of lifelines utilities into any CDEM response and recovery to an event.

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## PRINCIPLES

- Lifeline utility operators who have identified the risks they face and have taken steps to be prepared for an emergency will make a substantial contribution to ensuring communities can effectively respond and recover from an emergency

- Lifeline utility operators that invest in increasing the resilience of their operation and delivery
of services prior to an event will reduce the associated financial impact

- The identification of and where applicable the management of critical interdependencies between Lifeline utilities prior to an event will enable more effective and efficient response and recovery.

[2] CEDEM Act 2002, Schedule 1, Part A and B.
[3] CEDEM Act 2002, s.60.

ACTIVITIE

| OBJECTIVES | |
|---|---|
| These objectives will form the basis of the work programme for the term of this plan. | |
| **LIF1.** | The CDEM Group will support the Hawke's Bay Engineering Lifelines Group in developing and completing projects that improve Lifeline utility resilience. |
| **LIF2.** | The CDEM Group will develop and incorporate Lifelines Utilities Coordinators (LUC) into the GECC or EOCs to integrate and coordinate the activities of Lifelines operators with the response and recovery. |
| **LIF3.** | Local authority CDEM Group members as Lifeline operators, will engage and support the Hawke's Bay Engineering Lifeline Group. |

## SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Working Together: Lifeline Utilities and Emergency Management;
Director's Guidelines for lifeline utilities (DGL 3/02): December
2002.

Lifelines and CDEM Planning; Civil Defence Emergency Management Best
Practice Guide [BPG1/03]: July 2003.

Facing the Risks: Hawke's Bay Lifelines Engineering Project, 2001.

**Item 7**

**Attachment 1**

# MONITORING AND EVALUATION

*Resilience means being honest about our performance and making improvements.*

## MONITORING & EVALUATION

Within its area the CDEM Group is responsible for monitoring and reporting on compliance with this CDEM Group Plan, the CDEM Act 2002, and other legislative provisions relevant to the purpose of this Act. This plan has identified specific objectives which will guide budgeting and work programming over the term of this plan.

There is also a national programme of capability assessment which is run by the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management.

## PRINCIPLES

- Regular reviews of the progress of implementing this plan will help to ensure that the work programme is achieving the objectives sought

- Monitoring the performance of the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group and the community in achieving the Vision of this plan, will allow for the implementation of the plan to be adjusted if required

- Reviewing and monitoring the implementation of this plan will help to ensure that limited resources are used efficiently and effectively

- Understanding the existing capability of the Group and its members will allow for any gaps in capability to be addressed and for an appropriate response to an emergency.

ACTIVITIE

## MONITORING THE GROUP PLAN

The specific areas that the Group will monitor, evaluate and where appropriate review over the next 5 years include:

- The implementation of the Work Programme set under this Plan to CEG and the Joint Committee

- Participation in the MCDEM Capability Assessment programme and the implementation of recommendations

- The development and monitoring of annual work plans

- A review of the existing capability of the Group ECC and individual EOCs

- A review of the existing capabilities of CDEM partners in relation to their CDEM functions

- The development of a comprehensive measurement and reporting programme on the resilience of the Hawke's Bay community including:

  - Community understanding of the risks they face

  - Individual and community readiness indicators

  - Organisational resilience indicators including lifelines infrastructure, key partners and business

  - Resilience trends, using this information to test and adjust the Group Work Programme

- A mid term review of the plan to assess progress, relevance and priorities.

## GROUP PLAN WORK PROGRAMME

This work programme outlines the significant objectives identified in this plan. The objectives have been prioritised and an approximate timeframe has been applied based on that priority. A detailed implementation work programme will be developed based on all the objectives in this plan. (see table overleaf)

ACTIVITIES

| ACTIVITY | July 2014 to June 2015<br>HIGH | July 2015 to June 2017<br>MEDIUM | July 2017 to June 2019<br>LOW |
|---|---|---|---|
| Building & Maintaining Capability | Set capability requirements and identify gaps and needs. | Development and delivery of group wide training and exercising programme | |
| Community Engagement & Education | Priority communities identified and delivery programme developed for Community Response Plans. | Ongoing development and maintenance of CRP's.<br>Develop and deliver programme to increase businesses with continuity plans.<br>Education in schools programme developed and delivered. Public education programme. | |
| Emergency Operations | Hazard consequence planning and development of shared plans. | | |
| | Identify capability, capacity and compatibility of EOC's and develop plan to address gaps. | | |
| Lifelines | Lifelines Utilities Coordinators incorporated into EOC's. | | |
| | Support the Hawke's Bay Engineering Lifelines Group in developing and implementing projects that enable Lifeline utility organisations to improve their resilience. | | |
| PIM | Improve coordination and integration within the group.<br>Enhance social media as a communications and intelligence gathering tool. | More efficient use of group resources.<br>Interagency plan for events which have a build up phase. | |
| Recovery Operations | Develop recovery plan and structure. | | |
| Risk Reduction | New research project every year based on Hazard research Plan | | |
| | | | Develop a publicly accessible Geographic Information System (GIS) regional web based 'home of hazards' |
| Volunteer Management | Create all encompassing and consistent structure for volunteering.<br>Create Group wide volunteer recruitment, training and progression framework | Develop a coordination plan for spontaneous volunteers. | |
| Welfare | Develop and maintain welfare planning tools.<br>Review welfare structure. | Review welfare plan | |

**SUPPORTING INFORMATION** Hawke's Bay CDEM Group Capability Assessment Report 2010

Item 7

Attachment 1

72    Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group I Te Rākau Whakamarumaru ki Te Matau a Māui

ACTIVITIE

Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group I Te Rākau Whakamarumaru ki Te    73

**PART FOUR**

# APPENDICES

# APPENDIX 1: GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS

| TERM / ABBREVIATION | DEFINITION |
|---|---|
| **4R's** | The New Zealand approach to emergency management: Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery. |
| **Act** | The Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002. |
| **BCP** | Business Continuity Plan |
| **CDEM** | Civil Defence Emergency Management |
| **CEG** | Coordinating Executive Group |
| **CIMS** | Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) is the New Zealand command and control system for managing the response to an incident involving multiple responding agencies. |
| **Communications** | Unless otherwise stated, in this document 'communications' does not refer to infrastructure (such as phones and radios) but to the actions that need to be taken to get information to the public. This could include issuing media releases, liaising with key partner agencies and publishing information to websites. |
| **Community** | For the purpose of this Plan a community may include individuals, families, whanau, hapu, communities of interest, businesses and other organisations who interact with each other and have common interests. Communities may be defined geographically. |
| **Controller** | The person appointed under section 26 of the CDEM Act with those functions set out in section 28. Can be the Group (regional) or Local Controller. |
| **CRP** | Community Response Plan |
| **The Director** | The Director of Civil Defence Emergency Management is responsible for leading the development of structures and processes to support individuals and communities in reducing risk, increasing readiness and managing the response and recovery activities at the national level in civil defence emergencies. |
| **Director's guidelines** | Director's Guidelines are publications from MCDEM that provide guidance and advice on how a function defined by legislation or national planning arrangements should be performed. http://www.civildefence.govt. nz/memwebsite.nsf/wpg_URL/For-the-CDEM-Sector-Publications- Index?OpenDocument#d |
| **Emergency Services** | NZ Police, NZ Fire Service, National Rural Fire Authority, rural fire authorities and District Health Boards. |
| **EMIS** | National Emergency Management Information System. Used to manage emergencies during the response to an event. |
| **Engineering Lifeline Utilities** | Engineering Lifeline Utilities is a multi-disciplinary group of companies and authorities that look after the roads, bridges, buildings, power networks, airport, port, major industrial plants, telecommunications and flood control structures. The CDEM Act places a requirement on all engineering lifeline utility operators to ensure that they are able to function to the fullest possible extent, even though this may be at a reduced level, during and after an emergency. |

**APPENDICES**

| TERM / ABBREVIATION | DEFINITION |
|---|---|
| EOC | Emergency Operations Centre. Each TLA in the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group has an EOC. |
| Cultural Sites and Heritage Buildings | Cultural sites or buildings as identified in City/District Plans, and buildings or wahi tapu sites identified in the New Zealand Historic Places Trust Register. |
| Emergency Services Coordinating Committee (ESCC) | The ESCC was established by the NZ Police to develop and maintain key relationships and plan for CDEM Emergencies. The ESCC plays a key role in managing a developing emergency and deciding on a lead agency as part of the Hawke's Bay CDEM Adverse Events Procedure. |
| GECC | Group Emergency Coordination Centre. The Hawke's Bay GECC is located at 311 Lyndon Rd, Hastings, at the rear of the building. |
| Group | Means the Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group which has a membership of the Wairoa District Council, Hastings District Council, Napier City Council, Central Hawke's Bay District Council and the Hawke's Bay Regional Council. |
| Hazardous Substances Technical Liaison Committee (HSTLC) | The HSTLC was established by the NZ Fire Service to develop and maintain key relationships, and provide technical advice during a hazardous substances emergency. |
| HB Engineering Lifelines Group (HBELG) | The HBELG is made up of Lifeline Utility Operators as defined under the CDEM Act 2002 (e.g. power, water, sewerage, roads, communications and gas providers) and operating in the Hawke's Bay. The purpose of this Group is to plan and coordinate the restoration of key infrastructure as soon as possible during and after an event. |
| Integrated Emergency Management | IEM is the cooperation and coordination (horizontal integration) between CDEM agencies and coordination within these agencies (vertical integration); to ensure the effective and efficient use and delivery of resources. |
| InterComm | This group is managed by the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group PIM to develop and maintain key public information management relationships prior to an event, and coordinate public messaging during and emergency. The members are representatives of the communications staff of local authorities, emergency services and local lifelines operators. |
| Lead Agency | The agency with the legislative authority or expertise and resources, which has the primary responsibility for the leadership and control of the responce to an incident. |
| LGA | The Local Government Act 2002 |
| Local Authority | A city, district or regional council |
| Longer Term Plan (LTP) | A council's ten year strategic plan as required under the Local Government Act (2002) |
| MCDEM | The Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management based in Wellington and part of the Department of Internal Affairs. |

**Item 7**

**Attachment 1**

**Item 7**

APPENDICE

**Attachment 1**

| TERM / ABBREVIATION | DEFINITION |
|---|---|
| **PIM** | Public Information Management |
| **Psychosocial** | A process of facilitating resilience within individuals, families and communities (enabling families to bounce back from the impact of crisis and helping them to deal with such events in the future). Psychosocial support promotes the restoration of social cohesion and infrastructure within the post-emergency environment. |
| **Public Information Management** | Public information management (PIM) during an emergency involves the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information to the public. The term PIM may also be used to generally identify the person or team responsible for carrying out this activity during an emergency. |
| **RMA** | The Resource Management Act 1991 |
| **SOP** | Standard Operating Procedure refers to a document describing an agreed and formally established procedure that is the commonly accepted method for performing certain emergency management actions within a given situation. |
| **Subduction** | The subduction zone is where the Pacific Plate is drawn down under the Australian Plate causing earthquakes and volcanic activity across much of New Zealand.  |
| **Territorial Authority (TA)** | A district or city council. |
| **Welfare Coordination Group (WCG)** | The WCG provides for collective emergency welfare preparedness and planning, and provides the basis for the coordination of this function during the response and recovery. |

# APPENDIX 2: HAZARD AND RISK ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS

## PURPOSE

This appendix outlines the process that was carried out to analyse the hazards and risks for Hawke's Bay and provide a risk assessment to support the development of the review of the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group Plan.

## Background

The process of analysing the hazards and risks for Hawke's Bay was the first step in developing the strategic part of the CDEM Group Plan. The analysis
was necessary

- Cultivate a common understanding of the hazards and risks by all agencies with a CDEM role

- Identify the hazards and risks that the Group will manage (as opposed to those to be managed by individual agencies). This is a requirement under Section 49 (2)(b) of the CDEM Act 2002.

- Identify the hazards that are of national significance. The Director of CDEM needs to know this to meet Section 8 (2)(b) of the CDEM Act 2002.

- Facilitate the identification of issues to be addressed by the Plan. This ensures that issues to be addressed by the Plan are based on sound hazard and risk information.

APPENDICE

## PROCESS

### Hazard & Risk Assessment

GNS Science was commissioned to complete an updated assessment of 'Hazard & Risk in the Hawke's Bay' (GNS Science Report 2010/06 June 2010). These findings, along with the findings in the HB CDEM Plan 2005, were considered at a Risk Assessment Workshop with Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management partners in June 2012 to determine priorities for significant CDEM Group risks. Hazard scenarios were limited to a 1000 year return period.

### Risk Profile Template

Using the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management Risk Profile Template, the Risk Assessment Workshop (which involved experts in a range of subjects from different agencies and disciplines) analysed the risks that threaten Hawke's Bay, and completed a risk assessment.

### Hazard Summary Sheets

Hazard summary sheets were developed to support the risk profile. These, along with the results of the Risk Assessment Workshop, were sent out to the workshop attendees for final approval before being incorporated into this plan.

In order to develop the Hawke's Bay Risk Profile, the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group followed the method recommended in the Director's Guideline CDEM Group Plan Review for CDEM Groups [DGL 09/09] which is in line with the AS/NZS 4360 risk management process standard.

APPENDICE

| HAZARD CONTEXT/ DESCRIPTION | SCENARIO | LIKELIHOOD (provided where statistics available) | CONSEQUENCES |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Earthquake MMIX (9)** | A strong earthquake on the Poukawa Fault near Bridge Pa measuring 7.1 on the Richter scale. Substantial ground shaking throughout HB. | 740 year return period | 10-15 deaths, 250-350 injuries, some serious<br>$400m heavy damage to buildings. Damage to bridges and roads. Large cracks in ground.<br>Landslides on steep slopes. Liquefaction effects intensify<br>Substantial damage to lifelines including power, water & waste water and transportation routes. Telecommunications also badly affected. |
| **Tsunami Large 5m** | A distance source event M8.5 caused by a earthquake on the coast of Peru resulting in a wave which has an offshore wave height of approximately 5m in Hawke's Bay. Arrives on high tide. 10 hours advanced warning with time for evacuation. | 500 year return period | 2 deaths, 140 injuries<br>$800m damage to buildings, homes and coastal infrastructure. Many coastal private dwellings uninhabitable. Severe environmental damage along coast line and related inland low lying areas. |

80    Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group I Te Rākau Whakamarumaru ki Te

**Item 7**

**Attachment 1**

APPENDICE

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Volcanic Heavy 5-100mm** | Mount Ruapehu erupts with wind directing ash over HB. All cities and towns are affected, with region covered with 5 – 100 mm of ash over a period of 3 weeks of eruptions.<br><br>Wet weather exacerbates problems. | 1,000 year return period | 700 people affected with bad health from ash which is an irritant to lungs and eyes.<br>Burial of pasture and low plants, and foliage stripped off some trees. Most pasture will be killed by over 50mm of ash.<br>Livestock may suffer from lack of feed, wear on teeth, and contamination of water supplies. Major ash removal in urban areas. Weaker roof structures may collapse at 100mm thickness if ash is wet. Airports closed. Road transport badly affected. Electricity cuts due to ash shorting at substations. Water supplied limited due to failure of power to pumps. |

**Item 7**

**Attachment 1**

APPENDICE

| HAZARD CONTEXT/ DESCRIPTION | SCENARIO | LIKELIHOOD (provided where statistics available) | CONSEQUENCES |
|---|---|---|---|
| Earthquake MMVIII (8) | A strong earthquake on the Mohaka Fault line near Willowflat measuring 6.4 on the Richter scale. Substantial ground shaking throughout HB. | 130 year return period | 3-5 deaths , 90-150 injuries $130m building damage with some damage to earthquake resistant buildings. Cracks in ground. Heavy furniture overturned. Damage to lifelines including power, water & waste water and transportation routes. Telecommunications also affected. |
| Flood (Large >1 in 100 AEP) | A cyclone brings high rainfall to Hawke's Bay with considerable damage to Hastings, Napier and Central HB. Rainfall at Rissington is 510mm in 10 hours, and there is substantial flooding on the Heretaunga Plains caused by a breach in the stopbank on the Ngaruroro River. | 101 year return period | 2 deaths, 35 serious injuries Cleanup, production loss, and damage to homes and businesses in millions. Health impacts if sewage & water supplies affected. |
| Tsunami Moderate 100 years 1-2m | A regional source event M7.9 caused by an earthquake at the Kermadec Islands produces a 100 year return period wave for HB, with an offshore wave height of approx 1-2m. Arrives on high tide. 2 hours advanced warning. | 100 year return period | 28 injuries $7m damage to coastal infrastructure and boats including at the Port of Napier. |
| Earthquake MMVII (7) | A strong earthquake centred south of Wairoa measuring 6.9 on the Richter scale. Ground shaking throughout HB. | 26 year return period | 1 death & 15 injuries. $7m building damage. Tiles, water tanks, walls damaged. Some chimneys broken. Furniture movement. Lifelines including power, water & waste water and transportation routes all report some damage. Telecommunications affected. |

82        Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group I Te Rākau Whakamarumaru ki Te

APPENDICE

| HAZARD CONTEXT/ DESCRIPTION | SCENARIO | LIKELIHOOD (provided where statistics available) | CONSEQUENCES |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Volcanic Light 1-5mm** | Mount Taranaki erupts with wind directing ash over HB. Some of the cities and towns are affected, with region covered in 1-5 mm of ash over a period of 4 weeks. Weather stays reasonably dry. | 100 year return period | 100 affected with bad health from ash which is irritant to lungs and eyes. Airports closed. Livestock may suffer from lack of feed; wear on teeth, and possible contamination of water supplies. Minor damage to houses if ash enters buildings, soiling & blocking air con filters, etc. Road transport may need to be cleared. Electricity may be cut due to ash shorting at substations. High water use for ash clean up. Water supplies may be limited. |
| **Flood Average** | A chain of thunderstorms forms up the eastern coast of NZ which results in downpours in HB. In Napier & Hastings 50mm of rain falls in 1 hour – close to the average for an entire month. | 50 year return period | Millions of dollars damage from water and surface flooding, plus damage to some roofs and shop/ business stock, equipment and property. Cleanup, production loss, and damage to homes and businesses. |
| **Rural Fire** | Major fire in extreme drought conditions on rural-urban interface, and threatening urban areas. | Each year rural fire authorities control approx 500 fires which burn across about 400 ha of land. | Fire-fighters and residents killed and injured. Widespread evacuations required and extensive destruction of property and vegetation. National and international assistance required. Airspace restrictions. Loss of income to rural sector with significant losses to forestry. |

APPENDICE

| Earthquake MMVI (6) | An earthquake measuring 6.1 on the Richter scale with its epicentre near Lake Poukawa. Shaking throughout HB. | 6 year return period | $1.5m slight damage to poorly constructed buildings. Objects fall from shelves. Slight damage to lifelines including power and water supplies. Telecommunications overloads and cellphones affected. |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

APPENDICE

**Item 7**

**Attachment 1**

| HAZARD CONTEXT/ DESCRIPTION | SCENARIO | LIKELIHOOD (provided where statistics available) | CONSEQUENCES |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Drought** | A prolonged (greater than 4 months) and severe drought similar to that experienced in 1982. | Droughts affect the region on average once every 3 years. | Small streams dry up, trees die, and stock numbers are greatly reduced. Increased likelihood of extensive rural fires. Loss of water impacts on production and economic activity in the region and there is a general economic decline. |
| **Coastal Inundation** | A severe coastal storm swell event inundates land adjacent to the coast, as seawater is driven over beach crests. | Risk predicted to increase | Evacuations required. Some injuries. Building damage including sea water and loss of roofs from wind. Stormwater networks overwhelmed. Blocked and damaged culverts. Interruption of power. Road disruptions and temporary isolation of parts of the region due to access problems. |
| **Landslide (Very Large)** | After several weeks of wet weather in the region a large landslide occurs in the Esk Valley blocking SH5. | 100+ year return period | A number of casualties from an associated vehicle accident. A number of properties badly damaged. People are unable to return to their homes. Transportation redirects required. Severe infrastructure damage with SH 5 closed for over 8 weeks given the size of the landslide and rebuild required which results in high business & economic losses. |
| **Coastal erosion** | Storm leads to the removal of beach front and private coastal land adjacent to the beach. | Risk predicted to increase | Results in the destruction of several private houses on the coast. Loss of land, distress. Loss of utilities in the area. Damage to wetlands, riverbank and river mouth ecosystems. |

Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group I Te Rākau Whakamarumaru ki Te          85

APPENDICE

| Landslide Large | Numerous small rainfall induced landslides in all parts of the region. A small number block essential roads such as SH 2 & 5 for a period of 3-4 days. | 10 year return period | Some people are unable to return to their homes. SH Infrastructure damage. Transportation delays. Property damage. Economic losses. |

| HAZARD CONTEXT/ DESCRIPTION | SCENARIO | LIKELIHOOD (provided where statistics available) | CONSEQUENCES |
|---|---|---|---|
| Strong Wind | Ex-tropical cyclone affects entire region bring winds of 200 km/hr. | 142 year return period | Power supplies disrupted with power poles damaged by winds. Roofing materials torn off roofs, trees blown down, transport accidents and injuries. Some people unable to return to homes. |
| Extreme Temperature | Following a period of drought, a high establishes over HB bring extreme temperatures of 32°C for 2 days | Risk predicted to increase | A death(s) of urban-dwelling elderly without access to an air-conditioned environments. Highways and roads are damaged by excessive heat. Livestock, such as poultry, are severely impacted. Increased demand for water. |
| Volcanic Trace <1mm | Mount Ruapehu erupts with wind directing some ash over HB. Wairoa mainly affected, with region covered with less than 1 mm of ash over 1 week. | 20 year return period | Irritant to lungs and eyes. Airports will close due to potential damage to aircraft. Possible minor damage to vehicles, houses and equipment caused by abrasive ash. Dust affects road visibility and possible contamination of roof-fed water supplies. |
| Snow | A prolonged period of cold moist air produces heavy snowfall that closes all road into and out of HB. | | The cold weather freezes the snow, producing icy roads, which remain closed for a few days. Transportation delays. Stock losses occur in CHB due to the cold and snow. Some damage and disruption to power and telecommunication lines. |

APPENDICE

| Hail | Severe and widespread hail storm over the Heretaunga Plains in mid-summer. | | Damage to most of the export crop apples, estimated to be $50 million. Loss of family income for affected properties. Distress.<br>Minor damage to homes, broken windows, equipment/vehicles and air con units. |

**Item 7**

**Attachment 1**

**APPENDICE**

| HAZARD CONTEXT/ DESCRIPTION | SCENARIO | LIKELIHOOD (provided where statistics available) | CONSEQUENCES |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Frost** | A severe frost covers the Heretaunga Plains at the end of summer. | | Major crop losses, including tomatoes for Heinz Watties estimate to be in the millions. Major economic losses to families. |
| **Landslide Small** | A number of small rainfall induced landslides across SH 5 from Napier to Wairoa for a period of 1-2 days. | 1-2 year return period | Some people are unable to return to their homes. SH Infrastructure damage. Transportation delays. |
| **Urban Fire Multiple** | After a long hot summer, on a hot windy day a large number of fires occur in a short period over a wide suburban area. | | All Fire Service resources are fully committed. There are many casualties and one fatality. Several of the fires spread destroying several homes. Welfare provision is necessary. |
| **Lifeline failure - Electric** | A storm causes the 220kv link with Wairakei to fail, causing a total blackout to the region which lasts up to 6 hours in some areas. | | The power cut affects hundreds of homes and is estimated to cost the region's industry hundreds of thousands of dollars. Distress and communities affected. |
| **Lifeline failure -Water** | A water pipe attached to a bridge ruptures after a bridge collapse close to the epicentre of a small earthquake. | | Water supply to a small HB community fails and access is limited. Distress and communities affected. Alternative supplies required. |
| **Hazardous Substances Event** | A large explosion at an industrial site in Hastings, causes a huge fire and sends black toxic smoke over the east of the city. | 10 year return period | Injuries including burns and effects from toxic fumes. 150 homes require evacuation. Significant residential and central business district disruption from smoke/toxic cloud. Runoff of toxic materials into inland waters, air pollution, on-site contamination of soil and groundwater. Economic losses. |

APPENDICE

**Item 7**

**Attachment 1**

| HAZARD CONTEXT/ DESCRIPTION | SCENARIO | LIKELIHOOD (provided where statistics available) | CONSEQUENCES |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Pollution over unconfined aquifer** | A major truck accident on SH 50 causes a significant chemical spill which leaks into the surrounding land at Roys Hill. | | The major pollutant spill threatens the groundwater systems in the Heretaunga Aquifer which provide 85% of the water needs of the urban population of Hastings and smaller rural communities. |
| **Lifeline failure – Telecommuni- cations** | A telecommunications line attached to a bridge to a coastal community breaks after a bridge collapse close to the epicentre of a small earthquake. | | Coastal community loses telecommunications and access to 111 calls, putting lives at risk. Telecommunications in the region experience overloading due to earthquake. |
| **Civil unrest/ Terrorism** | Terrorism targets include political & economic interests, critical infrastructure, mass gatherings of people, & events that capture media attention. | | Violent acts, protest and civil unrest can all impact severely on normal life and operations. |
| **Major transport accident Marine** | A ship goes aground on Pania Reef, leaking tonnes of heavy fuel oil into the Bay. | | Port of Napier operations affected. Marine industry affected. Businesses/agriculture exports/imports affected and economic losses across the region. Black oil on HB beaches requires months of clean up. Distress and health impact from fumes for those living close to the beaches. Significant wildlife fatalities. |
| **Lifeline failure - Gas** | A bridge collapse breaks the gas supply to Napier. | | Significant economic impact, businesses affected. |
| **Lifeline failure - Waste Water & Sewage** | After 3 weeks of wet weather, the failure of a pump station causes the back up of sewage in a Napier community | | Public health issues. Risk of contamination from sewerage systems. |

Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group I Te Rākau Whakamarumaru ki Te                    89

**APPENDICE**

| HAZARD CONTEXT/ DESCRIPTION | SCENARIO | LIKELIHOOD (provided where statistics available) | CONSEQUENCES |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Major transport accident Air** | A fully laden airplane crashes near to a residential area | | Deaths & injuries. Transportation systems disrupted. Damage to infrastructure in the area. Large cost of response and investigation. Business disruption |
| **Dam failure** | A dam on Te Mata Peak breaks following heavy rain. | | The broken dam sends a wall of water down through the residential area of Havelock North. Many houses are destroyed and there are many severe injuries. |
| **Major Transport accident Road/Rail** | A train derails between Napier and Hastings. | | Injuries. Transportation systems disrupted. Damage to infrastructure in the area. Large cost of response and investigation. Business disruption. |
| **Human Pandemic** | A new strain of influenza spreads around the world and arrives in HB | | Up to 300 deaths, 59,000 clinically unwell over a 2-3 month period. Interruption to business, services, schools through staff being unwell or affected. Problems with food supplies to those infected. Problems with storage and disposal of bodies. |
| **Animal Epidemic, Plant and Animal Pests** | A number of cases of anthrax are detected on the banks of the Tukituki River. It affects animals and humans, and can be fatal, so is considered a serious public health risk. | | Large number of illness in Central HB and 1 death. Public health officials overwhelmed with demand for information. Trade is severely affected. Significant economic losses. Food safety issues. Other public health priorities compromised. |

**Item 7**

**Attachment 1**

# APPENDIX 3: REVIEW OF CURRENT PRACTICE

APPENDICE

## REVIEW PROCESS

Part of the Group Plan Review process was to review the 'state of the nation' in terms of CDEM activities in Hawke's Bay to identify what we were doing well and where there were gaps and opportunities. A working party for each activity reviewed the status and agreed on any amendments that were necessary. This in turn helped the focus on setting objectives and priorities for the Group Plan.

The following is a summary of our findings:

## REDUCTION

### WHAT WE ARE DOING WELL

- Hawke's Bay currently has good base information on the known hazards that affect the region.

- There is a good programme to support new research projects along with updating existing hazard information.

- The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group maintains good relationships with the Crown Research Institutes and other researchers working in the field of natural hazards.

- Individual people have a basic understanding of the hazards that potentially impact on Hawke's Bay.

- There is increasing awareness of the links between CDEM risk analysis and land use planning process used by local authorities.

### GAPS AND OPPORTUNITIES

- While various organisations hold hazard information, there are a variety of practices in making this information available to the public.

- There is less understanding by the public or organisations of how identified hazards will directly impact on them.

- There is no established process for CDEM planning to be considered as part of land use planning process.

ay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group I Te Rākau Whakamarumaru ki Te                   91

**Item 7**

**Attachment 1**

APPENDICE

## READINESS

### WHAT WE ARE DOING WELL

The readiness levels of individual people are steadily increasing.

Larger businesses and Lifeline utilities have generally developed good business continuity plans to enable them to respond and recover from an emergency. However these plans often lack the coordination to deal with interdependencies across different organisations.

Hawke's Bay CDEM agencies have developed good processes and capability to respond to small to medium sized emergencies.

There has been an increased effort in the recruitment and training of CDEM volunteers particularly in urban locations.

The resourcing of the CDEM Group has increased in the last couple of years, although the clarity and consistency of the existing Group structure can be improved.

Hawke's Bay has a number of active groups/ committees which are supported by the CDEM Group including: Welfare Coordination Group (WCG), Emergency Services Coordinating Committee (ESCC), Hazardous Substances Technical Liaison Committee (HSTLC), and the Intercom Group. The Hawke's Bay Engineering Lifelines Group has recently been re-established

### GAPS AND OPPORTUNITIES

- There are still significant numbers of individuals and families who are either unprepared or lack the capability to be prepared.
- Overall the preparedness of communities needs to be improved.
- Only a small number of small to medium sized businesses have business continuity plans to enable them to recover from an emergency as soon as possible.
- While the Hawke's Bay does have a Lifelines Group, the Lifelines Plan is now 12 years old and in need of review.

- Recent events such as the Christchurch earthquakes have reinforced the need to ensure that the focus of CDEM activities needs to be across the 4Rs. In the past the CDEM Group has not been resourced to engage effectively in readiness activities across the Group.
- More work is required to develop and coordinate the ability of the Group and partner organisations to lead and support the response to significant emergencies on a coordinated community wide basis. (See Risk Profile Section which identifies significant major risks for the Hawke's Bay).
- Hawke's Bay CDEM has a Welfare Plan which is in need of review.
- There is a lack of consistency across the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group in the training of response and recovery staff and this impacts on interoperability during an emergency.
- Variations between agencies in volunteer recruiting and training makes interoperability between local authorities uncertain.
- There is a need to coordinate public education across CDEM agencies to make best use of existing resources and ensure consistent messaging occurs.

## RESPONSE

### WHAT WE ARE DOING WELL

The CDEM Group has an adequate existing warning system to reach members and partners.

The establishment of a permanently set up GECC has enhanced the response capability of Hawke's Bay CDEM. .

Each local authority has established an EOC to facilitate the response to an emergency within their area.

**APPENDICE**

## GAPS AND OPPORTUNITIES

- Some partner organisations are limited in their internal warning processes and their ability to maintain a 24hr watch.

- The current mass public alerting system across the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group members is not coordinated and in some areas there is no clarity about the process of initiating the public alerting system and putting this into action.

- The staffing of the GECC into a second shift needs to be considered.

- There is a lack of consistency across the CDEM Group members and partners in the collection and sharing of intelligence. This is compounded to an extent by the lack of common IT operating systems within local EOCs.

- Further work is needed with CDEM members and partners to clarify and reinforce the purpose and role of the Group during an emergency.

- There needs to be more clarity on how the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group will establish a command and control system for managing a significant disaster.

## RECOVERY

### WHAT WE ARE DOING WELL

- The Group has developed a comprehensive Recovery Strategy which sets out long term recovery objectives and identifies operational tools.

- A recovery work programme has been developed

- A Group Recovery Manager and alternatives hashave been appointed, however someeach Group members do not have an has identified local recovery manager.

## GAPS AND OPPORTUNITIES

- Hawke's Bay CDEM does not currently have a formal recovery plan.

  Capacity needs to be developed by Hawke's Bay CDEM agencies to lead and support the

community in recovering from an emergency soon as possible.

- Recovery operations are time, resource and funding intensive. A better understanding of the capability of lifelines operators to respond and recover and the implications, is needed across the Group.

## RISK REDUCTION

See reduction section on page 88

## COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT & EDUCATION

### WHAT WE ARE DOING WELL

- Some community response plans have been developed, particularly in coastal communities.

- Priorities for community response planning have been set in some Council's plans. Where possible these priorities align with the risks faced and other programmed Council community development processes.

- Good education materials and programmes have been developed.

## GAPS AND OPPORTUNITIES

- There is potential for CDEM community response planning to be coordinated with other local authority community development activities and with other community safety programmes initiated by agencies such as the NZ Fire Service, Police and the District Health Board.

- There is an opportunity to better engage in response planning with communities of interest (ethnic, Marae, business, special needs groups).

- Better coordination between individual local authorities in community engagement processes (such as Community Response Planning) could increase the effectiveness of engagement and education.

90          Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group I Te Rākau Whakamarumaru ki Te

• The current process and form of Community Response Plans is not coordinated or consistent across the Group. While it is recognised that the content of a Community's Response Plan will differ from community to community, it is important that the structure is constant to allow for interoperability between different local authorities and areas.

• There is an opportunity to prioritise the development of community response plans based on agreed criteria.

• Many communities do not have a community response plan.

• A coordinated approach is needed to engage with schools and community groups.

# PUBLIC INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

## WHAT WE ARE DOING WELL

• The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group and individual local authorities maintain a dedicated PIM capability.

• The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group's Adverse Event Operating Plan sets out the procedures and responsibilities for release of public information during an adverse event.

• A cluster group of Hawke's Bay communications specialists called the InterComm has been established to build relationships and coordinate PIM planning prior to and during an event.

• The InterComm group has

• The Group Communications Strategy can support the community engagement process. This strategy needs to be regularly updated.

prepared a joint document - Media Messages for Broadcast During an Emergency.

• The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group members have good coordination and cooperation for PIM activities.

## GAPS AND OPPORTUNITIES

• Work has commenced on a Hawke's Bay CDEM Social Media Strategy for the use of social medial during an emergency. There is potential to develop social media as a tool both for the distribution of public information and intelligence gathering.

• There needs to be a plan for establishing a single PIM team during a major disaster.

• Potential exists to review current PIM planning in light of recent reviews of the response to the Christchurch Earthquakes.

• Relationships could be developed between Hawke's Bay 's PIM with adjoining CDEM Groups to share information and support for events near or across regional boundaries.

• Developing a strategy for managing media and VIPs during an event would enable information pathways to be established early in an emergency.

• A more timely and coordinated PIM response is needed for Hawke's Bay wide events.

APPENDICE

## VOLUNTEER MANAGEMENT

### WHAT WE ARE DOING WELL

- Local authorities and the Red Cross recruit and train established volunteers.
- Most local authorities and welfare agencies have established volunteer welfare teams.
- A number of large businesses have established industry rescue squads.
- Training is working well in some areas.
- Recognition is done well.

### GAPS AND OPPORTUNITIES

- There is no coordinated analysis of existing capability and capability gaps for volunteer teams for the Group area.
- Opportunities exist to coordinate and cooperate in the recruitment and training of volunteers across the local authorities and NGOs to improve efficiency, and interoperability.
- There is an opportunity to coordinate and compliment the activities and training of industry response/rescue teams in the Group area.
- There are no plans in place for the use of spontaneous volunteers during an emergency.
- Clarification of roles and responsibilities of various volunteer groups, taking into account legislative requirements, is needed

## BUILDING & MAINTAINING CAPABILITY

### WHAT WE ARE DOING WELL

- Current CIMS training is being delivered on a Group area wide basis and is well attended by members of partner agencies.
- Some local authorities have developed training programmes for their volunteers and staff.
- The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group is involved in current national initiatives to review the emergency management qualifications and develop a national integrated training framework.
- The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group has an established Training Advisory Group (TAG).
- The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group is part of the national exercise programme.

### GAPS AND OPPORTUNITIES

- The TAG membership, terms of reference and role needs to be reviewed.
- A training needs analysis for the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group needs to be developed to identify capability/training gaps and provide information for a Group training/exercise programme.
- There is an opportunity to coordinate training and exercises across the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group members to provide for interoperability, consistency and pre-event relationship building.
- The development of a 3 year training and exercise plan will enable the delivery of well planned and resourced training, focused on the needs/gaps identified.
- A synchronised training and exercise plan will help to ensure that individual and organisational CDEM skills and capability are developed, practiced and tested in a coherent manner.
- Training and exercises need to include a debrief, feedback and review process to ensure lessons learnt are integrated back into the training development process.

APPENDICE

- There is no comprehensive system for tracking the training of individuals to ensure they have the appropriate skills for the position they hold and are suitable for deployment both within the Hawke's Bay and in support of other Groups.
- Opportunities could be identified to better link with national exercises collectively and the national competency framework.

## WELFARE

### WHAT WE ARE DOING WELL

- The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group has developed a Group Welfare Plan to guide the planning, coordination and delivery process.
- The Hawke's Bay WCG has provided a forum for building inter-agency relationships.
- The WCG provides strong leadership to the welfare sector.
- The WCG meetings are well supported by agencies.
- The past delivery of welfare by individual local authorities during an emergency has been co-ordinated.
- The role of the Welfare Manager is working effectively.
- There is ongoing improvement at a local level drawing from what has been learned from previous events and emergencies

### GAPS AND OPPORTUNITIES

- The Group Welfare Plan needs to be reviewed and, at the same time, an opportunity could be taken to review the terms of reference of the Hawke's Bay WCG.
- Further work is needed on welfare planning for communities of interest (ethnic, Marae, business, special needs groups).
- Improved Community Response Planning would enable better prioritisation of welfare planning and delivery.
- The response capability of individual welfare providers in Hawke's Bay is not well known and

there is an opportunity for better understanding and coordinating this.

- While welfare capability exists for small to medium scale emergencies, planning is required to increase the scalability of the welfare response up to large disasters and providing inputs into a national level event.
- There is an opportunity for better interoperability and coordination between the welfare planning and response of local authorities.
- An induction for new WCG members will enhance their understanding of their role and that of other members of the CDEM Group.

## EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

### WHAT WE ARE DOING WELL

- Good relationships and communication exists between Hawke's Bay CDEM members and partner agencies.
- Planning for an operational response to emergencies has occurred in the past and has involved partner agencies such as the Emergency Services.
- The establishment of an Adverse Events Standard Operating Procedure provides for the upgrading of a response from 'Adverse Event' to 'State of Emergency'.
- The Emergency Service Coordination Committee (ESCC) provides for coordinated planning prior to an emergency.
- CIMS is generally used as the basis for inter-agency coordination.
- The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group has a coordinated and well established warning system.
- The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group SOPs have been adopted for use by Group members within their Emergency Operations Centres (EOC).
- There are established processes for the integration of scientific advice into the CDEM response and recovery to an event.

Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group I Te Rākau Whakamarumaru ki Te          93

**APPENDICE**

Exercises have been run as region
wide integrated exercises delivered

through the

APPENDICE

CDEM Group Office. These have involved a wide range of organisations and implementation of opportunities for improvement.

## GAPS AND OPPORTUNITIES

- A number of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) need to be reviewed to incorporate lessons learnt and evolving structures within the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group and partner agencies.

- While some event-specific contingency planning has occurred, these need to be reviewed
and aligned with the updated Hazardscape Assessment and any gaps addressed.

- The gathering and collation of information by different agencies is not always well coordinated, understood or shared.

- The capability to analyse information and provide intelligence within the CDEM Group needs to be strengthened.

- The existing capability of EOCs for all Group members needs to be better understood and any gaps addressed.

- Event debriefs need to clearly identify responsibilities for corrective actions and any outcomes need to be monitored for implementation.

- The alignment of EOC CIMs practice would be beneficial.

- There is an opportunity to increase the frequency and comprehensiveness of exercises.

## RECOVERY OPERATIONS

### WHAT WE ARE DOING WELL

- There are established processes for the integration of scientific advice into the CDEM response and recovery to an event.

- There is a greater recognition of the importance of recovery to the community.

- The Group and ~~some~~ TLAs have appointed recovery managers

- The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group has developed a Recovery Strategy which sets out the arrangements for recovery activities across the 4Rs
- Recovery is being considered or practiced during emergency exercises.
- A recovery work programme has been developed

**APPENDICE**

## APS AND OPPORTUNITIES

~~The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group does not currently have a Recovery Plan which sets out the arrangements for recovery activities~~.

Recovery needs and processes may not be well understood in local authorities and may only be seen as a post response activity rather than being integrated into BAU and response operations.

~~The role of Recovery Manager, and the need for this appointment, is not well understood by local authorities preparation and planning for an emergency event.~~

~~Recovery is rarely, if ever, considered or practiced during emergency exercises which tend to focus primarily on the response to an event.~~

CDEM Group members need to better understand and appreciate the considerable resources needed to recover from a range of events so that strategies can be developed to meet these demands.

Further work is required in identifying the specific recovery needs of a range of events in the social, economic, natural and built environments.

The development of regularly held Recovery Forum involving local authorities, lifeline utilities, partner agencies and organisations would provide information, give opportunity for case studies and training, would enhance operability and understanding, and would provide an opportunity to focus forum members on the demands of a recovery operation.

APPENDICE

## LIFELINES

### WHAT WE ARE DOING WELL

- The Hawke's Bay Engineering Lifelines Group completed *Facing the Risks: Engineering Lifelines* Project in 2001.

### GAPS AND OPPORTUNITIES

- *Facing the Risks* needs to be updated in light of new hazard information and lessons learnt from recent events around New Zealand and the world.

- While Lifeline utility operators generally have good understanding and planning for the impacts of natural hazard events on their operations, there are opportunities to overlay this information to identify common priority risk locations and interdependencies.

- An assessment of the external dependencies of Lifeline utilities will identify planning priorities for ensuring continuity of service.

- Clarifying the roles and responsibilities of the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group and Lifeline utilities prior to an emergency will help to ensure that effective cooperation occurs during the response and recovery.

- Increasing the level of engagement by Lifelines utilities as a collective group would improve the overall resilience of the sector.

Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group I Te Rākau Whakamarumaru ki Te      97

# APPENDIX 4: LIST OF SUPPORTING PLANS & PROCEDURES

The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group Plan is a strategic document; therefore details of operational plans, procedures and processes are contained in the supporting documents listed below. Some of the objectives in the Group Plan identify the need to develop more plans and procedures, and review existing plans. This has been identified as part of the 5 year work programme.

......................................................

## Supporting Plans

Hawke's Bay CDEM Group Welfare Plan V1.2 (November 2006)

Hawke's Bay CDEM Group Pandemic Hazard Plan 2 (September 2006)

......................................................

## Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)

| | |
|---|---|
| SOP 1. | Warning System and Contact Procedur |
| SOP 2. | Adverse Events Procedure |
| SOP 3. | Situation Reporting Procedure |
| SOP 5.1 | Making a Declaration |
| SOP 5.2 | Control Structure |

# APPENDIX 5: KEY APPOINTMENTS

**KEY APPOINTMENTS**

**Group Controller: Ian Macdonald (Primary)**

Ken Foote (Alternate)

Iain Maxwell (Alternate)

Elizabeth Lambert (Alternate)

David (Jim) Tetlow (Alternate)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

**Functions and Powers delegated to Group Controllers**

Functions ref s28 CDEM Act

2002 Powers (ref to act)

1. General powers ref s18(2)
2. Power to require Information ref s76
3. Information to obtain a warrant s78.
4. Receipt of information s81.
5. Emergency Powers s86-92 and s94.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

**Group Recovery Manager:** Michael Adye **(Primary)**

Richard Munneke (Alternate)

John O'Shaughnessy(Alternate)

**Functions and powers granted to Group Recovery Managers**

Functions reference s30A CDEM Act

2002 Powers (Ref Act):

1. General powers reference s94H.
2. Power to require information s94I
3. Evacuation of premises and places s94K
4. Entry on premises and places s94L
5. Closing roads and public places s94M
6. Power to give directions s94N

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

**Local Controller Hawke's Bay CDEM Group**

~~Te Arohanui Cook~~ Doug Tait

~~Steve Thrush~~ Josh Lloyd

Mike Maguire

Craig Cameron

Alison Banks

Antoinette Campbell

~~Glen Lucas~~Jon Kingsford

~~James Baty~~Kitea Tipuna

Helen Montgomery

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

**Functions and Powers delegated to Local Controllers**

Ref s27 CDEM Act 2002 noting the restrictions under s27 (2)

Emergency Powers s88 to 92

97

# APPENDIX 6: STRATEGIC LINKAGES

The purpose of this appendix is to show the linkages between the vision and strategic goals of this Plan; and the objectives and methods developed to implement the strategy. The identification of these linkages as the plan developed was an integral part of the process.

**VISION:**

**A Resilient Hawke's Bay Community**

**He Aumangea Hapori ki Te Matau a Māui**

APPENDICE

**Item 7**

**Attachment 1**

# REDUCTION

## Goal:

Local communities, work together to reduce the risk of hazards

## Outcomes:

Everyone understands the risks they face and accept responsibility for reducing risk and being prepared.

Sound integrated planning, which has resulted in risks being reduced to acceptable levels.

| STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE | | RELATED WORK PROGRAMME OBJECTIVES |
|---|---|---|
| RED1 | Improve our understanding of hazards in Hawke's Bay and the associated risks and consequences. | EO1,3, RR1,2 |
| RED2 | Undertake long term strategic reduction of the risks from hazards through collaborative planning with stakeholders. | LIF1, RO1, RR2 |
| RED3 | Communities and individuals are aware of the hazards they face. | CEE1,2,3, PIM4, RR3,4 |
| RED4 | Continue to identify, document and share current best practices and identify methods of improving and measuring Hawke's Bay community resilience through hazard reduction. | CEE4 |

Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group I Te Rākau Whakamarumaru ki Te

99

**APPENDICE**

## READINESS

**Goal:**

People and communities provide for their own safety and well-being

**Outcomes:**

A strong community spirit within which communities work together to ensure their safety.

Businesses with well rehearsed business continuity plans that safeguard both people and business income.

Community and response organisations with capability to deal with unexpected events.

The community recognises the critical role civil defence emergency management plays in assuring our safety and prosperity.

| STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE | | RELATED WORK PROGRAMME OBJECTIVES |
|---|---|---|
| **CDEM Agencies Readiness** | | |
| REA1 | Align all CDEM readiness activities with the hazard risk priorities identified in this Plan. | BMC1-5, CEE1,2,3, EO1, LIF1, RR1,3,4, VM2, WEL3 |
| REA2 | Ensure CDEM Group members have the capability to respond to emergencies in their area and promote the need for capability within emergency services and other partners. | BMC1-5, EO1-3, LIF1,3, PIM2,3,4, RO1,3, VM1-4, WEL1-3,5 |
| REA3 | Continue to improve coordinated and integrated emergency management between local authorities and with other CDEM partners. | BMC1-5, CEE5, EO1-3, LIF1,3, PIM1-4, RO1,3, VM2- 4, WEL1-3,5 |
| REA4 | Enhance the capability and interoperability of the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group through well planned, needs-based professional development. | BMC1-5, EO2, PIM2,3,4, RO3, RR4, VM1, WEL5 |
| **Community Readiness** | | |
| REA5 | Improve community preparedness through strong leadership and commitment to CDEM at political and executive levels. | CEE5, WEL4 |
| REA6 | Work with communities to develop Community Response Plans to improve community preparedness. | CEE1, PIM4, RR4, WEL4 |
| REA7 | Improve the level of awareness and preparedness of business to enable them to respond and recover from an emergency as quickly as possible. | CEE1, PIM4, RR4, WEL4 |
| **Individual Readiness** | | |
| REA8 | Continue to improve awareness and preparedness through consistent and relevant public education, messages and engagement. | CEE2,3, PIM1,2,4, RR4 |

10  Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group | Te Rākau Whakamarumaru ki Te

| REA9 | Identify and prioritise vulnerable sections of the Hawke's Bay community and improve their preparedness for an emergency. | CEE1,2,3,5 | |

**Item 7**

**Attachment 1**

APPENDICE

## RESPONSE

### Goal:

Response agencies prepared to provide a rapid, well coordinated and effective response to an emergency.

### Outcomes:

People who know what to do and help each other in the event of an emergency.

A rapid, well coordinated and effective response to an emergency.

| STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE | | RELATED WORK PROGRAMME OBJECTIVES |
|---|---|---|
| RES1 | Develop levels of activation and their trigger points to guide the transition of the management of an event from an incident to a complex emergency. | EO1 |
| RES2 | Develop response plans in accordance with the hazard risk priorities identified in this Plan and that these are implemented effectively during an emergency. | CEE1, EO1, RO1, VM2,4, WEL2,3,4 |
| RES3 | Develop, maintain and implement appropriate Group Standard Operating Procedures to enable CDEM agencies to effectively respond and recover from the priority hazards identified in this Plan. | EO1,2, PIM2,3, RO1, VM2,4, WEL2 |
| RES4 | Ensure the CDEM Group warning system is relevant and effective for all Group members and partners. | EO1-3, PIM2,3, |
| RES5 | Ensure that the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group maintains and where appropriate practices a coordinated, mass public alerting system. | CEE3, EO1, PIM1-4 |
| RES6 | The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group will provide coordinated support to the response of individual members during a local emergency. | EO2,3, LIF2, PIM2,3, VM2, WEL1,2,3 |
| RES7 | Ensure the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group will be capable of providing support to other CDEM Groups in the country if required. | BMC3, EO2,3, PIM2,3, VM2, WEL2,3 |

APPENDICE

Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group I Te Rākau Whakamarumaru ki Te                    10

APPENDICE

## RECOVERY

### Goal:

Communities and organisations are capable of recovering from an emergency in an effective and efficient manner.

### Outcomes:

A responsive, well coordinated and efficient recovery to an emergency.

| STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE | | RELATED WORK PROGRAMME OBJECTIVES |
|---|---|---|
| REC1 | Recovery capability and capacity will be strengthened across Hawke's Bay CDEM members and partners. | BMC1-5, EO1-3, PIM2,3, RO1,2,3, VM2, WEL1,2,3,5 |
| REC2 | Resources and funding for the recovery will be allocated in a timely manner. | RO1,2, WEL1-3 |
| REC3 | Recovery is integrated into the other 3Rs of Reduction, Readiness and Response. | CEE1, EO1, PIM2,3, RO1,2, WEL2,3 |
| REC4 | Recovery planning and operations are integrated across the social, economic, natural and built environments. | CEE3, 5, EO1, LIF3, PIM1,4 RO1,2, WEL2,3 |

10　　Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group I Te Rākau Whakamarumaru ki Te

Approved 20 June 2014. Updated as at 19 May 2017

**HAWKE'S BAY EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT GROUP**

CIVIL DEFENCE

4 July 2017

By email to:

bettercdresponses@dpmc.govt.nz

**SUBMISSION TO MINISTERIAL REVIEW: BETTER RESPONSES TO NATURAL DISASTERS AND OTHER EMERGENCIES IN NEW ZEALAND**

This submission is made on behalf of the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group on the *Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand*.

This submission is made in the context of the Terms of Reference (TOR) for this review.

While the Group fully supports the review and believes it is timely, as a preliminary matter we wish to point out that the context of the review needs to be based on the facts of any specifically cited response, not unsubstantiated opinions.

For example in in the TOR for this Review mention is made of criticism of the effectiveness of the civil defence emergency management sector in the response to the August 2016 Hawkes Bay gastroenteritis outbreak. In fact the Report of the Havelock North Drinking Water Inquiry: Stage 1 states:

*Ultimately the welfare support provided to the Havelock North community appears to have been helpful and generally well executed but it effectively started only on Tuesday 16 August 2016 when it could have been identified as necessary on Friday 12 August 2016, and certainly should have been by the morning of Saturday 13 August 2016.[1]*

While the Inquiry criticised the District Health Board and Hastings District Council (in its role as a drinking water supplier) on the timeliness of identifying the issue and possible welfare needs, it did not criticise the CDEM welfare response itself.

There was some minor criticism of the decision not to declare a state of emergency under the CDEM Act 2002 (the Act) for this event. This was a conscious decision made at the time in consultation with the Ministry of Civil Defence Emergency Management (MCDEM). Considering the fact that Heath were the lead agency and there was no indication that the responding agencies could not cope, the definition of an emergency under the Act was not fulfilled. This was confirmed in part by the Government Inquiry as follows:

*The Inquiry has, however, considered whether a drinking-water emergency should have been declared under s 69ZZA of the Health Act. While the Inquiry has identified above aspects of HDC's and the DHB's*

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[1] Government Inquiry into Havelock North Drinking Water (2017), p. 135 [568]

WORKING TOGETHER

Napier City Council
Wairoa District Council
Hastings District Council
Hawke's Bay Regional Council
Central Hawke's Bay District Council

Postal| Private Bag 6006 | 159 Dalton Street | Napier 4142 | New Zealand
Location| 311 Lyndon Road East | Hastings | Telephone 06 8359200 | www.hbemergency.govt.nz

*contingency planning and response that were deficient, it does not consider that the overall circumstances of the outbreak meant that a drinking-water emergency should have been declared.*[2]

This contrasts the decision to declare a local state of emergency for the Havelock North Fires. Whilst again CDEM was not the lead agency, the Rural Fire Authority advised it could not acquire the resources it needed to fight the fires and the definition of an emergency under the Act was fulfilled.

It is therefore important that this Review obtain the full facts on any emergency response used as an example before using this as a basis for suggesting operational or legislative changes.

This submission will address the following matters:

- The place of response in the context of comprehensive emergency management in New Zealand
- The role of Local Government in emergency management
- CDEM response capability at all levels
- Existing command and control arrangements under the CDEM Act 2002
- CDEM response structures as provided for under the CDEM Act 2002
- Situational awareness in a CDEM emergency

### The Place of Response in the Context of Comprehensive Emergency Management in New Zealand

The New Zealand doctrine for emergency management is based on what is termed comprehensive emergency management which is represented by the 4Rs being Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery. While this Review is focused on response, it is important that any changes to legislation, structures or responsibilities consider the flow on effect across Reduction, Readiness and Recovery.

In the CDEM context, comprehensive emergency management is essentially delivered locally by the CDEM Groups which in themselves are made up of a coalition local authorities. This is logical as functionally individual local authorities are also primarily responsible for reduction, readiness and recovery across a wide range of other activities at a local level.

Reduction, readiness (community resilience) and recovery are delivered across a range of local government activities as normal business. Most CDEM Groups would have strong linkages into (or may take the lead on) the local government functions that contribute to comprehensive emergency management.

Response however, is primarily delivered by the CDEM Group in coordination with the emergency services and other government and non-government agencies.

Response is actually a very small, yet publically facing, part of comprehensive emergency management.

Key Points:

1. The concept of comprehensive emergency management should be maintained as the basis of how New Zealand deals with CDEM emergencies.

---

[2] Government Inquiry into Havelock North Drinking Water (2017), p. 145 [603]

2. If this is accepted then any separation of response from CDEM is likely to weaken the delivery of comprehensive emergency management.

### The role of Local Government in Emergency Management

This section focuses on the role of local government in CDEM, especially beyond the CDEM Group.

Section 17 of the Act outlines the functions of the CDEM Group. These logically compliment a number of the roles and functions of local government under the Local Government Act 2002. Furthermore section 17 also outlines a number of pieces of legislation supporting the CDEM Act which are also primarily administered by local government (e.g. Resource Management and Building Acts)

Beyond CDEM, local government is largely responsible for a range of functions such as:

- natural hazard research, risk analysis and reduction (Reduction);
- local economic and community development/resilience (Readiness/Recovery); and
- individual resilience (Readiness/Response/Recovery).

It is therefore understandable, that under the Act, CDEM outcomes are seen as largely being delivered by local government (often through the CDEM Group). The only significant exceptions to this are the obligations placed on Lifelines operators (of which all councils are also members) and the emergency services during the response.

Other requirements generally only fall on central government agencies during readiness and in support of the response. Central government welfare agencies would be an example of this.

MCDEM is one obvious exception to this, however the Ministry's role is more in the policy development and setting guidelines in readiness, supporting any local response and coordinating a national response.

The main issue for local government is not so much in reduction, readiness and recovery activities, but capability in the response. We believe that rather than making significant changes by removing responsibility for the response away from CDEM, clarity of those responsibilities and enhanced capability is needed to improve the overall response. This will be discussed more fully in the next sections of this submission.

Key Points:

1. Local government is a vital partner for central government in building individual and community resilience in making New Zealand as a whole more resilient to disasters.
2. The roles and responsibilities given to local authorities across a range of legislation (other than the CDEM Act) means local authorities are well placed to deliver CDEM outcomes to local communities.
3. Response capability is a weakness in local government, however that weakness is variable between CDEM Groups depending on resourcing and capability.

**CDEM Response Capability at all Levels**

We would agree that the response capabilities of New Zealand Emergency Services within their defined areas of responsibility are generally good. Therefore the purpose of this section is to make comment specifically on the CDEM sector being MCDEM, CDEM Groups and individual local authorities.

Our view is that this discussion would be helped by using the review of the response to the Canterbury Earthquakes as context. We would encourage the TAG to particularly read the response structures and capability comments in the *Review of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Response to the 22 February Christchurch Earthquake* (p190-195). It would appear to us that the comments made on recent responses and the resulting TOR of this review, are very similar to those issues raised as a result of the Canterbury Earthquake response review.

One of the key recommendations of that review relevant to response capability was:

1. *Enhance professionalism in emergency management: a 'cadre' of highly trained emergency managers from organisations across the country should be established to lead and control emergency responses.*

The Cabinet decided this should be investigated further, however we are not aware of any significant progress in this regard.

<u>MCDEM</u>

MCDEM has had relatively very little resource increase since the Canterbury Earthquakes until very recently. An analysis of the Ministry's Annual Plans shows that at the time of the Canterbury Earthquakes MCDEM had a staff of 39 full time equivalents (FTEs) and an operating budget of $10.7M. By comparison in 2016 MCDEM had about 40 FTEs and an operating budget of $11.7M.

Our view is the Ministry is under resourced particularly for a response related activities including developing increased response capability across the sector. As mentioned, until the 2016 Budget announcement MCDEM budgets were at best standing still. In the last 6 years however the requirement for policy development and change has increased greatly. Our view is that this has effectively meant that MCDEM has become more focused on developing policy and the response capability has not kept pace with wider changes in the sector.

This should not be taken as criticism of MCDEM staff who are committed, work hard and have very good relationships with the CDEM Groups.

However most national CDEM response roles are tacked on to an existing role which by nature leads to difficulties in prioritising work. Furthermore the structure of the Act makes it hard for MCDEM to take a stronger role in requiring consistency in response readiness across the CDEM Groups.

Our view is that MCDEM needs additional resourcing to develop a more effective national response structure including providing support to CDEM Groups during a response. To compliment this we also believe that MCDEMs role needs to be strengthened in the Act. This will be discussed more fully in the next two sections of this submission.

CDEM Groups

As a general observation, since the Canterbury Earthquakes the CDEM Groups have put a significant investment into their overall capability. For example, in less than 5 years the Bay of Plenty Group office has gone from 3 FTEs to 12[3]. The Waikato Group have increased their FTEs from 1.3 to 9. In the case of the Hawke's Bay Group, staff have increased from 1.5 to 6.5 FTEs. There has also been a corresponding increase in operational expenditure. In the case of the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group increasing from $1M in 2010 to $2.1M in 2016.

By contrast there has generally been very little increased investment by individual territorial local authorities. This points to the fact that most individual councils believe that a cooperative approach along shared service type arrangements produces the best CDEM outcomes for their communities. This has definitely been the experience from the Hawke's Bay perspective.

A number of CDEM Groups now employ full-time professional Group Controllers who are often the CDEM Group Manager as well. This approach is not uniform however and some smaller Groups do not have significant resourcing or capability to do this.

In Hawke's Bay the additional resourcing available since 2010 has focused on:

- Hazard research and reduction
- Increasing community and individual resilience planning
- Professionalization of key response roles such as Group Controller, Group Welfare Manager and response managers
- Training and exercising of council staff who operate coordination centres
- Welfare planning and response
- Coordination centre technology and processes

The key realisation in regard to capability is that the bar is consistently rising. While the Hawke's Bay Group has developed its response capability significantly, we would still struggle to effectively respond to a sustained large-scale event. For that reason we would support the development of national teams that could be deployed to support or even manage significant events.

As mentioned previously this was a significant recommendation of the Christchurch Earthquake Response Review and Cabinet agreed this should be investigated. We would recommend this now be given some priority and resourcing. National response teams could be multiagency (including selected CDEM Group staff) and should contain experts across the full range of CIMS functions. These teams may be deployed to take control of an major emergency but more importantly they could also be deployed across the full range of events to provide advice and expertise to a Group or local coordination centre.

We note this is not a new concept with Maritime NZ and Rural Fire having a similar tiered response capability.

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[3] Comparisons between 2010 and 2016 and does not include local EMO numbers.

Key Points:

1. The funding and resourcing of MCDEM has not kept pace with the investment by many of the CDEM Groups and the increasing expectation of a response. This needs to be addressed.
2. That multiagency National response teams should be developed to respond or support the response to significant civil defence emergencies.
3. Significant increases in resourcing has occurred at the CDEM Group level, however these could be better utilised and aligned through strengthening the role of MCDEM beyond a mainly policy/advisory role.

### Existing command and control arrangements under the CDEM Act 2002

The current Act is structured to deal with two levels of response namely national and local. In a national response the lines of command and control are relatively straight forward, however the national controller only has powers to direct the response down to a local level when a national declaration occurs. The February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake is the only time a national emergency has been declared.

In contrast the Group Controller has the ability to give direction to a local controller in any emergency whether a declaration has occurred or not. In line with our recommendation that MCDEM be better resourced to support the response to civil defence emergencies, we also recommend that the national controller also be given powers to direct group controllers in an emergency whether a national declaration has occurred or not.

Command and Control Definitions

During a state of national emergency the Act and the National Plan Group require the Director and/or national controller to *direct and control* the overall response[4]. However in section 9(2)(a) the powers are changed to *coordinating* resources.

In comparison during a declared local emergency group controllers are generally given powers to *direct and coordinate* the response. In our view use of the word coordinate lacks clarity and confuses the command and control arrangements in the response.

While individual emergency services and other government departments must retain command of their organisation, if a controller has responsibility and accountability for the overall response then they need to have very clear control arrangements over the supporting agencies.

The NZDF clearly identify command and control relationships which are words that are seen as having two very different meanings. Command is seen and being the direct authority to allocate people/resources to a specific task. Control is seen as the authority to delegate and prioritise tasks. For example in a CDEM context the police area commander will retain full command over their organisation however the operational control to delegate and prioritise the police CDEM response tasks may be given to the controller.

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[4] Section 8(2)(h) of the Act

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In our view this type of approach is clearer than "coordinating" resources, which leaves room for ambiguity during a response.

We believe that CDEM response command and control needs to be very clearly defined in the Act and in particular the National Plan.

Declarations

The Act provides for local elected officials to declare a state of emergency for their area. The Hawke's Bay CDEM group has clear delegations for who and where a declaration can be made. At the beginning of each triennium CDEM induction/familiarisation is conducted for councillors where the delegations, roles and responsibilities for elected officials is explained.

We are of the view that the existing provisions for declaring a state of emergency are fit for purpose. However there is often tension between the desire to have more control over an emergency response and having to place this responsibility in the hands of a single controller.

We are of the view that this clear separation between governance and management in the response needs to remain. This separation exists at central government levels where ministers do not interfere with operational matters.

The Joint Committee has the power to replace a controller during an emergency if they are not satisfied, and this is the appropriate mechanism for political input into the operational aspects of the response.

We also note that if the Minister has concerns over the handling of a local emergency, they have the power under the Act to either make a local declaration themselves or remove the relevant CDEM group from control of the response.

Key Points:

1. The power of a controller to direct a response in an emergency should apply whether a state of emergency has been declared or not.
2. That the national controller should be given the power to direct a group controller during an emergency.
3. That the command and control arrangements during an emergency need to be reviewed and clarified. In particular there needs to be clear definitions for these arrangements and those responsible for the response should have an appropriate level of control over supporting agencies.
4. That local government elected officials are the appropriate level for declaring a local state of emergency, however beyond the strategic input of the Joint Committee, a trained controller should retain overall management of the response.


**CDEM Response Structures as Provided for Under the CDEM Act 2002**

CDEM response structures under the Act envisage three levels being national, group and local. The Group <u>must</u> appoint a Group Controller, however it <u>may</u> appoint local controllers. This structure and how

**2017 Submission Ministerial Review Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in NZ**     **Attachment 1**

**Item 10**

**Attachment 1**

associated coordination centres work together in response was reviewed as part of the Christchurch Earthquake Review.

The key recommendation from that Review was:

*The emergency management response: territorial authorities should no longer have power to control the response to emergencies, but that they still retain the power to declare them.*

The Cabinet rejected this recommendation stating:

*Rather than diminishing the role of territorial authorities, MCDEM with work with regional CDEM Groups that need strengthening.*

Our view is that this Cabinet decision was a fundamental misunderstanding of how Groups should work and therefore missed an opportunity to streamline and clarify the roles of the different levels of government in CDEM. As stated in the Review:

*The Review found that the inherent duplication of control between the regional CDEM Group and CCC (Christchurch City Council) hampered the Response to the earthquake. The division between these two entities persisted in the CRC (Canterbury Response Centre) after it was formed. It is clear that the potential for duplication across the country needs to be reduced. This would concentrate resources, training and expertise on a smaller number of incident management teams and EOCs while still ensuring that emergency management is decentralised. (p190)*

*.........*

*This recommendation arises directly from an assessment of the efficiency and effectiveness of the several EOCs that operated during the Response:*

- *Initially both CCC and the Group operated separate EOCs in the same city, initially some few hundred metres apart. This involved duplication, confusion as to roles and uncertainty with supporting agencies as to with whom they should be dealing.*
- *After the declaration of National Emergency the two EOCs were merged but within the new CRC the two groups never melded into a cohesive organisation. This was despite the efforts by individuals on both sides to make the new structure work.*
- *It is quite clear the CCC EOC on its own could never have handled an emergency of this severity satisfactorily nor would the Group ECC have been able to cope, especially without the active support of the CCC.*

*These conclusions are reinforced by the experience after the September event when three TLAs each declared a state of local emergency and appointed their own EOC. The emergency was thus managed in three separate parts, despite considerable commonality in issues faced and resources required. With that event, partner agencies like the Police, MSD, the DHB and NGOs needed to appoint representatives in three EOCs rather than in one. (p191)*

Our view is that the above situation still exists across the country today and it is reinforced by the often conflicting roles and responsibilities between the national response, CDEM Groups and individual local authorities.

As an observation it would appear criticism of the response to recent events has occurred where there has been a lack of cooperation and at times strained relationships between members of the CDEM Group.

Our view is that individual members of the CDEM Group must abide by the majority decisions of the collective. There are examples around the country where individual councils have taken an "opt out" approach to CDEM Group decisions. This should be clarified in the legislation with powers to remove the ability of a local council to control a CDEM response given to the Minister and/or the Joint Committee.

We are of the view that you cannot allow differences or personalities to interfere with a coordinated Group response in a CDEM emergency.

While at times there has been conflict between individual Hawke's Bay councils on matters other than CDEM, both the Joint Committee and the CEG work to the common good and relationships in this area are strong. This has allowed the Group to take a comprehensive look at its capability, response structures and resourcing across the 4Rs but in particular for the response.

In 2015 the Group commenced an internal review of its response structures and method of operations. The review found:

1. Individual local councils lacked the staff and resources to manage anything other than a small emergency.
2. There was a lack of inter-operability between the coordination centre staff of different councils.
3. There was variability between equipment and processes in different coordination centres.
4. There was duplication of effort between the GECC and local EOCs.
5. The emergency services and other government agencies could not provide liaison and support five separate coordination centres across the region.
6. The public's expectation of a CDEM response had increased and this combined with the rise of digital media had increased the demand for instantaneous information and focus on the needs of the individual rather than communities.

It is likely that the above conclusions would be common across most Groups.

The Group decided that a rationalisation of Hawke's Bay response structures was needed to ensure that significant staff trained to an appropriate level were available to staff coordination centres during both a local and regional emergency.

The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group also rationalised its controller pool from 25 to 13 and appointing local controllers to the entire Hawke's Bay Group area so they can deploy in support of different councils. This has allowed us to focus limited resources on the developing a smaller pool, to a higher level.

The new mode of operational response adopted by the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group to address the above issues is outlined as follows:

1. The Group ECC will always activate in support a local council. The level of activation will depend upon the scale of the emergency however this helps to ensure that local councils have immediate access to the expertise held at the Group office.
2. Where possible the Group Controller will take the lead in the initial response to any event. This ensures that the expertise of the full time controller is used to establish situational awareness,

liaison with the emergency services, set the initial response objectives and develop the first action plan before a shift handover.

3. The GECC is staffed by three shifts made up of the staff of Hastings, Napier and the Regional Councils. This enables local knowledge to be retained in the GECC.
4. Individual councils are only responsible for managing their lifeline activities and this response in integrated into the Group Operations function.
5. All other CIMS functions are managed and fulfilled centrally.
6. The structure allows for Wairoa and Central Hawke's Bay to run scaled down EOCs given their relative geographical isolation.

As a result the number of coordination facilities across Hawke's Bay has effectively reduced from 5 to 3.

This structure has only recently been implemented. However a number of benefits are already accruing with common training and standardisation of roles and processes across different council staff. Recent gastro outbreak and rural fire events in Hastings District have been support by coordination centre staff from Napier City and Hawke's Bay Regional Councils.

We acknowledge the Hawke's Bay approach may not suit all Groups. In particular smaller groups who do not have the ability to provide a full-time CDEM controller resource, or those with large or remote areas. There could be an argument for the Government to establish a fund for Groups that lack the ability to fund appropriate response structures for their region.

Consideration should also be given to a more the most effective and equitable way to fund CDEM in to the future to ensure, regardless of where you live, you can expect a consistent level of service in readiness, response and recovery.

Currently there are a number of variables that determine how well funded CDEM is in each region. Some of the variability is around individual council decision-making and priorities, some is simply due to the size of the rating base. Within the Groups themselves, varying rating bases across individual local authorities often result in larger TLAs effectively subsidise smaller TLAs.

Hawke's Bay CDEM Group is moving towards a single regional targeted rate based at the property level. This will simplify the funding process, ensure budget allocation is done in the best interests of the Group and that there is equity between ratepayers who are effectively receiving the same level of service.

A consistent funding model across New Zealand would lead to a more equitable and consistent level of capability.

The funding model for CDEM is different to that of the other Emergency Services which are centrally funded and often use population to determine the capability to be provided. The funding model alone won't improve capability but a centralised funding model, alongside commitment from TLAs to provide staff and share resources with a centralised agency, could improve capability.

Key Points:

1. In general individual territorial authorities lack the expertise and resources to manage a significant CDEM response.

2. At a local government level the majority of CDEM expertise and experience now lies at the Group level.
3. We are of the view that at the local authority level there is no need for two layers of response as this leads to duplication and confusion.
4. While territorial authorities still need to respond in their role as Lifeline providers and support specific response functions, there is little need for them to direct or control a multiagency coordinated response at a local level.
5. The role and functions of regional CDEM Groups should be strengthened to ensure individual local authorities must actively participate and abide by the decisions of the Group.
6. A review of CDEM funding should be conducted to help ensure equitable service and capability across New Zealand.

**Situational Awareness in a CDEM Emergency**

This is an area which is constantly evolving as technology and expectations develop. From our perspective there appears to be three issues.

Firstly the ability for senior politicians and executives to access immediate information through news blogs and social media has increased significantly over the last 5 years. The issue is that much of this information lacks the checks and balances that official information must go through. There is no easy solution to this issue, however if the right technology was available and was used across all agencies and Groups, the flow of information and therefore situational awareness would improve.

Secondly, in terms of technology there is a wide range of off the shelf products which can be easily implemented to provide for quick impact and needs analysis.

There has been some work nationally to develop an impact analysis tool which can be used on the ground by all emergency services and CDEM volunteers. These systems automatically collate the information centrally at a coordination centre. However this appears to have stalled as different agencies have tried to cater for their specific needs.

This has also occurred in the welfare needs analysis space. The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group has developed a very simple tool based on free software used by NGOs. This enables individuals to be registered and their welfare needs identified. This information is collated at the GECC and cases allocated to the appropriate agency. An overall picture of the welfare situation can be easily attained.

We have yet to use this software in an event, however a recent welfare exercise had encouraging results and significantly increased our welfare capability.

All of these systems are portable and simple to use. They can use mobile or satellite data, or the data can be uploaded upon return to a civil defence facility.

The third issue is around the selection and governance of these types of systems. There needs to be a focused process for selecting systems and all agencies should be required to adopt the solution.

It would appear to us that technological solutions are available but identifying and implementing a common platform across all agencies involved in a CDEM response becomes bogged down in individual agency preferences and bias.

This needs to be addressed at a central level and individual agencies (including CDEM Groups) need to be held accountable if they do not adopt a common emergency management platform.

A good example of this is the decision by some CDEM Groups to not fully adopt EMIS. If all Groups used EMIS in the way it was intended the ability for the NCMC and other Groups to get situational awareness at a regional level would be greatly enhanced. Our view is that Groups should be required to use EMIS through the National Plan or other regulation.

Key Points:

1. Situational awareness is the key to making appropriate response decisions in a timely manner.
2. Decisions on what platforms record and deliver impact and needs information should be made at a national level by a single agency after consultation rather than agreement.
3. All agencies and CDEM Groups should be required to adopt these platforms and EMIS rather than allowing an "opt out " approach.

**Conclusions**

Despite recent commentary on responses to CDEM emergencies, the coordinated response to a civil defence emergency in New Zealand has improved over the last 5 years.

However improvements can always be made and this Review is an opportunity to reinforce and address a number of reoccurring issues identified in responses since the Canterbury Earthquakes.

It also needs to be remembered that a civil defence response is not just the responsibility of MCDEM, the CDEM Groups or individual councils. In responding to a civil defence emergency all agencies and even communities become part of Civil Defence. Any change that is just focused on one sector of the system will not make a significant difference.

Any change will need to resourced otherwise it is likely to fail and we will be having the same conversations in another 5 years.

The Hawke's Bay CDEM Group would like the opportunity to be heard and questioned on this submission.

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*Signed on Original*

Bill Dalton
Chairperson
Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group

Item 10

## Ministerial Review

## Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies

17 November 2017

Attachment 2

**Item 10**

**Attachment 2**

# Foreword

Anyone living in New Zealand is keenly aware that as a country we are vulnerable to geological and weather events and other hazards. The last six or seven years have been particularly eventful. Sometimes the consequences have been devastating and tragic – other times we have been luckier. The purpose of this review is to ensure that New Zealand's emergency response capabilities and framework is world leading and well placed to meet future challenges.

The measure of success has to be the extent to which the public has trust and confidence in the emergency management system. The system must lessen the consequences of an emergency - reducing death, injury or suffering, and damage to property.

In our view, ensuring public confidence in the emergency management system will require strengthening the application of current legislation, consistent with the intent of the CDEM Act, together with some changes to allow stronger national-level direction and regulation.

There are many strengths in the current system. The 'all hazards-all-risks' approach and connections to the wider national security system, the integration across the '4R's' of Reduction, Readiness, Response, Recovery, and the emphasis on engaging communities in emergency management, are consistent with international best practice.

There is clearly an enormous amount of commitment from staff from multiple agencies, volunteers and communities in responding to emergencies - this provides a good base to build on. At the same time, however, recent events have shown that the current system doesn't always work as well as it should for communities, stakeholders, and the public overall.

This review invited submissions and met with many people to understand their perspectives on the issues raised in the terms of reference. We visited regions that had recent experience of responding in a state of emergency. We heard a number of consistent themes throughout that engagement. These themes formed the basis of our views on the changes required. We tested these views further before settling on the recommendations in this report.

We looked for best practice in the emergency management systems of other jurisdictions – Australia, United Kingdom, United States and Canada.

We also considered the findings of previous reviews of responses to particular events, and reviews of emergency management systems generally. This included consideration of the findings and recommendations of reviews into recent events, such as review commissioned by Fire and Emergency New Zealand (FENZ) into the Port Hills fires, the independent reviews of the response to the Bay of Plenty weather events in April, and an internal government report on the refinery to Auckland pipeline disruption. These reviews highlight many of the same issues that we note in this review.

I am very grateful to all the organisations and individuals who wrote submissions and took the time to meet with members of the Technical Advisory Group.

I thank all the members of the Technical Advisory Group for their contributions, and the secretariat for their efforts in supporting the work of the Technical Advisory Group. The range of agencies represented highlights the many entities that need to collaborate and understand how each other works, in order to achieve 'better emergency responses'.

**Roger Sowry**

Chair Technical Advisory Group

# Contents

**Item 10**

**Attachment 2**

# Summary and key recommendations

New Zealanders expect a national emergency management system that can be relied on to work well when needed. That calls for a system that is underpinned by clear roles and responsibilities, good information and communication, the right capability and resources, and that makes the most of local knowledge - balanced with the need for specialist expertise and national capability.

This is in keeping with the intent of the current legislation. However, practice over the past fifteen years has not always matched this intent. The result is marked variations in practice and patchy capability across the country, and different understandings about roles, responsibilities and authority.

Ensuring public confidence in the emergency management system will require strengthening the application of current legislation, consistent with the intent of the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act (CDEM Act), together with some changes, to allow stronger national-level leadership, direction and standards.

Our recommendations are interdependent, and should be considered as a package. We believe that together they will provide New Zealand with a system that will be fit-for-purpose and well placed to meet future challenges.

Change is needed to the functions, structures, and culture at the national level. We recommend establishing a proactive *national emergency management agency* to provide national coordination and support in local emergencies, national control in national emergencies, and to lift CDEM performance overall. This includes professional leadership for the emergency management sector and a far stronger role in setting and enforcing national standards. The national agency must also provide assurance that those standards are being met. We see merit in the national director having stronger powers to direct and to ensure that responses to emergencies take account of national interests.

In all emergencies – regardless of scale – the consequences affect people, local economies, and communities. It is clear that local leadership, knowledge, and engagement with those affected communities is integral to supporting trust and confidence and to ensuring an effective response. We recommend that *mayors should have primary authority for declaring states of local emergency* under the CDEM Act. Further, we recommend providing the option to *declare a 'major incident'* in order to signal the significance of an event and achieve public recognition of the action being taken, without the extraordinary powers invoked under a state of emergency.

Organisational arrangements need to recognise that emergency response will require territorial, regional, and national capabilities in all but the most minor events. Emergencies can quickly escalate from a contained community event to a cross-district/regional emergency. The reality of how emergencies develop, the current legislative and institutional arrangements, and human nature, all contribute to the risk of not realising an emergency is beyond one's capability and capacity until far too late.

The current legislation intended that emergency management would be a consortium of territorial and regional effort (exercised through regional Groups). We are of the view that that intent needs to be strengthened. We recommend retaining the joint committee governance with iwi added. The majority view recommends requiring the development of *more formalised shared service arrangements, implemented by the regional or unitary council, to strengthen a Group-wide approach and accountability*. This would be supported with consistent Group Emergency Management Office structures.

Iwi need to have a major role in regionally based arrangements. Currently the resources, capability, and social capital of iwi to assist in emergency response is not recognised in legislation, and specific needs of Māori, whanau, hapū, and iwi are often not recognised in Group plans. We found a compelling case for iwi to be represented at all levels of the Group structure from our meetings with iwi and our reading of submissions received. As a result, we recommend *clearer protocols with iwi, and full participation of iwi in coordination and planning structures*.

There is a need for far greater professionalisation of emergency management in the CDEM system. Key roles in the system are often part-time. There is no real career path. Training and professional development is very patchy and there are no required professional standards or accreditation. Even with the best will in the world, emergency management responsibilities do not always get the priority they deserve (often an add-on to people's 'day jobs'). Despite the statutory requirement for Groups to have "suitably trained and competent personnel for effective emergency management in their areas", there is no assurance that the people on the spot will have the training, capability, or aptitude needed to respond to an emergency. No one wants response efforts being undermined by having the wrong person in the job. We recommend that *all staff in emergency management roles meet national standards for professional development and training, and key roles (for example, the Controller role) have national accreditation*.

Group effort needs to be backed with national capability that can be deployed as required. The recommendation *to establish a cadre of professionals to act as 'fly-in teams'* first surfaced in the Review of the CDEM Response to the 22 February Christchurch Earthquake. It received strong support then and was endorsed in many submissions received for this current review. There are examples of surge capacity teams deployed at the regional level, in other emergency response services, and internationally. Details of the capabilities required and the most appropriate operating model will need to be worked through. The starting point should be the functions in the CIMS[1] framework – controllers, planning, operations, logistics, intelligence (including science), communications, and welfare – drawn from the agencies best placed to provide these capabilities.

Local context and circumstances are important and must be taken into account in any response. But there is also a national interest in ensuring that the system will work when needed. There is a real need for some consistency, standardisation and agreed protocols (for example, in operating practice and procedures, structures, signage, roles and responsibilities). This allows Groups to support each other, and to help coordination (including, for example, deploying fly-in teams and managing cordons). The current legislation allows for this. Accordingly we recommend *greater national consistency and standards, and a more robust system of audit and assurance to ensure those standards are met*.

CDEM legislation is not as clear as one might expect. Regularly we heard that the authority to act, or the authority to task someone, either does not exist or is not clear. This situation can lead to a lack of coordination, no one really in charge, and the risk of poor outcomes for the community. We see a strong need to *clarify that Group (and national) Controllers have control authority - the authority to task other agencies - under a state of emergency*.

Authority must be backed by joined-up intelligence to support decision-making, with systems that allow agencies to work to a common operating picture. New Zealand's intelligence infrastructure and hardware has been inadequate in recent emergencies, although agencies individually have a lot of capability to draw on. Recent advances in technology could help provide better intelligence for

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[1] Coordinated Incident Management System (now in its second edition)

emergency management. We think *a new fit-for-purpose all-of-government NCMC[2] and 24/7 monitoring, alerting, and warning centre* is required. Further we recommend *investigating existing technologies available internationally to support a common operating picture*.

Effective responses rely on good communications to affected communities, to the public, and to decision makers. Mayors (and Ministers) will always front in emergencies, but they will need support to do that well. Social media is increasingly important, both as a source of intelligence, and as a communications channel. The Public Information Management (PIM) function in the current arrangements is primarily about information to the public through traditional channels, rather than strategic communications advice to assist Ministers and decision makers. As a result, we recommend *adding strategic communications to CIMS (and to fly-in teams)*, and *ensuring timely, consistent, and proactive use of the range of appropriate channels* (for example, social media, online, radio, print, TV).

We expand on these points in the chapters that follow. Appendix 2 provides details of current arrangements. Appendix 7 also lists a number of secondary matters that came to our attention.

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[2] National Crisis Management Centre in the Beehive basement in Wellington

# Chapter One: National level functions and structure

## Introduction

While this is not a review of the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management (MCDEM) our findings and recommendations have marked implications for the national-level emergency management agency.

The role we envisage is a significant shift in emphasis and stance from that of MCDEM currently and raises issues about the most appropriate structure, functions, and resourcing of the national-level emergency management agency.

## What we found

MCDEM has no formal statutory responsibilities. Its primary role is to enable the Director CDEM (the Director) to meet their functions, use of powers, and duties. These include:

- advising the Minister of Civil Defence
- identifying hazards and risks of national significance
- monitoring and evaluating the National CDEM Strategy and the National CDEM Plan
- developing standards and guidelines
- monitoring performance of CDEM Groups
- promoting civil defence emergency management, and leadership, and stewardship of the CDEM system
- in a national emergency, directing and controlling the resources available for civil defence emergency management, and controlling Groups
- outside of national emergencies, coordinating the resources available for emergency management.

While the purpose and construct of the CDEM Act puts the emphasis on local authorities taking joint action (through regional Groups), the provisions of the Act allow for an assertive, and when required, directive stance nationally to ensure readiness to respond.

Over time MCDEM's approach has emphasised the importance of guidance, relationships, consultation, and suasion, rather than the use of prescriptive or directive powers in the Act. Indeed, early guidance from the Ministry (in 2002, immediately after the Act came into effect) stated that '*the Ministry has no intention to develop rigid codes of Group practice, or conduct audit programmes. It is most appropriate that Groups decide on their own performance levels or targets and evaluation programmes, within their Group Plan*' (DGL 1/02 page 11).

This approach has been appropriate for ensuring commitment to the National CDEM Strategy and Plan Order and Group ownership of their own plans and activities. Moreover it was a pragmatic response given the Act has no penalties for non-compliance with national directions outside a state of national emergency.

Nonetheless, we believe that devolution to this degree has resulted in wide variation of practice, performance, and capability across Groups, and unclear command, control and coordination authority across agencies in emergencies.

We heard from a range of submitters who echoed this view. There was a call for greater clarity and direction in the legislation (fewer 'mays' and more 'musts') and for more proactive leadership nationally - both in planning and in response. As one submitter noted, 'Wellington is good at writing guidelines and [Groups] are good at ignoring them'.

We found that MCDEM has also taken on a range of activities that are not directly related to the core business of enabling the Director to meet their statutory functions and duties across all hazards. In particular, MCDEM is the 'lead agency' for particular hazards – specifically for natural disasters (earthquake, tsunami, flood, other weather) and for infrastructure failure. MCDEM is also the lead agency for the coordination of welfare services aspects of emergency response and a number of subfunctions related to welfare services (including registration and needs assessment). These acquired responsibilities do not sit well with oversight of emergency management generally in an all hazards - all risks framework.

## Options and evaluation

As later chapters discuss there is a need for a far stronger, more proactive, stance at the national level.

We consider below:

- the functions of that agency
- the organisational form of that agency, and
- resourcing considerations.

### Functions of the national agency

The national agency's primary purpose is to enable the Director to meet their functions and duties, and exercise their powers (see above). The outcome sought is effective risk reduction, readiness, response and recovery from emergencies arising from all hazards and risks. Specific functions for the national agency arising from this review include:

- being responsible for providing national support and coordination in states of local emergency, and control in national emergencies
- taking an oversight role through developing, monitoring and evaluating the all hazards-all risks National CDEM Strategy and Plan, and addressing matters of national interest relevant to Groups and other agencies[3], and
- assuring system capability and performance through setting standards and monitoring whether those standards are being met.

Within that, a number of judgements are required:

- **Policy vs operations**: We see the national agency primarily as an operational agency. This includes operational policy (for example developing the National Strategy and National Plan). Strategic policy relating to emergency management across all relevant Acts should be considered as a part of wider national security policy, and accordingly responsibility transferred

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[3] For example, coordinated business continuity plans across Government agencies, coordinated requests on national capability or scarce resources in Group plans, ensuring attention to national priorities by Groups, and responding to common issues raised by Groups, their plans or other agencies.

to the national security policy directorate of DPMC. This is a change from the original decisions that established MCDEM in 1997. It reflects both the evident need for a greater *operational* focus at the national level to support effective emergency management, and the greater *strategic* focus required than was apparent at the time MCDEM was set up.

- **4R's vs readiness and response**: On balance we recommend retaining responsibility for all 4Rs (with an all hazards – all risks perspective) within the national agency. Arguably, reduction and recovery are primarily *consultative*: readiness and response are primarily *directive.* Managing these different styles within one organisation can be challenging. However, drawing the line between reduction and readiness for example, or between response and recovery, would be arbitrary, and all four aspects need to be seen as a whole to be effective.

- **Lead agency responsibilities:** Lead agency responsibilities need clarifying generally (see discussion in Chapter Six). Further to that, being the lead agency responsible for particular hazards or consequences does not sit well with the all hazards – all risks perspective that the national agency needs to take. We recommend that:

  - *MBIE is specified as lead agency with responsibility for central government advice on infrastructure failure* across the 4R's, recognising its relevant policy and regulatory roles and links to industry and sector coordinating entities (telcos, energy). There are also calls to be made in relation to responsibility for transport and water.
  - *Responsibility for assessing, monitoring, and alerting the hazard risk in relation to geological and meteorological risks (earthquake, tsunami, volcanic, landslide, flood, severe weather) is clarified and assigned to the agency with best information and capability to undertake it.* It is clear that the national agency would lead the *response* to national emergencies, and coordinate and support the response to local emergencies, caused by such events. That is on the basis that a state of emergency has been declared because of the consequences, not on the basis that it was caused by a natural disaster. Responsibility for assessing, monitoring, and alerting the hazard risk, advice on mitigating the risk, and so on, sits better with the agencies with specialist capability in those hazards (for example, MetService for severe weather, GNS Science for geological hazards). This would suggest for example that responsibility for tsunami warnings should be with GNS Science.
  - *MSD is specified as lead agency across 4R's with responsibility for coordinating welfare services and the subfunctions of registration and needs assessment.*

- **Audit and assurance vs regulatory compliance:** The national agency will need to play a strong role in setting, monitoring and reporting national standards. These standards would be given effect through regulation, which is provided for in current legislation. Some submissions called for a stronger focus on regulatory compliance to ensure duties are being met. We believe it is best to reinforce the accountability of Groups to their communities for performance against national standards, and to rely on local pressure to provide incentive for performance against those standards. Some submissions saw merit in establishing a new position of Inspector-General of Emergency Management (as in some Australian states) to audit and provide assurance over the emergency management system. We do not see the need for that at this stage. Instead we recommend using the current monitoring framework to full effect. This would see:

  - the national agency set standards by regulation
  - Groups self-evaluate performance against those standards
  - the national agency assess and publish Groups' compliance and performance against those standards

Chapter One– National level

- the Office of the Auditor-General (OAG) to report on emergency management matters in its local government audits.

These recommendations all influence the structure and capability of the national agency.

## New National Emergency Management Agency

We believe there is a strong case for a significant shift in culture, objectives, business strategy and operating model at the national level. The choice is either to shift MCDEM's focus and culture within the current organisational arrangements, or to take the opportunity to establish a new National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) to replace MCDEM.

Restructuring on its own would do little to change focus and culture. However establishing a new agency would provide greater autonomy, transparency, and status for the emergency management role. It may also allow greater strategic focus for DPMC in respect of DPMC's other roles. And it would send a clear signal of change in direction and operating style.

The disadvantage of course would be the level of disruption and instability that any restructuring incurs - and the expense of rebranding.

On balance, we believe that establishing a new organisation is required.

## Structure

There are a range of options for the structure of NEMA. Broadly, these are:

- a business unit within DPMC (as MCDEM is currently) or of another department
- a stand-alone department or departmental agency
- a stand-alone Crown entity, or
- a part of Fire and Emergency New Zealand (FENZ).

We do not see any compelling synergies that would warrant NEMA being a business unit of another department, and we do not recommend this option. In our view, there is a need to raise the profile of NEMA in line with the mission of leadership and culture described above.

We do not favour the Crown entity option. The Minister plays an important role constitutionally in emergencies. The Minister is the authority of last resort with powers that include declaring states of emergency and directing resources. This requires a strong relationship between the agency and the Minister.

Some submitters raised the idea of FENZ taking on a wider emergency management role – in effect becoming or subsuming NEMA. We do not support this. First, it would not allow for the close connection with the Minister that we believe is required - and second, it is not clear that FENZ would be the best place for NEMA to be the national agency in an all hazards-all risks and 4R's sense given FENZ's primary responsibilities.

On balance, we recommend NEMA is established as a departmental agency. This gives the benefit of status as a department -- with a Chief Executive accountable to a Minister – while taking account of its likely size as a fairly small and focussed organisation. It may lack the economies of scale enjoyed by larger departments.

Departmental agencies are hosted by larger departments with some connection to the mission of the agency. It makes sense for that to continue to be DPMC, given the connections to the wider national security system that DPMC also has responsibility for.

Chapter One– National level

### Resourcing

It will be important that NEMA has the resources and capability to credibly do the job expected of it. We expect that will require strengthening of the capability and capacity.

Resource needs are likely to include stronger operational capability (including use of legislative tools) and dedicated response staff to allow it to flex and adapt to all contingencies – with arrangements in place to cover not just medium-scale events, but also large-scale catastrophic events if needed. Secondment arrangements with other departments as well as 'on-call' arrangements could strengthen surge capacity.

## System Stewardship

We are aware than many of the recommendations of this review are not new. They have been considered previously, in the context of other reviews of the system, of events, or of exercises. However, progress on actioning them appears to have been patchy or slow. On the face of it, that suggests there may be barriers to addressing these cross-cutting issues that require collective endeavour and commitment from a number of agencies. This situation is not unique to this area of the public service. The practical implementation of the recommendations of this review will therefore need effective mechanisms to progress these cross-cutting issues.

Related to that, there is a need for continued attention to ensure good stewardship of the emergency management system, so that Ministers, stakeholders, and the public can have confidence that the system will work as intended when needed, and be cost-effective. There has been a lot of effort in this area (as a part of the national security system) over recent years. The National Security System Handbook sets out the overall governance arrangements for the national security system. And as noted by the Auditor-General and others, there is much to be commended in the current arrangements.

Nonetheless, on the basis of the findings of this review, we believe there is a need to strengthen the accountability for stewardship of the emergency management system (particularly in respect of multi-agency issues) if we are to be confident that it will remain fit-for-purpose and fit-for-the-future.

The question of how to get better collaboration and collective impact across agencies is not unique to this sector. A range of approaches have been taken across the public service to break down 'silos', get better collective impact, and to strengthen incentives and accountability for stewardship. We recommend looking at the applicability of those models for this sector, and in particular:

- **Transparency**: require clear priorities and results, greater CE accountability for achieving those results, and transparency of performance against those results. This is the thinking behind the *Better Public Services* framework for example. In this area, we cannot rely on evidence of outcomes to drive performance and stewardship – it would be too late then. There is room for more clarity about key hazards and risks, and transparency in assessment of how they are being managed. The work of the National Risks Unit in DPMC may be helpful in this regard.

- **Governance**: require joint strategic planning and coordinated implementation across key agencies, backed by a Ministerial group to drive demand. This is the approach taken in other sector groups – in natural resources, social services, and economic agencies for example. This could involve the National Security Committee playing a stronger role in governing work programmes.

- **Setting up a cross-cutting agency**: establish a cross-cutting agency to better integrate work areas, and to disrupt departmental silos.  This is the approach taken in the Social Investment Agency for example.

We think there is merit in all these approaches, and recommend that they be developed further to support collective action and system stewardship in this area.

Further, we note that to be effective, all these approaches require stronger incentives and accountability for collective action – perhaps through joint accountabilities in departmental CE's performance agreements, backed up in Ministerial letters of expectation.

## Recommendations

We recommend that you:

1.0 **Agree to establish a new National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) as a departmental agency hosted by DPMC**, to replace MCDEM.

2.0 **Agree that the core function of NEMA is to enable the Director CDEM to meet their functions and duties and exercise their powers** under relevant emergency management legislation, including:
    2.1 As the national authority for support and coordination in states of local emergency, and control in national emergencies.
    2.2 Taking an oversight role through developing, monitoring and evaluating the all hazards-all risks national CDEM Strategy and Plan, and addressing matters of national interest in Groups' and other agencies' plans and activities.
    2.3 Assuring system capability and performance through setting standards and monitoring that those standards are being met.

3.0 **Note that this will require more proactive leadership** of the sector, and an assertive, and when required, directive stance, as envisaged in the provisions of the CDEM Act.

4.0 **Retain the 4R's all hazards—all risks perspective within NEMA, with a focus on operational responsibilities**, and consider shifting strategic policy advice responsibilities to a separate part of DPMC.

5.0 **Agree that the NEMA's monitoring responsibilities, and OAG audit responsibilities, will be used to full effect through publication of results**.

6.0 **Agree that lead agency responsibilities are allocated to appropriate agencies**, and that:
    6.1 MBIE is specified as lead agency with responsibility for infrastructure failure.  There are also calls to be made in relation to responsibility for transport and water.
    6.2 Responsibility for assessing, monitoring, and alerting the hazard risk in relation to geological and meteorological risks (earthquake, tsunami, flood, other weather) is clarified.
    6.3 MSD is specified as lead agency with responsibility for welfare aspects of response.

7.0 **Ensure that NEMA has the resources and the capability to credibly do the job expected of it**.

8.0 **Strengthen incentives and accountability for system stewardship**, through:
    8.1 Developing transparency, governance, and structural approaches to strengthen collective action and stewardship in this sector, and
    8.2 Considering joint accountabilities in departmental CE's performance agreements, backed up in Ministerial letters of expectation.

# Chapter Two: Regional Structure

## Introduction

This chapter considers the structures and arrangements that are overseen by local government.

A core component of the CDEM Act 2002 is the establishment of CDEM Groups. A Group is a consortium of the local authorities in a region, working in partnership with emergency services, to undertake CDEM functions within their Group area.

There are 16 Groups in New Zealand, generally following regional and unitary council boundaries.

A region wide Group approach is explicitly required by the CDEM Act. Groups must prepare a Group Plan that identifies the hazards and risks in the area, and how they propose to manage those hazards and risks. The smallest area over which CDEM activities would be planned and implemented was assumed to be the geographic area of a regional or unitary council, with the provision for neighbouring Groups to operate collectively. We have heard that 'what you do before an event is critical'.

In non-unitary council regions, Groups have discretion in regard to the split of functions between the regional council and territorial authorities, the contribution respective councils make, and any business structures to assist collaboration. The Act is permissive rather than prescriptive on those arrangements.

The question asked by this chapter is whether current arrangements are fit for future needs.

The important principles are:

- the well-being of local communities should be in the forefront of Group decision-making

- continuous and sustained improvement in performance across the Groups should be integral to Group planning

- resources should be used efficiently, with incentives for performance and accountability to communities

- the current Act's intent and purpose should be reaffirmed, with the Act's particular requirement that Group members collaborate

- strong and necessary links to territorial authority functions should be retained

- be adaptable and nimble and take account of resourcing pressures on differently sized councils

- minimum standards should incentivise and support collaboration and cooperation, including the establishment and deployment of fly-in teams.

## What we found

Since the CDEM Act came into effect, the different Groups in New Zealand have taken different approaches.

This has allowed a measure of innovation and flexibility. Some Groups have initiated, and successfully run, a shared services approach (for example in Otago and in Nelson/Tasman). Other Groups have discrete examples of good practice - e.g Bay of Plenty's involvement of iwi and Canterbury's proposal for an intra-regional surge capacity.

*Item 10*

*Attachment 2*

Chapter Two – Regional Structure

At the same time however, the wide variation in approaches has impacted on the effectiveness of emergency management, and the confidence that can be had in the system overall.

**There is little consistency in operating practice**, systems, terminology, roles or responsibilities across Groups. That makes interoperability and cooperation harder. Group Plans are often not clear about roles and responsibilities for Group members and others during emergencies, and certainty about who does what during response is mixed. We heard many submitters call for greater consistency in operating practice across Groups, and clarity about the respective roles for territorial and regional councils.

Approaches are **not always collaborative.** In some areas territorial councils do not buy-in to the joint planning and implementation activities. This outcome is at odds with the existing and clear purpose of the present statute that local authorities will coordinate, through regional groups, planning, programmes and activities related to civil defence emergency management (section 3(d)). The shortcoming in the statute is not that it is not clear about what is required but it lacks positive incentives for compliance and sanctions for non-compliance. This has perhaps given rise to a perception in some quarters that compliance with the purpose of the statute is voluntary. In our view the purpose of the statute is clear. Adherence, through a variety of mechanisms, needs to be incentivised and required.

There is confusion about whether the current arrangements are based on **two or three tiers** of governance and coordination. There was a common perception from submissions and discussion that the CDEM structure was primarily in three parts, and that that was too many. Some submitters noted for example that "recent emergencies...demonstrated that the local, regional, national structure does not work" and that the "the current 3-tier system does give good span of control, however there are too many weak links." The common references in submissions to three tiers reflects the *act locally, coordinate regionally, and support nationally* tagline that has developed. This is not in the Act. The Act has a two tier system: regionally coordinated Groups and a national level Director.

**Capability** of Groups is very mixed. The CDEM National Capability Assessment Report 2015 shows that 13 years after the Act came into force, only half of the Groups reached the target set by MCDEM for adequate capability across the 4R's. Group Plans rarely acknowledge the number of small district councils that will struggle to resource an emergency response of any scale.

Our conclusion is that, while there is merit in Groups taking account of local circumstances and context, overall these variations affect the ability of Groups to respond effectively and meet their community expectations. We believe a return to the intent of the Act is required.

## Options and evaluation

To that end, we consider that there is a clear need to require Groups to:

- adhere to the statute's present requirements and take a regional approach
- be subject to stronger national standards on minimum requirements (such as capability and operating practice)
- provide adequate funding and resourcing to ensure a minimum standard of performance capability is acquired, and
- be subject to stronger governance and accountability expectations of their performance.

Item 10

Attachment 2

Chapter Two – Regional Structure

We considered a range of options for achieving that.

1. **Strengthened Status Quo** – no change to the functions and requirements set out in the current CDEM Act, but bolster implementation with stronger national standards (through NEMA), and stronger accountability for resourcing, capability, and performance (through NEMA monitoring and OAG audit).

2. **Mandatory Group framework** - retain the Group joint committee governance arrangements but require more consistent approaches across Groups (in roles and responsibilities, operating practice, for example) and a more formalised shared service arrangements, resourced and administered by the regional council. Like option one, this option can be supported with national performance standards and increased monitoring.

3. **Specify CDEM as a solely regional council function** – this envisages a structure where CDEM activities are a business unit of regional council. Territorial authorities would have to be subject to regional council direction and any delegations.

4. Set up **a separate entity, akin to a council controlled organisation,** with a Board. This would provide separation from the local government structure. It would enable formalised shared service to territorial authorities and the regional council.

5. One **organisation across New Zealand** - so all the key coordination functions, and employment of Group Controllers are run centrally. This option came up in a number of forums, although in different forms.

Option 1 would allow Groups to determine the 'how' – that is, what arrangements work best for their circumstances to meet the required regional approach and national standards. The joint committee of elected members would be collectively accountable for meeting those requirements and for the performance of the Group.

Option 2 would specify the 'how' – that is, it sets standard arrangements that Groups are to put in place. That allows for greater consistency and confidence that the arrangements will work, but may raise questions about their appropriateness to all Groups' circumstances. The regional council would be directly accountable for the performance of the Group.

There were a range of views on this. On balance the majority favour option 2. This approach would allow for a stronger regional focus, greater consistency in practice across Groups, better assurance about capability, clearer roles and responsibilities in emergency response, and clearer accountability for performance. Notwithstanding the advantages of option one in allowing arrangements to be tailored to local circumstances, the majority's belief is that even with stronger standards and accountability, nothing will improve, or it will improve at too slow a pace, if we continue with current roles and structure.

The minority view (held by the LGNZ representative on TAG) is that option 1 (which at various levels might encompass in practice aspects of options 2, 3 and 4) is preferable and less prescriptive in nature. With the right incentives, improved sanctions for non-compliance, and a requirement for revenue adequacy to meet set minimum standards of performance, a fit for purpose outcome consistent with the present purpose of the statute is attainable. It leaves sufficient flexibility to cater for differences in approach between regions.

Chapter Two – Regional Structure

Options 3, 4 and 5 are substantially different from the status quo, and would all come with substantive cost. In particular, the option of a single organisation (option 5) does not utilise, and build on, the principle that local communities are best served by people who know them and their local issues. The level of commitment we have seen from many councils and individuals to more collaborative approaches does not warrant such a substantial change to the local level arrangements.

On a technical note, we recognise that the Chatham Islands Council, and the special status of White Island, require specific consideration and further work. For the Chatham Islands, the principle of collective support during an emergency still applies. But it is physically very isolated, and has its own Act acknowledging its size and unusual circumstances. For White Island, we note that it currently falls outside any territorial authority, and so has no mayor.

## Recommendations

We recommend that you:

**1.0  Require Groups to take a regional approach consistent with the intent of the CDEM Act**

**2.0  Require Groups to provide adequate funding and resourcing for effective CDEM activities**

**3.0  Strengthen national standards over minimum requirements** (for example, capability, operating practice as outlined in Chapter One)

**4.0  Strengthen Group (joint committee) governance** (for example, requirements on members to participate, limits on ability to delegate), and

**5.0  Strengthen accountability for Group performance** (through NEMA monitoring and OAG audit, as outlined in Chapter One)

The majority recommend that you:

**6.0  Require the development of shared emergency management services across the CDEM regions**, covering:
    6.1  The regional or unitary council responsible for resourcing and administration.
    6.2  Consistent Emergency Management Office structures, with EOCs across the Group area.
    6.3  Regional appointment and oversight of all Controllers, with clear line management and an emphasis on appointments embedded within territorial authorities.
    6.4  Defined functions and responsibilities for respective territorial and regional councils.

Item 10

Attachment 2

# Chapter Three:  Declarations

## Introduction

Declaring an event, or potential event, a 'state of emergency' is a key part of the emergency management system.  A state of emergency, over a defined area, triggers the ability to use extraordinary powers and access resources.  The appointed Controller has control authority.

This chapter discusses who declares a state of emergency (local and/or national), factors affecting their decision to declare (or not), geographic scope and the public's expectations around information.

## What we found

Although the Act emphasises taking a Group area wide approach to declaring states of emergency, the default practice is that mayors use the option of declaring over their districts.

There are mixed motivations to 'declare'. The most common reasons are access to resources and need to access the power to evacuate.

Other reasons included to signal to the public that the event needs to be taken seriously, and to give the public confidence that the event is being responded to appropriately.

Reasons for not declaring included concern that it would signal a failure – for example a lack of readiness or poor preparation; no evidence that the emergency services cannot cope; or no need to access powers.

> *The Mayor of Whanganui declared a state of local emergency on 4 April 2017, in anticipation of a flood event based on the weather forecast.  Although the predicted flood level did not eventuate, the voluntary evacuations and media coverage during daylight mean the community felt prepared. The mayor and council received no public negative reaction to what they refer to as "the dry run".*

We heard that mayors have been asked to make a decision to declare, or not, when they lack experience and training.  This can result in confusion, mistakes and delays.

There is inconsistent practice across New Zealand. Different factors are prioritised in different cases. Occasionally there is strong media and public debate about what should have happened. Following extensive coverage and increased discussion about civil defence emergencies in 2017 we note a visible shift in the bias – towards declaring states of emergency.

There was some support in submissions, particularly from Groups, for provision of an interim mechanism - a 'major incident' declaration - that would signal event significance and importance to the public, but not trigger extraordinary powers.  For some this recommendation was expressed as a desire for clarity between activation of an emergency operation centre and a declaration.

It is not uncommon for a state of local emergency to be initially declared by mayors over their districts, and then within hours or a day a state of local emergency being declared for the whole, or greater parts of, the region.  This latter 'Group declaration' is declared by the relevant person appointed by the Joint Committee – sometimes without consulting or even advising the mayors affected.

Item 10

Attachment 2

Chapter Three – Declarations

## Options and evaluation

We considered three options around who should make declarations of states of emergency.

**Option 1: Mayors have primary authority to declare for their districts (change of onus from the current Act, and recognises current practice).** Deciding to affect residents requires a value judgement that only elected representatives can legitimately make. Locally this will be mayors or a delegated councillor. The downside of this option is that sometimes it is very clear that a much wider area needs to be covered by a declaration (where a multi-district or Group wide declaration makes pragmatic sense).

**Option 2. Status Quo - a chosen elected representative or the Mayor:** this option still has an elected representative making the decision.

**Option 3. Officials, rather than elected members, have the authority to declare:** this is on the basis that the decision to declare is a technical one – the use of powers requires a professional judgement. We are aware that this option, particularly the power of the Director to declare a state of emergency, was specifically removed from the CDEM Act 2002 during the Committee stage.

We recommend option 1, which emphasises the current usual practice of mayors declaring. We continue to be of the view that elected members, when trained and receiving sound advice, are best placed to front any decision to declare, rather than officials. This option also needs to provide for a single declaration that covers more than one district. We do not recommend changing the current powers of the Minister of Civil Defence to declare in certain circumstances.

### Factors affecting the decision and scope

We considered how best to address a reluctance to declare, when declaring would have boosted awareness of an event, good community and personal decision making, and public confidence in those with authority.

A state of emergency area should be limited to the physical location affected (unless requisitioning powers are required over wider areas). It is appropriate for an area as small as a ward (such as Matata) to be under a state of emergency while the rest of the district remains outside of that declared 'state'.

We support the view that **guidance to declare a state of emergency should formally include 'public confidence' as a factor to consider.** On its own, maintaining public confidence may not be a strong reason to access the extraordinary powers triggered by a state of emergency but it should be a factor. The option of declaring a major incident (see below) may also meet this need.

### Major incident

We see merit in **provision to declare a 'major incident' as an alternative to a state of emergency.** Declaring a major incident would likely result in activation of an emergency operation centre, increased social media profile, liaison and coordination with emergency services and use of powers available to councils, Fire and Emergency NZ, the Police, and others, under other Acts. Any need to access CDEM powers could be reconsidered as required. This option formalises what already occurs. An 'activation' is a common initial response of councils and emergency services to events, either followed by a stand-down or a formal emergency declaration. As with the current declarations, it should be a mayoral decision and announcement.

Item 10

Attachment 2

## Recommendations

We recommend that you:

**1.0 Clarify that elected representatives (the mayors) have primary authority to declare states of local emergency for their respective districts.**

    1.1 Revise section 25 of the Act to give mayors the primary role.

    1.2 While mayors have primary authority, provide for the Chair of the Joint Committee to be able to declare in appropriate circumstances (consulting with affected mayors where practicable) as a multi-district or Group wide declaration may be most appropriate.

**2.0 Require training and advice as a precondition for any person (primarily the mayors) using their authority to declare a state of local emergency.**

    2.1 If a mayor is not trained then another trained representative of the elected members of the Joint Committee (the Group) will need to declare.

**3.0 Retain the ability for the Minister of Civil Defence to declare any state of emergency (local or national).** No change to the current Act is proposed.

**4.0 Amend guidance to include 'public confidence' as a factor to consider in deciding to declare a state of emergency.**

**5.0 Provide the option of the mayor declaring a 'major incident'.**

    5.1 Under a major incident the legislative powers available are limited to those that the councils and emergency services (such as Police) can use under other Acts[4].

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**What might Recommendation 5 look like?**

*Scenario 1:  Whanganui potential floods April 2017* - would achieve helpful media profile, and coordination across emergency services. CDEM powers weren't needed (message was get prepared to evacuate). Although forecasts supported a precautionary approach, the 'emergency' never eventuated.  If the flood had occurred everything was in place to upgrade to a declaration and start evacuations using powers.

*Scenario 2: Hawke's Bay gastro outbreak* - there was neither a CDEM state of emergency nor a drinking water emergency declared (under the Health Act). CDEM powers were not required. But the council as owner of the infrastructure was a key player, along with the DHB. An announcement of 'major incident' might have raised the profile and assisted dissemination of information.

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[4] Examples include: utility preventative works under section 330 of the Resource Management Act 2002, evacuations under the Fire and Emergency NZ Act 2017 and road closures for repair under the Local Government Act 1974.

# Chapter Four: Role of Iwi

## Introduction

While the review terms of reference does not specifically refer to iwi, we became aware of the role iwi had played in recent emergencies when considering matters related to Outcome 1 and Outcome 2 in the terms of reference. We also had a significant number of submissions that highlighted the capacity and capability of iwi to support those impacted by disasters.

Iwi response to disasters and emergencies, like that of others involved, is swift and driven by local needs. There is commonly early activation of marae, Māori wardens and other Māori whanau, hapū, and iwi networks to the fullest extent possible, in the context of the emergency.

Iwi's first call is to support whanau/hapū.

Iwi are also a huge source of social capital with significant resources to activate in response: such as welfare – shelter and food, communication networks and access to key supplies.

However, iwi participation in emergency management is not included in current legislation and the relationship is not always well managed at Group or national level.

## What we found

The settlement of historic claims under the Treaty of Waitangi has resulted in significant growth of iwi business, social development and general organisational strengthening across New Zealand.

Some councils and their staff have not kept up to date with developments in this area and are not engaging with local Rūnanga appropriately – this is especially noticeable in iwi being 'consulted' far too late in planning stages.

Marae are commonly well resourced to assist in emergencies. The philosophy of manaakitanga and looking after the visitors first prevails, and the focus is the whole community. This capability is reflected in National CDEM Plan clause 73(5)(g)(i). In some recent events (14 November earthquake and flooding in Whanganui) local iwi initiated resources and communication networks, but there was no formalised structure for their involvement.

We received many submissions from iwi and others regarding iwi who responded rapidly to community needs but were excluded from operations discussions or included so late that they felt insulted. Iwi expect to be involved because they know the locality and people in it.

In some recent emergencies iwi were not consulted during the local planning or response phases even though 80% of the affected population identified as Māori. Funding for reimbursement of costs incurred by Marae and/or other iwi resources was either not clear, or was regarded by iwi as bureaucratic and complex.

One exception was the relationship being developed in Whanganui where iwi participated from the outset in April 2017 for the first time. There may be others.

Chapter Four – Role of Iwi

## Evaluation

Iwi alone carry the mandate to determine the nature and extent of the role they may wish to play in emergency management. We support and encourage a nationally led approach to develop and enhance the relationship between CDEM agencies (nationally and locally) and iwi. We also encourage a nationally led initiative to support the development of locally led protocols for iwi participation in emergency management.[5] It is important that all Groups and responders work appropriately with iwi.

While Te Puni Kōkiri (TPK) has a role in the region and can assist with engaging iwi organisations, this does not mean that TPK is able to represent the regional iwi. There is greater value in agencies with a role in response working to develop relationships with key iwi organisations in advance, as an integral part of emergency management planning and preparation. Iwi representatives commented that they wished to be viewed as a partner of value, engaged with at the outset, rather than just another entity to consult with when plans were developed.

Evidence from submissions and our meetings with iwi created a compelling case for iwi to be represented at all levels of the Group structure. However iwi were quick to point out that there are varying levels of capacity to engage. Participation needs to start with a conversation. In many regions there are a number of iwi in a region. In most cases iwi have good relations and regularly work together to ensure they are able to resource participation.

The recent engagement model developed to enable participation under the Resource Management Act was identified by iwi as one that Groups could look to. This is an approach that could also work for enabling iwi to determine how they wish to participate in emergency response and across the 4R's.

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**Mana Whakahono-a-Rohe**

There is a participation model that has been written into the Resource Management Act (RMA) legislation that may provide a model for engagement on emergency management. Mana Whakahono-a-Rohe are mechanisms for iwi participation in local government decisions. They are written agreements between local government and iwi authorities to record how iwi authorities will participate in the preparation, change or review of a policy statement or plan.

These agreements are not limited to one iwi authority and one council, there can be more than one party to each side of the agreement. The RMA provides several guiding principles for the participating authorities that wish to initiate a Mana Whakahono-a-Rohe.

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## Recommendations

We recommend that you:

1.0  **Recognise the capability** that iwi bring to emergency management.

2.0  **Legislate** to enable iwi to participate in planning for and responding to a natural disaster or other emergency, and to bring more clarity to their role:

   2.1: Appropriate iwi representatives to be part of the Groups' Coordinating Executive Group (CEG).

   2.2: Appropriate iwi representatives to be included on the Group Joint Committee.

3.0  Look to the recent **Mana Whakahono-a-Rohe** amendments to the RMA as a model for a future CDEM Act amendment. Both the Local Government Act and recent amendments to the RMA provide examples of legislative changes sought.

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[5] Toi Moana – Bay of Plenty Regional Council submission

# Chapter Five: Capability and capacity

## Introduction

People and organisations involved in emergencies need to have the appropriate experience and competence to manage public safety effectively and efficiently. Capability relates to the degree of competency and skills, knowledge and attributes. Capacity refers to the quantity of a resource – in this case having the appropriate number of capable people. Both are important.

Under the CDEM Act, Groups are required to ensure suitably 'trained and competent' personnel are available for effective emergency management in their area (section 17). The Group Controller is also required to be suitably qualified and experienced (section 26).

CDEM capability is currently assessed in a number of ways.

- Through reviews of emergency responses and exercises.
- The national capability assessment of individual Groups by MCDEM (2012 and 2015 carried out to date).
- Three-yearly progress reports to Cabinet on the National CDEM Strategy.
- Five-yearly reviews of the National CDEM Plan.
- MCDEM is subject to a number of government auditing and monitoring processes.

## What we found

There is no clear definition of what 'trained' means when referring to the capability of Controllers or other roles in the CDEM framework. The term is used often but may mean a range of things – complete or incomplete, up-to-date or undertaken many years ago.

### Group and council capability and 'fly-in' resource

The national capability assessment reports[6] demonstrated that, after 13 years, Group capability was not up to the mark in the majority of Groups - only half of the 16 Groups achieved the MCDEM target for performance across the 4R's in 2015. Existing approaches to 'encouraging' appropriate Group capability are not succeeding.

Small councils have little capacity on their own for anything but minor and common events (localised fire, floods for example). The evidence demonstrates that most will rely on regional/Group resources. The major metropolitan councils are better able to cope, but even there, there is a significant range of capability. And as the Canterbury earthquake sequence showed, all councils will require significant assistance once an emergency reaches a certain size or lasts longer than 3-5 days. In most emergencies the ability of Groups to cover the Controller(s), PIM and other key roles will quickly reach capacity. Local responders may also be personally affected by the emergency, and as a result, find it hard to carry out their responsibilities.

Accessing capacity from other Groups generally relies on the relationships established prior the event by emergency managers. Even then, accessing resources can be very slow in a rapidly evolving situation.

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[6] CDEM National Capability Assessment Report December 2015

Chapter Five – Capability and Capacity

Recent practice has been to fly in staff from local and central government to support local response (for instance, Kaikoura, Hurunui, and Marlborough following the Kaikoura earthquake and tsunami; Havelock North for the drinking-water emergency; Whakatane after cyclones Cook and Debbie). These staff have not, however, been ready to go on an hour's notice, so deployment has taken a day or two.

The Review of the CDEM Response to the 22 February Christchurch Earthquake recommended developing a 'cadre' of response professionals who could be deployed as required. Our findings indicate that this 'fly-in team' is a much needed resource that would provide assurance - to the public and to the government. Many of the submissions we received supported the concept.

## Controllers

The Controller has significant statutory powers and protection from liabilities. However there is no accreditation or certification required for Controllers. A recent survey of Controllers found that less than a third of Controllers had any training before they took up a Controller role.[7] The appointment process for Controllers is ad hoc and there are some people in this role who do not have the skills and knowledge needed for the role.

> There are currently around 230 Controllers and 31 of these are permanent full-time Group staff. Approximately half of all those who identify as Controllers are trained. There is no formal process for ensuring that all Controllers maintain and update their skills.

There are two courses for Controllers. One funded and endorsed through MCDEM and delivered in partnership by Massey University and Auckland University of Technology (AUT). The other was recently established at Auckland University. Auckland Council Controllers attend the Auckland course.

Of the 78 participants from the 2014 and 2015 cohorts at Massey University, 42 have completed the course (54%). There is a small expected dropout rate. Of the more than 150 people who have enrolled in this course 51 have completed the third phase – some, of course, have not yet had sufficient time to complete this section.[8] The course was due to come up for re-tender in June 2017, but was delayed for a year because of this review.

> **Example of relevant capability development: Maritime NZ's On-Scene Commanders**
>
> The Maritime On-Scene Commander training was identified as a good example of training for response by a number of people interviewed in the course of this review. National On-Scene Commanders are appointed by the Director of Maritime New Zealand and the Regional On-Scene Commanders are appointed by the Regional Councils. Regional Commanders train at the Marine Pollution Response Service (MPRS) assessment centre based at Te Atatu South in Auckland.
>
> People who undertake this role will have demonstrated competency in their background, and personal qualities. They may have completed other well regarded and relevant training and would have been involved in actual Maritime events or exercises. They will have a management or leadership background.
>
> Once training of National On-Scene Commanders has been completed the potential commanders are approved by the Director of Maritime New Zealand, who has the power to veto anyone he or she does not think is suitable for the role.

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[7] MCDEM Controller Development Survey Results Feb 2017
[8] MCDEM Controller Development Survey Results Feb 2017

Better Responses Review – 17 November 2017                                          21

Item 10

Attachment 2

Chapter Five – Capability and Capacity

## Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) training

There is no complete training package to ensure competence in all of the CIMS functions. There are some NZQA unit standards for emergency management accessed through training institutions in various locations nationally but most of the unit standards are now out-of-date or expired. MCDEM is in the process of developing CIMS functions courses (there is a bridging unit to link the Unit Standards pathway into the CIMS function courses under development). Some courses are already available for Groups to access online but there is no ongoing 'train the trainers' programme. Submissions indicated that some Groups have difficulty finding appropriate trainers. MCDEM does not deliver training except to its own staff.

## Emergency agencies

New Zealand's police, fire, and defence force all have significant training regimes in place. Some aspects of training that take place within these organisations are relevant for those undertaking roles in emergencies. It is also important that Controllers and government departments with emergency management responsibilities have a full appreciation of the role that these entities play during response. At present, often only ad hoc linkages are made between response agencies for training purposes.

## Volunteers

Volunteers are important in the CDEM system, but the arrangements for deploying volunteers are unclear. The Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 puts responsibilities on those who assign tasks to volunteers that are similar to workplace responsibilities for employees.

There are around 17 volunteer New Zealand Response Teams (NZRTs) in New Zealand. Most of these are attached to Groups, although not all Groups have identified a requirement to have one or more NZRT. There is a range of competency within and between these NZRTs. The national committee led by MCDEM and NZ Fire Service (now Fire and Emergency NZ) that once addressed the light rescue function (one of a number of functions NZRTs may perform) is no longer in place. Accessing the allocated $1 Million of ACE[9] funding (intended to train volunteers) is bureaucratic and involves a Group linking their allocated funding places with one of four tertiary providers that TEC[10] has nominated for the training.

Spontaneous volunteers including spontaneous groups such as the 'student army' and 'Farmy Army' have increased since the 2010/2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence. Connecting the formal response structures with spontaneous individuals and groups is documented in CIMS (2nd edition) and the Volunteer Coordination Director's Guideline but has not been practically and consistently implemented. Some iwi welfare or other support groups have also identified themselves as volunteers. Where possible it is important that these spontaneous volunteer Groups, much respected and appreciated by impacted communities, are protected from personal risk by careful management and the assigning of appropriate tasks.

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[9] Adult Community Education
[10] Tertiary Education Commission

## Evaluation

Professionalism in emergency management is patchy. The basic choice is to either:

- **Professionalise emergency management:** this would mean far greater attention to capability development (including training) and professional development, accreditation and certification for key positions (such as Controllers and other CIMS functions) and clear career paths. This would put it on a par with other emergency services, commensurate with the responsibilities and capability required for the role. It would however imply a major shift to operating models.

  or

- **Continue with best-endeavours approach:** this would see emergency management continue to be primarily as a local government activity undertaken by local government officers alongside their other work.

In our view the case is compelling for professionalisation. This would need to be supported with appropriate appointment, standards, training (through a single national capability development system), with an associated, recognised certification process.

### Training

Controllers have significant powers attached to their position. They must be able to command the respect of their counterparts in Police, Fire and Emergency NZ, Ambulance, and Defence. Training for Controllers must have sufficient rigor and accreditation and include personal competencies. People undertaking this role need to perform well in high stress situations. Controllers commonly have an important but different role prior to events that require a mix of valuable skills and personal attributes. The Director must have the right to veto Controller appointments that she/he does not consider appropriate. Having two Controllers courses with different training content and approach is a problem when the outcome sought is consistent performance from trained and competent Controllers.

There are some genuine obstacles to achieving and maintaining competence across the wider CIMS functions. Upskilling any workforce requires time and practice. Emergency response and recovery is no different. Councils, emergency services, lifeline utilities, public agencies, and other organisations will need to agree to prioritise training and accreditation over other work (including day-to-day work), to ensure that an appropriate number of staff have the right qualifications. The current duplication of training in CIMS is confusing.

We understand that there is work underway on a case for updating and strengthening NZQA unit standards for CIMS training. This work may contribute to supporting the professionalisation that we recommend.

Clearly, there would need to be a managed transition to a professional emergency management workforce. Work would be required on priorities, cost effective options, staging and recognition of the different starting positions. During this transition it will be important to retain and support current capacity – both paid and volunteer.

### Fly-in Teams

We support the concept of a fly-in team made up of individuals who could perform the roles of Controllers, as well as taking care of planning, logistics, intelligence and communications. The capabilities required and operating model need to be further worked through. Members would need to be carefully selected and trained. Deployment could be either on request of the Group Controller, or on the discretion of the Director.

Chapter Five – Capability and Capacity

The fly-in team proposal has been considered over several years, but has not been implemented. The matter of funding is still unresolved: there is a cost involved in establishing and maintaining the team, as well as the deployment costs.

The fly-in teams would encourage an *NZ Inc.* approach. The recommendation recognises that there is strong capability within the emergency management and government sector in New Zealand. There are existing highly regarded deployment models. [11]

## Volunteers

Volunteers within the NZRTs should have training certificates relevant to a national standard, and a process for confirming or invalidating existing training certificates.

We consider that during an emergency response when deployed for the purposes of urban light rescue Fire and Emergency NZ should oversee those teams that are trained, equipped, and resourced to an agreed accredited level. This would not imply that those teams would fall under the umbrella of FENZ outside of response. A conversation between CEG chairs, FENZ and NEMA is needed to progress how future response team functions and relationships could work from an operational sense, including responsibilities of councils that choose to employ these teams directly.

In addition we understand that FENZ would encourage any members of these teams to consider joining their Volunteer Brigades (and meeting FENZ requirements for volunteers) if they wish to undertake a volunteer role in Fire and Emergency.

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**Australia's trained and accredited state volunteers**

*'The most important assets of the State and Territory Emergency Services are their volunteers.'*

Western Australia has a robust system and network in place for training, developing and deploying volunteers. Some key aspects include a high level of standardised training, which is required to be maintained, and volunteers must be accredited. In turn they are issued with ID cards and uniforms. This system has resulted in a highly professional and experienced force – one which is greatly respected and valued by the community and other emergency services. They are considered to have a 'key role in countering the effects of natural and man-made emergencies'.

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## Recommendations

We recommend that you:

1.0 **Strengthen the professionalism of emergency management, with a particular focus on Controllers.**
   1.1. Require all Controllers (Group and National) to meet one mandatory national standard of technical and personal competency, prior to their being accredited as a CDEM Controller.
   1.2. Confirm that only accredited Controllers are permitted to act as Controllers during any declared state of emergency.
   1.3. Investigate the ability to leverage off Australian Emergency Management experience.
   1.4. Require the Director to personally confirm that a Group Controller meets the expected standard prior to formal accreditation.

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[11] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFAT) deployment guidelines for emergencies in the Pacific provide an example that could be used to develop similar deployment guidelines for the Fly-in-Team. The MFAT deployment guidelines were referred to positively by senior staff in the emergency sector.

Chapter Five – Capability and Capacity

1.5. Investigate a process by which the status of someone as an accredited Controller is reviewable.

1.6. Develop national training and professional competency for all the relevant CIMS functions.

**2.0 Establish 'Fly-in' Teams**

2.1. Have national teams of <u>professional CDEM Controllers</u> and other essential roles (such as CIMS functions, strategic communications, science) that can be immediately deployed (either on request of the Group Controller, or on the discretion of the Director)[12].

2.1.1 Provide for professionals to be on the 'Fly in' roster from a variety of agencies.

2.1.2 Recognise that some or all of national support roles are likely to be required with any state of emergency that is more than minor.

2.1.3 Investigate where these priority roles can be sourced from (secondments are a possibility).

**3.0 Ensure a consistent high standard of volunteer competence**

3.1 During an emergency response when deployed for the purposes of urban light rescue, shift oversight of trained and accredited NZRTs to FENZ as the agency with the most appropriate functional alignment with this volunteer capability.

3.2 NEMA to work with WorkSafe New Zealand to get clarity on its accountability when Groups engage volunteers (and other employees) in response.

3.3 For NZ Response Teams:

3.3.1 Agree that during an emergency response when deployed for the purposes of urban light rescue FENZ have control of the teams if they are trained, equipped and resourced to an agreed accredited level.

3.3.2 FENZ and NEMA to work with CEG chairs and NZRTs on how the teams can be recognised as being trained for responsibilities that they can appropriately assist with during emergencies.

3.4 Identify how New Zealand can incorporate best practice from Australia's State and Territorial Emergency Services (SES) in recognising/training/accrediting volunteers, including assessment of volunteers' existing qualifications.

3.5 Explore how best to protect volunteers from liability if they are 'in the system' i.e. NZRT, USAR.

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[12] Response will range from mentoring and support to full control depending on circumstances.

# Chapter Six: Authority for Command, Control, and Coordination

## Introduction

This chapter examines the structure in place for command, control and coordination in an emergency. We considered whether current legislative frameworks, including roles and decision-making powers, and related practices were fit for purpose, well managed, and efficient.

Having clear lines of authority, both across agencies and within structures is critical to having a well-managed and efficient response.

Command, control, and coordination have specific meanings in this context (also refer Appendix 2). There is an assumption that all roles are undertaken by competent persons – and this is covered in Chapter Five.

- Command (authority within an agency) is executed vertically, and includes the internal ownership, administrative responsibility, and detailed supervision of an agency's personnel, tasks, and resources. Command cannot normally be exercised outside an agency.

- Control (authority across agencies) is executed horizontally, and is the authority to direct tasks to another agency, and to coordinate that agency's actions so they are integrated with the wider response. Control authority is established in legislation or in an emergency plan. This is control to task a certain agency towards a certain outcome (achieve a managed evacuation for example). It is not control over the actual resource – personnel and vehicles.

- Coordination: bringing together agencies and resources to ensure unified, consistent, and effective response. Command and control assist with coordination by defining authority between and within agencies.

## What we found

In many instances, protocols, relationships, and local knowledge about expertise assisted a good response. But we also found examples of confusion and frustration when formal authority was lacking and expectations of who would do what were not met.

### Command authority

Command authority within supporting agencies (for example, emergency services, NZDF) are well established. We do not discuss them further here.

During declared states of local emergency the command structures within the CDEM system (between the national and local level, and within the local level) are limited and sometimes unclear. This is complicated by the wide range of Group structures.

The Director CDEM has no ability to direct the actions of a Group Controller unless a state of national emergency is declared. No Director, that we are aware of, has utilised their power to act on default of a Group or person[13] - for example, in the event of failure to appoint a 'suitably qualified and experienced' person as Group Controller (required under section 26 of the Act).

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[13] A power under section 75 of the CDEM Act to undertake an action where the Group has been negligent.

Chapter Six – Authority

We found mixed understanding of the command powers of the Director. Some have assumed that whenever the NCMC was activated, by default the position of National Controller and/or the Director had increased authority. This is not the case. However, there are scenarios where it may be beneficial for the Director to have the ability to intervene – in particular, to ensure national interests are considered in local decision making, or to ensure that weight is given to national-level knowledge and intelligence.

> **Scenarios where local decision-making may not take account of national interest**
>
> - The Director CDEM, due to their access to intelligence from within the 'centre' is able to make an urgent decision when a delay might adversely affect a community (for example, deployment or evacuation).
> - A matter has been escalated to the national level, for example due to complexity, multi-agency interest or media attention.
> - Management of scarce national resources, when there are competing local needs (i.e. multiple states of local emergency).
> - There is a matter of specific national interest that needs consideration during a primarily locally managed event (for example infrastructure of national interest).

Within the Group structure, command authority can also be unclear. Currently when a state of emergency is declared, the appointed Local Controllers have the same power as Group Controllers. It is not a delegated authority (although Local Controllers are subject to direction from the Group Controller during a state of emergency). As a result there are at times both Local and Group Controllers making decisions over the same matters. This can be confusing, inconsistent, and hamper effective responses.

We also found that the authority of a Group Controller during an emergency was not always well understood or respected. Within councils, Controllers may face a conflict of interest with senior council managers, Chief Executives or elected officials expecting to direct operations or decisions during a response.

## Control authority

The Director/National Controller appears to have wide control authority in a state of national emergency under the CDEM Act. However, when there has been no such national declaration, and local government and emergency services are managing an event, the Director's powers are constrained. The Minister retains backstop powers of control. This has not been used to date.

Under the CDEM Act, Group Controllers do not have full control authority even when operating under states of emergency. This has been evident in some recent events, where Group Controllers have not had the clear authority to task other agencies. In many instances this has not been a problem. Activated emergency operation centres (EOCs) bring resources together (such as Police and Fire and Emergency NZ) and allows for coordination in response. However, in other instances, essential tasks were identified and it was not clear if <u>anyone</u> had either responsibility to do the task or the ability to task an agency. And we heard of examples where responsible agencies simply didn't turn up to the EOC even though an emergency had been declared. This has led to a perception that responding agencies can pick and choose what they do, despite agreement to tasking for these roles in planning documents. For example, tasking for a range of likely activities (such as logistics, and movement control) are described in the National Plan Order 2015. However, there is no certainty that the Plan will be followed, and there is no penalty for non-compliance during a state of local emergency. A

Chapter Six – Authority

recurring example of unclear tasking was the management of cordons – the task of overseeing who accesses closed roads or areas and related safety issues.

## Lead Agency

The term 'lead agency' is used in a range of documents, including the National CDEM Plan Order 2015, the National Security Handbook, CIMS 2nd Edition, and the Group Plans. The term's meaning changes with context and by document. It can mean variously:

- the agency with responsibility for managing a hazard across the 4Rs (including managing the response to an incident)
- the agency with the primary mandate to manage an emergency arising from that hazard
- the lead as directed by the Controller, or
- the functional lead for managing particular consequences (e.g. welfare, rescue, financial support).

Some documents emphasise continuity – providing horizon scanning and risk mitigation for a named hazard. Others emphasise the lead will change -- across the 4Rs and/or over time (for example as an incident becomes an emergency).

The control authority and powers that lead agencies have in their own legislation varies markedly. In some instances, the lead agency specified (in respect of various hazards) changes between the documents. For some hazards it is not clear that the most appropriate agency has been specified as the lead agency. For other hazards, there is no lead agency specified.

Unsurprisingly, this has led to a range of interpretations. The responsibilities and authority of a lead agency is unclear. This situation is confusing, occasionally contradictory, and in an emergency it is potentially risky.

## Coordination

We found that use of CIMS is recommended, but not mandatory. It is not universally used. That raises coordination issues in response.

A key coordination forum is the CEG. Membership varies by Group. There are some statutorily required positions. However, important parties (such as ambulance services, and iwi) are often not part of the coordination structure.

We heard many submissions from particular community groups concerned to ensure that response arrangements would be effective in meeting their needs. There were representations covering rural perspectives, animal welfare (including pets and animal rescue), provision for children and young people, recognising interests of blind and other people with disabilities, and isolated communities. The concerns tended to have most connection to the welfare function under CIMS, in particular concerning the need for good awareness about the diverse needs of the community in emergency response. This also requires good intelligence and situational awareness, effective public information, and clear command and control authority.

Item 10

Attachment 2

Chapter Six – Authority

## Options and evaluation

The basic choices are around:

- **Status quo legislation** and rely primarily on coordination (between agencies, and across levels in the system) in states of emergency. This is on the basis that emergency response needs a great deal of judgement about priorities, specialism, flexibility and agility and that strict control is unlikely to allow for an effective response in practice.

or

- **Strengthened legislative mandate** to ensure clearer command and control in emergency response. This is on the basis that clear control across agencies and command structures (particularly through the CDEM structures) is needed to ensure optimal use of resources and coordination of effort, and to avoid confusion that can impede effective response.

Overall, we consider that clearer command, control and coordination is required. The framework for this is already provided by the CDEM Act 2002. For some recommendations the strength of the mandate and the mechanism (for example whether primary legislation, regulation or guidance practice is appropriate) requires further work.

### Command

We recommend a new power for the Director, providing for the national interest to be considered in responding to local emergencies. As this power would cut across local decision-making, we consider that it would need to have appropriate checks and balances. This would include, for example, clear parameters around its use. It would also need to be used transparently (for example, requiring reporting of its use to Parliament, or mandatory independent review of its use).

More generally, the enabling rather than directive nature of the Act creates a lot of variation in roles and responsibilities across Groups. Greater standardisation, including in operating practice and coordination structures, is needed to allow for interoperability between Groups. This includes, for example, the need to provide for the fly-in teams to operate effectively. As discussed in Chapters One and Two, the current Act allows for the Director to set standards. We recommend that these provisions be used to support appropriate minimum standards to allow greater coordination and interoperability across Groups.

We think that within the Group structure there should be a clear command authority below the Group Controller, with any 'local' or secondary Controllers to be under the clear command authority of the Group Controller in charge of an event (noting there will be roster changes). They should not have independent powers. We also think that Controllers who may be based within a territorial authority need to have responsibility to coordinate across the wider Group area, as well as a responsibility towards that territorial authority. This will be assisted by the recommendations in Chapter Two.

It must also be clear that during a declaration the authority of a Group Controller is understood and respected, including the relationship to the mayor, other members of the council, and the CE. The unequivocal authority of the Controller assumes that all Group Controllers are competent - appropriately trained and accredited (see Chapter Five).

### Control authority and lead agencies

We recommend that when a state of emergency is declared under the CDEM Act, the Group Controller has clear control over the emergency response. This includes the ability to task other agencies. Further, we see a need for clearer and more binding default tasking, for example in National and Group

Plans. These Plans can set out tasking and resources available to support response, along with appropriate limitations. Prior to an emergency the key emergency agencies need to agree where, and when, they perform particular tasks. There are some obvious matters for which responsibilities and parameters can be pre-arranged.

> *Example of tasking in a Group Plan 'NZ Red Cross has agreed to manage spontaneous volunteers during the response phase as outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding between the Group and NZ Red Cross.' (Nelson Tasman CDEM Group Plan 2012)*

Our findings on lead agencies leads us to make two points:

First, we agree with the need to be clear about which agency has responsibility for advice and support on known hazards and risks, and for managing that hazard across the 4Rs (this may include managing the response to an incident caused by that hazard or advice on the change in risk). This is the intent in the National Security Handbook.

We recommend that the list of lead agencies is reviewed to ensure it is complete and appropriate, well-understood by those agencies and other parties involved, and given consistent expression in relevant plans. (Also refer to Chapter One for discussion on lead agency responsibilities for NEMA).

Second, we are of the view that there needs to be more clarity about which agency is in control during an emergency. If an incident has developed to the point where a state of emergency is declared under the CDEM legislation (in order to access resources or powers), then the CDEM (Group or National) Controller needs to have responsibility for overall management and control of the emergency response. This is irrespective of the hazard that caused the emergency. The 'lead agency' for the hazard will continue with responsibility to manage the specific incident (FENZ managing the fire, Police the criminal act) while the CDEM Controller will have control for the managing the consequences of emergency overall (for example, setting objectives and directing the overall response, identifying critical resources and prioritising effort).

## Coordination

Although improvements can be made, CIMS is a valuable framework. We recommend that all those involved in managing emergencies commit to its use and collectively refining it so that it continues to be fit for purpose.[14]

We recommend extending the membership of CEGs to include all key entities required to coordinate an effective response. This would include ambulance as an emergency service. It would also include iwi (see separate recommendation in Chapter Four) as appropriate for the Group area. We would also emphasise the role of the Regional Emergency Management Advisors (currently with MCDEM) in supporting coordinated advice at the CEG level, and suggest that they are recognised as full members.

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[14] We note that the Port Hills fires Operational Review came to the conclusion that FENZ should adopt AIIMS (the Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System) rather than the New Zealand endorsed CIMS, on the basis that that would allow for better interoperability between NZ and Australian fire services. FENZ is yet to make a decision on this recommendation. The TAG recognises the benefit of AIIMS for FENZ operating in an individual agency environment. But, the focus for the TAG is the multi-agency environment and coordination across New Zealand agencies. Hence collective use of CIMS, updated as necessary, was considered more appropriate.

We also recommend reinforcing the expectation that representatives of agencies in the CEG will attend emergency operation centres (if at all practical) when they are activated, either in a declared CDEM state of emergency, or a developing event. Coordination needs liaison between agencies, and that requires participation. This includes services such as Police, FENZ, Ambulance, DHBs, and other parties such as iwi.

We do not make any specific recommendation in this report for representation of particular community interests on CEGs. We believe the increased professionalism (covered in Chapter Five) and stronger regional approach (Chapter Two) will help.

## Recommendations

We recommend that you:

*Command within the CDEM structure.*

**1.0 Enable the Director to direct Group Controller(s) during an emergency under the CDEM Act when there are matters of national interest**
    1.1 Include appropriate checks and balances to this command authority:
        1.1.1 Setting out circumstances of national interest requiring intervention
        1.1.2 A requirement that any use of the authority is transparently reported.

**2.0 Create generic authorisation of accredited Controller appointments**
    2.1 Provide for qualified people to be brought in during events (fly-in teams – see Chapter Five) and be able to:
        2.1.1 Access the relevant CDEM Act powers of a Controller, and
        2.1.2 Enable them to act in the role of CDEM Controller anywhere in the country.

**3.0 Require clear command authority at Group level.**
    3.1 Require any 'local' or secondary Controllers to be under the clear command authority of the Group Controller in charge of an event (noting there will be roster changes). They do not have independent powers.

**4.0 Confirm the authority of Group Controller**
    4.1 Reinforce that there is no mandate for the Group Controller to be subject to direction by those that might have a different relationship to them outside a state of emergency.

*Control across agencies during response*

**5.0 Require clear control authority for Group Controllers**
    5.1 Ensure that when a state of emergency is declared under the CDEM Act the Group Controller has control over the emergency response. This includes being able to task other agencies.
        5.1.1 Develop and set out parameters of agency tasks – such as appropriate limits and preconditions – in the relevant Plans (National CDEM Plan Order for nationally managed hazards and Group CDEM Plans), and
        5.1.2 Develop effective mechanisms to bind and clarify responsibilities.

## 6.0 Assign default tasking to agencies

6.1 Require that relevant agencies specifically consider likely emergency response tasks and assign responsibilities, including:

6.1.1 The CIMS functions (for example, logistics, planning, intelligence) within operation centres.

6.1.2 Commonly experienced short-term tasks of manning cordons, rapid assessment and air traffic control.

6.1.3 Roles and responsibilities as part of the fly-in team discussed in Chapter Five.

## 7.0 Clarify and review lead agencies descriptions

7.1 Review the list of lead agencies so that it covers agencies with the primary mandate for overseeing a particular hazard or risk across the 4R's (including who manages the response to an incident) and ensure consistent expression through relevant documents.

7.2 Change references to lead agency to clarify that, when a <u>state of emergency</u> is declared under the CDEM Act:

7.2.1 A Controller (Group or National) has overall control to manage the emergency, and

7.2.2 The agency managing the hazard continues to have responsibility for managing the specific incident.

*Coordination*

## 8.0 Require use of CIMS (2nd edition)

8.1 NEMA to require all entities listed at the front of the CIMS 2nd Edition to commit to using it, and collectively updating it to add clarity and reflect NZ legislative roles and authority.

## 9.0 Extend membership to key entities required to coordinate an effective response

9.1 Extend CEG membership to include ambulance as emergency services and also iwi (see separate recommendation in Chapter Four) as appropriate for the area.

9.2 Emphasise the role of the Regional Emergency Management Advisors (currently with MCDEM) and recognise them as full members of the CEGs.

## 10.0 Representatives from agencies in the CEG to attend emergency operation centres

10.1 Emphasise the importance of the liaison role when there is a declared CDEM state of emergency:

10.1.1 For services such as Police, FENZ, Ambulance, iwi, DHBs, and

10.1.2 Ensure they are represented at the activated operation centre following a catastrophic event (such as a large earthquake) or when it is activated to respond to a developing event (such as a weather event).

Item 10

Attachment 2

# Chapter Seven: Intelligence

## Introduction

In the immediate aftermath of a disaster a range of critical needs emerge: food, water, shelter, and the need to locate family. In order to act effectively and efficiently involved entities need accurate information.

After a major disaster, all that was known about that community may no longer be true. Incoming information needs to be verified in order for it to be reliably acted upon. For large scale events essential intelligence is required from a range of sources including disparate IT systems and platforms.

CDEM intelligence capabilities in emergency struggle with the sheer speed and volume of information during an emergency response. Systems for situational awareness/intelligence sharing and dissemination need to be better coordinated and more agile. A Common Operating Picture provides a detailed, accurate and comprehensive view (single source of truth) of the unfolding situation that includes management of the hazard and dealing with the consequences.

## What we found

Technology is advancing rapidly but the struggle to synthesize vital intelligence from many sources into one common operating picture is a challenge for most jurisdictions at present. Most find that the latest developments in this field are not fully mainstreamed into emergency operations technology applications. The constant updating and refining of improvements is another source of challenge.

All of the key response agencies gather essential information - yet current systems do not link easily to enable a full situational report. In recent emergencies the Group Controller has experienced frustrations when requesting information from other agencies. Very little has been forthcoming – there was no automated feed of information into the system.

### Common Operating Picture and separate systems

New Zealand's intelligence infrastructure and hardware has not been sufficient to deliver an accurate and comprehensive common operating picture during recent large scale emergencies.

The agencies with situation awareness systems (fire, police, health, defence, for example) have invested considerable resources in their own online systems and it is likely that they will be reluctant to invest further resource in a shared system. None of these existing models would appear to be the multi-agency answer.

There is no current agreement between the core agencies on what information forms the common operating picture (e.g. lifelines information, where cordons are, isolated geographical areas, welfare needs) and how information from multiple sources can be drawn together to give a common picture.

There is some interest in the Victorian Emergency Management Common Operating Picture (EM-COP) which was originally developed by the USA's emergency management agency (FEMA). However, the concept will need to be demonstrated and socialised with agencies.

Item 10

Attachment 2

Chapter Seven – Intelligence

## National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC aka the Bunker)

The Bunker is outmoded and no longer fit-for-purpose. Its physical layout alone inhibits working together with appropriate technology to achieve a common operating picture. It is difficult for staff to connect to their work IT systems. The Bunker also lacks sufficient GIS capability and other critical analytical capability to evaluate strategic information.

Most of the key response agencies' national coordination centres are significantly more technically advanced than the NCMC.

Unnecessarily restrictive security classifications prevent access to important situation information and decision making.

We understand that MCDEM has been tasked with scoping the feasibility of updating the Bunker so that it can continue to function moderately well in the short to medium term. This includes scoping the purpose and functionality required from the NCMC in the future. Work is also underway for an alternate NCMC in Auckland.

> The Crisis Coordination Centre (CCC) is the Australian Government's periscope into everything that is happening around the globe [and internally]. It is an all-hazards, 24/7 facility with representatives from a range of Australian Government departments, including the Bureau of Meteorology and Geoscience Australia. It provides the whole-of-government picture to decision makers during times of crisis, whether it is a natural disaster or a security incident. The CCC also coordinates physical Australian Government assistance during disasters and emergencies and manages the National Security Hotline—the single point of contact for the public to report suspicious activity.[15]

## EMIS

MCDEM and Groups use the Emergency Management Information system (EMIS) - a software tool – when managing civil defence emergencies. It is a workflow system, aimed at managing requests, tasks and resources, logging information, and the collation and filing of developed datasets such as action plans and situation reports. It is not an all-of-government system. EMIS does not create a common operating picture. EMIS is currently being upgraded to a new platform.

Submissions indicated that EMIS is often confused with IT systems that provide a common operating picture. Several references were made to EMIS as unfit for carrying out IT functions that it was never designed to perform. This lack of clarity on its role has resulted in EMIS being considered unfit for purpose – however other feedback, from those who use it regularly in response situations, consider it to be an effective programme for recording resource demand and supply in an emergency.

## 24/7 monitoring, alerting, and warning of events

The current system of monitoring, alerting and warning has developed in an ad hoc way, over time, to meet individual agencies legislative and operational responsibilities.

There are a number of 24/7 'awake' centres across a range of agencies. New Zealand's Rescue Coordination Centre (RCCNZ operated by Maritime NZ) is one. NZ Transport Agency has another. New Zealand Defence also has staff awake during the night.

Both MCDEM and GNS Science have a duty roster of people to perform key roles who will be woken if an event occurs during the night. The MCDEM Duty Team consults with GNS Science (for geological

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[15]https://www.ag.gov.au/EmergencyManagement/Emergency-management-capability

related emergencies) and assesses information about the hazard risk, decides appropriate action (such as issuing warnings), issues the information via multiple channels and commences a response. By not having an awake duty team, delays with communication of warnings and establishing a response are inevitable.

There is some support for a centralised, staffed multi-agency, 24/7 operating centre in New Zealand, but the next stage requires a robust assessment of needs and costs to justify such an investment.

NZ's tsunami alert is behind international best practice. Currently Geo-Net provides earthquake information to a panel of experts convened by GNS Science. These experts then consult and agree on the risk of a tsunami and provide a stream of advice to MCDEM who then decides whether or not to issue a public warning. This process is shortened for local source tsunamis. In other countries (such as Japan, Sri Lanka and Singapore) tsunami forecasts are handled by integrating three different levels of information technology: trans-ocean modelling, coastal sea modelling and coastal flood modelling. At present in New Zealand these three system tiers operate virtually independently. This is unsatisfactory when emergency coordination is vital.

This situation may not be such a significant issue for slowly developing emergencies such as floods, cyclones and tsunamis that result from a distant earthquake such as in Chile. However it is a source of concern for tsunamis that result from seismic activity in the region near our shores, for example the Kermadec trench. In this scenario urgent response will be required from many Groups in order to avoid large scale loss of life.

Tsunami risk is a very real threat to safety of life in New Zealand. New Zealand has experienced about 10 tsunami of five metres or more since 1840. Recent tsunami research has presented a mixed picture. Parts of our coast are exposed to greater tsunami hazard than previously thought, while the hazard in other coastal regions is the same or less. Focusing on those that take less than three hours to reach here suggests that one may occur in New Zealand about every 40 to 50 years on average. So it is likely that at least one will occur in the lifetime of most New Zealanders.[16] The 2004 Boxing Day tsunami in the Indian Ocean reached heights of nine metres. A five metre tsunami would cause significant damage to a coastal community.

## Science

The November 14 earthquakes revealed a number of pressure points for GNS Science post a significant natural disaster. There was a tendency for ministers and the media to seek information direct from GNS Science on seismic risk, rather than through established CDEM communication channels such as PIM.

## Evaluation

The intelligence function needs the capacity and tools to do more than just receive, store and show data. It needs to be able to generate useful robust, accurate and verified information to guide response and recovery decisions.

The Bunker is falling behind best practice. Yet when an all-of-government response is called for, following the activation of the national security system, it is expected that this will be led out of the

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[16] GeoNet report cited on MCDEM website

Chapter Seven – Intelligence

NCMC. As a result of these shortcomings, we think it unlikely that any other lead agency would run an event from the Bunker. It needs further investment to continue functioning effectively.

We note that any solution towards enhancing the Bunker and/or a common operating picture will involve significant investment. Further, the creation of a common information management system – or a common operating picture – would likely require a Cabinet decision. There is obvious benefit in a common operating model for New Zealand being adopted. Some would also say an urgent need.

While DPMC as a central agency has indicated strong support for the creation of a common operating picture, we note the challenges set out above. We recommend giving priority to the work needed.

We think there is benefit in looking to use and integrate existing 24/7 capabilities to provide intelligence and assessment of developing or shock emergencies (with an all hazards and risks perspective). That may mean aligning processes and procedures across agencies to reduce duplication and improve coordination, drawing on the respective strengths and core business of those organisations. We also suggest investigating the benefit of using the new national emergency management facility as part of the 24/7 operation.

The Crown Research Institutes (CRIs) have a range of valuable capabilities (including resilient infrastructure and telecom capacity) with an interest in contributing more. We note that there are cost implications. We regard accessing science expertise as an essential element of effective response and recommend including science as appropriate into the 'fly-in' team.

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**United Kingdom embeds science advice into emergency response**

The Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) ensures that timely and coordinated scientific advice is available to inform disaster response decision making. SAGE includes experts from within government and leading specialists from the fields of academia and industry. The Group is chaired by the Government's Chief Scientific Adviser or a departmental Chief Scientific Adviser.

SAGE has developed methods for getting science advice to both national and regional levels of response. Sometimes this is an incident presence and on other occasions advice is accessed remotely.

The rationale for this emphasis on science advice is that effective emergency management and informed decision-making relies on leaders having access to the best available advice in a timely fashion. The guidance focuses on the coordination of scientific and technical advice to inform strategic UK cross-government decision making during the emergency response and recovery phases.

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## Recommendations

We recommend that Ministers:

**1.0  Establish a new national emergency management facility (replacing the Bunker) with a fit-for–future physical layout and technological functionality**

1.1  Enable a national emergency to be controlled and managed from the new facility.

1.2  Provide for all current CIMS functions, along with a common operating picture and strategic communications.

1.3  For national resilience, provide for two facilities and/or easy transfer of base operations.

1.4  Maintain effective technological links with other operating centres (Groups, Police, FENZ, Defence, Ministry of Health, and Transport for example).

1.5  Systems to be adaptable so that all central government organisations can effectively operate out of the central facility if required.

Item 10

Attachment 2

Chapter Seven – Intelligence

**2.0 Invest in the technology to ensure a fit-for-purpose Common Operating Picture**

2.1 Investigate technology needed for a Common Operating Picture based on international best practice models as a strong contender for New Zealand's common operating model.

2.2 Expect all entities with emergency operations functions to collectively solve the challenge of cross agency systems to share intelligence, and situational assessment.

**3.0 Establish an integrated 24/7 operation for the monitoring, alerting and warning of emergencies**

3.1 Investigate the benefit of using the new national emergency management facility (see rec 1.0 above) as part of the 24/7 operation.

3.2 Utilise and integrate with existing 24/7 capabilities to provide intelligence and assessment of developing or shock emergencies (with an all hazards and risks approach).

3.3 Increase the speed by which alerts are provided and distributed, particularly in regard to simplifying or shortening current practice and providing timely and geographically accurate tsunami warnings.

**4.0 Recognise the importance of science intelligence as part of situational awareness:**

4.1 Develop an expert group based on the UK SAGE model.

4.2 Enable relevant science capability to be embedded as part of the fly-in team.

**Item 10**

**Attachment 2**

# Chapter Eight: Information and Communication

## Introduction

Maintaining public trust and confidence through effective communications is important. The time taken to access up-to-date information on the current emergency, and the way that information is gathered and disseminated were two issues at the forefront of the Minister's concerns at the outset of this review.

In New Zealand there is a principle that in an emergency people should prepare to look after themselves in their own home as long as they are able to. Public information helps people both prepare and know what to do in an emergency. And the public also needs up-to-date information during emergencies.

The Chapter covers the communication of emergencies, to the communities affected, the wider public and also to the spokespersons who the public look to for assurance and information.

The media environment has changed in the past five years. Twitter, Facebook and other forms of social media have become primary sources of information for the public. People are increasingly turning to these sources of information in an emergency. Traditional media sources have been impacted by this societal change and those that remain constantly need to find a fresh news angle in order to survive.

Preparing and sharing information about the response directly to the affected public (via social media and other channels) is the primary function of the information desk. Community liaison, media enquiries, information and warnings, and supporting response spokespeople are also part of the role description. At the Group level, the PIM role is commonly carried out by people from local authorities who have been assigned this function. They may have a communications role in their local council and they may have received some relevant training.

## What we found

Recent events highlight a significant gap between what communications professionals are expected to deliver during an emergency or event, and the resources and capacity that is currently available through the PIM function. There are commonly too many points of liaison for a small communications team to handle effectively and efficiently. When a response involves multiple agencies there is inevitable complexity that requires an equivalent escalation in communications coverage.

Having a stream of information that has been officially been cleared and signed-off (commonly referred to as official information) cannot consistently meet the pace of media dialogue and social media activity. It is important to be clear where official comment will come from.

### Public information and preparedness

We heard from Groups about the importance of public information before the event to build community resilience and support emergency preparedness. Having well prepared communities and households, with a good understanding of what to do in an emergency, was seen to help the effectiveness of the response.

Chapter Eight – Information and Communication

## Spokesperson

During recent emergencies it was clearly challenging to maintain public trust and confidence when social media was so rapid, random, and very difficult to control. A dimension of this is that suddenly a 'media star' will become the go-to person for the media. This person may not be the official spokesperson, nor have accurate information on which they base their comment and advice.

We are of the strong view that those who respond to media questions must be well briefed and supported by people who have considerable experience in this field. It is difficult for a Controller to coordinate an emergency response and also manage the media interface.

In the past where a Controller has tried to do both, it hasn't worked (for example initially in Christchurch in 2011). Although Mayors are commonly designated or self-appointed spokespeople, the minister, Director CDEM, local MPs, Group Controllers, emergency services, NGOs may all be asked for comment by many media outlets (including international). Keeping track across the multiple layers and access points for media commentary can be challenging. Any spokesperson needs advice on all the different media channels and what other people are saying to the media.

Mayors have an elected community leadership role and are commonly sought for comment during local emergencies. However the range of often detailed information that media may have questions about, due to their sweeping of social media, is vast. The spokesperson increasingly needs to recognise and value the support of a skilled media strategist as well as technical information from the Controller

## Strategic communications

More pressure has been put on politicians and senior officials to be ready to defend and 'front-foot' the unfolding disaster. Managing the full onslaught of media attention across all channels has become a more complex task. We have found increasing recognition of, and respect for, strategic communications expertise to support spokes people.

Strategic communications support to Ministers to date has been ad hoc. It has involved casting around to see who is available among the core of recognised communications experts (known at central government level). Seven years of significant emergencies has demonstrated that the strategic communications role, when in place, has provided much needed advice to the Mayor (usually the spokesperson) the Minister and the Director. The role has been most effective when strategic communications support has been available both in central government, Wellington, and on the ground at the site of the emergency.

## Public Information Management

We asked Controllers and local authorities, who had managed recent events, how the PIM role had worked. People in the PIM role are generally assigned by the collective Group or a territorial local authority. While there are some very capable people in the role in some areas, in some emergencies the people assigned to the PIM function may never have done this task before. PIM is further discussed in the capability chapter. Having an inexperienced person in the role has caused delays and frustrations in some recent responses.

## Working with the media

In an emergency, the public will turn to channels they know and trust. We found that Radio continues to play a fundamental role in the early stages of recent emergencies. However for some in the community their preferred source of information is increasingly social media – a fact that needs to be

Item 10

Attachment 2

Chapter Eight – Information and Communication

recognised in a communications strategy. Failure to do so will leave a void that others (for better or worse) will fill.

Some important media streams may have been forgotten (e.g. iwi radio). Access to information for Māori would be improved through better utilisation of Māori media including iwi radio, and social media networks of iwi, and of iwi and Māori providers.

## Use of technology in communications

Some progress has been made in the use of new technologies to support alerts and warnings. MCDEM has been working on a cell broadcasting alert system that is due to 'go live' by the end of 2017. The alert system is a 'push' system. It enables messages to be sent to all cell phones in a geographical area. The cell broadcasting system will be used by Police, FENZ, MPI, Ministry of Health, MCDEM and Groups and the system will require ongoing resourcing and a dedicated 24/7 monitoring and warning centre to maximise its potential.

There is little commonality between IT systems of the various councils and, across government, organisations are slow to change practices that have not worked over repeated responses. The different communication needs at local, regional and national levels are not widely understood across the sector.

## Evaluation

There are clearly good developments occurring in technology but also some need for improvement. The importance of well-resourced social media capacity for gathering intelligence and managing a response is high and growing. Social media advances have demonstrated the need to be pro-active and ensure public trust and confidence is maintained and people have the right information to assist them with their personal actions during an emergency. Active monitoring of social media can add to the intelligence to support the common operating picture (refer Chapter Seven).

## PIM role

The PIM function needs to ensure timely, consistent, and proactive use of the range of appropriate channels (e.g. social media, online, radio, print, TV).

In particular, this needs to include capability for managing and utilising social media. There are a number of people with a high level of PIM training around New Zealand and their expertise should be recognised. We include their presence in the recommended 'fly-in' team discussed in Chapter Six.

## Spokesperson

It is important to provide a good communicator as spokesperson. Logically we would expect this role be filled by whoever the impacted community elected to lead them. This fits with our recommendation on the role of the mayor as primary person to declare a state of emergency (see chapter 3). In a modern media context the spokesperson needs the support of a senior and experienced communications practitioner who can brief and counsel them.

## Strategic communications

When deployed in recent large emergencies, the strategic communications specialist has complemented the PIM function. The strategic communications person will also advise when a range of other spokespeople are needed to complement the elected role. This may include scientists with expertise relevant to the specific type of hazard.

Chapter Eight – Information and Communication

We consider that strategic communications support should be deployed immediately for all sudden onset emergencies such as earthquakes, and other disasters depending on scale. This role would complement the local PIM function. CIMS should recognise strategic communications expertise as an essential element of effective response.

The strategic communications capability already exists across government and within some private companies. The central government 'Head of Communications Group' is a natural location to support a database of people with capability and experience and the means of rapid deployment.

## Recommendations

We recommend that you:

**1.0 Confirm local Mayor as primary spokesperson**
  1.1 Provide the mayor with supported strategic communications advice
  1.2 Require Group plans to identify arrangements for a regional spokesperson when managing an event that crosses territorial boundaries.

**2.0 Recognise Strategic Communications as an essential element of effective response**
  2.1 Deploy strategic communications support immediately for all sudden onset emergencies such as earthquakes, and other disasters depending on scale.
  2.2 Provide communications advice and support for the Minister(s), local MPs, Mayors and Chief Executives/Director.
  2.3 Liaise with their counterparts in other agencies (such as Police, Fire, MFAT, and NZDF) to shape a comprehensive situation report for national and international media.
  2.4 Work from both the NCMC and 'on the ground', to cover strategic communications needs.

**3.0 Include and deploy trained and experienced PIMs and Strategic Comms in 'Fly In Team'**
  3.1 Allocate the task of maintaining the database of people with strategic communications, and other specialist communications capability, for deployment as part of the fly-in-team.
  3.2 Resource capability for social media monitoring and use.

**4.0 Ensure timely, consistent, and proactive use of the range of appropriate media channels** both for communication, and for gathering intelligence.

Item 10

Attachment 2

Released by the Minister of Civil Defence

Appendices

# Appendix 1: Terms of Reference

## Purpose

This review will provide advice to the Minister of Civil Defence on the most appropriate operational and legislative mechanisms to support effective responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand.

The purpose is to ensure that New Zealand's emergency response framework is world leading, and well placed to meet future challenges. In light of recent events it is appropriate to see how we can further enhance and strengthen the current system.

## Context

A series of recent hazard events and emergencies in New Zealand have resulted in wide spread reflection on whether the current operational and legislative settings for responding to natural disasters and other emergencies are fit for purpose.

Responsibility for the management of these events lay with three different agencies[17]. The civil defence emergency management sector was however involved in all three responses as either lead or support agency. In all three cases the effectiveness of the civil defence emergency management sector was called into question resulting in a loss of stakeholder, public and Ministerial confidence in the response system.

The National Security System, of which civil defence emergency management is a part, has a range of lead agencies that operate under different legislative mandates, depending on the hazard type. The complexity of the system is well understood by those agencies that operate within its framework, but are not widely publicised or understood by the public[18].

Many lessons from the Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 and other events have been successfully embedded into the operation of the current civil defence emergency management system. However there has been no significant review of the organisational structures, roles and decision-making powers, within which responses are orchestrated. It is timely to take a wide look at how the sum of those parts work together. In particular, to consider whether any changes to settings could optimise the civil defence emergency management system's performance in the response phase.

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[17] August 2016 Hawkes Bay gastroenteritis outbreak (lead agency Health); 2 September 2016 East Cape earthquake and tsunami (lead agency Civil Defence Emergency Management); 14 November 2016 Kaikoura earthquake and tsunami (lead agency Civil Defence Emergency Management); and 13 February 2017 Port Hills fire (lead agency Selwyn Rural Fire Authority).

[18] November 2016, Controller and Auditor General report Governance of the National Security System.

Item 10

Attachment 2

Appendices

## Project Definition

**The problem**
The purpose of the review is to ensure that New Zealand's emergency response framework is world leading, fit-for-purpose, and well placed to meet future challenges.

The current organisational structures, roles and decision-making powers in the civil defence emergency management response system need to align with the expectations for system performance.

Recent events tested New Zealand's response framework, and its effectiveness in supporting decision making, information sharing and operational capability. In particular it has been noted that:

- The underlying principle of "act locally, coordinate regionally, support nationally" may not be suitable in all circumstances.

- Decisions are not necessarily made by adequately skilled and experienced people, mandated at the appropriate level of government, and supported by the best information possible in the circumstances.

- Volunteers may not be adequately supported by a professional emergency management force.

- Information is not always readily available to decision makers on the scale, complexity and evolving nature of the emergency, to determine the capacity and capabilities required for the response effort.

- There is a need for timely, consistent and accurate communication to the public.

- Response capabilities are not necessarily deployed as promptly and seamlessly as possible, taking advantage of economies of scale and the experience of senior responders.

In summary, the operational and legislative settings within the system may not be performing optimally to meet current and future needs, and the role that New Zealanders need it to play.

**Scope**
The work will examine:

- The current devolved decision-making model from central to local government, and framework of lead and support agencies to manage response to emergencies arising from specific hazards.

- Decision making and chain of command, including:

  - who has the power to declare a State of Emergency, and

  - whether there is a need for an interim mechanism to manage a localised event with significant consequences or that could evolve into a state of local emergency or a state of national emergency.

- Response capability and capacity.

- Whether legislative changes are required to the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (and other legislation related to emergency response).

Better Responses Review – 17 November 2017

43

Appendices

**Outcome 1:** The emergency response system is fit for purpose and aligns with stakeholder expectations, taking account of the need to prioritise preventing death, injury, and property damage, and the fast-moving nature and uncertainty of emergencies.

**Outcome 2:** New Zealand has the appropriate response capability and capacity for civil defence emergency management responses.

- The system capacity supports the availability of appropriately skilled and responsive resourcing, regardless of the location and scale of the emergency.

- Appropriate protocols exist to enable supporting agencies to swing promptly into action.

- Agencies with specialist capabilities (such as logistics, aerial surveillance and interpretation) are knitted into the fabric of a response.

- Business continuity across the whole of government supports an effective response and prompt recovery.

**Outcome 3:** Clearer definition of who determines the need for and declares a state of emergency and at what point the Director Civil Defence Emergency Management can step in to declare a state of emergency.

- A single lead role across any geographical area affected by natural disaster

- The purpose and consequences of declarations of states of emergency are clear

- Appropriate interventions and escalations are available.

**Outcome 4:** The chain of command and control, coordination, and decision making during an emergency is effective and appropriate.

- There is a clear operating model and chain of command and control and coordination during response, including the recognition of lead and support agencies.

- The system enables decisions to be made quickly, by appropriately skilled and experienced people, mandated at the right level, within the most appropriate agency and incorporating the best available information.

- All participants in the system understand the operating picture and their respective roles and responsibilities, including how these might change over the course of the response or as the event unfolds.

**Outcome 5:** Information flows into, across, and out of the emergency response system effectively, allowing timely and accurate communication to Ministers; agencies; officials; stakeholders with particular interests; and to the public during emergencies.

- Recognition of the modern news cycle – immediacy of social media and power of factual decisive information delivered as speedily as possible

- Stakeholder needs are understood (what information is required; where and how to gather the information, providing it at the right time and in the right format).

**Attachment 2**

Appendices

- Official information maintains pace with media dialogue and social media activity.

The work will not examine the current legislative framework for hazard risk assessment and management set out in other legislation, for example the Resource Management Act 1991, but may make reference to any further work or consideration that may be necessary to better fit other Acts to enable resilience and preparedness.

**Consultation and Engagement**

The chair of the Technical Advisory Group is expected to agree with the Minister of Civil Defence the overall process, including matters of consultation and engagement. There is significant benefit in direct engagement with key stakeholders, as their contribution will add value to the Technical Advisory Group's advice. This should include providing for engagement with local government, emergency services, relevant government departments, and iwi and Māori. The means of consultation and engagement will need to reflect the time available and it is recognised that engagement will commonly be though the chair and the secretariat.

**Key Deliverable**

A review document examining the current operational and legislative settings for responding to emergencies and the recommended options for change.

The document will be provided to the Minister of Civil Defence no later than three months from the date of the agreement to these Terms of Reference.

## Governance

**Sponsor**

Minister of Civil Defence

**Technical Advisory Group**

A Technical Advisory Group made up of:

- Roger Sowry, as Chair;

- Benesia Smith MNZM, independent consultant;

- Malcolm Alexander, Chief Executive, Local Government New Zealand;

- Assistant Commissioner Mike Rusbatch, New Zealand Police;

- Deputy National Commander Kerry Gregory, New Zealand Fire Service;

- Major General Tim Gall, New Zealand Defence Force;

- Sarah Stuart-Black, Director, Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management.

**Project Team and Secretariat**

The project team and secretariat is headed by Jeremy Corban.

Item 10

Attachment 2

Appendices

**Item 10**

**Attachment 2**

# Appendix 2: Current Arrangements

This appendix outlines the current policy, legislative and institutional arrangements for responding to emergencies in New Zealand.

## Policy

Emergency management in New Zealand is seen as a part of the national security system. National security is the condition which permits the citizens of a state to go about their daily business confidently free from fear and able to make the most of opportunities to advance their way of life. It encompasses the preparedness, protection and preservation of people, and of property and information - both tangible and intangible.

New Zealand takes an 'all hazards – all risks' approach to national security. This approach acknowledges New Zealand's particular exposure to a variety of hazards and threats, any of which could significantly disrupt the conditions required for a secure and prosperous nation.

The New Zealand system also emphasises the importance of resilience, for example the ability of a system to respond and recover from an event (whether potential or actual).

To achieve this, New Zealand takes an integrated approach to managing risk. Known as the 4Rs this encompasses:

- Reduction
- Readiness
- Response
- Recovery

See glossary for definitions.

## Legislative and institutional arrangements

Management of response involves local and national agencies and at least 11 relevant Acts.

The main Act relevant to this review is the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (CDEM Act). The CDEM Act was intended to **"ensure that New Zealand has the appropriate structures, expertise, and resources** to manage disasters at local and national levels[19]. The CDEM Act has a very wide definition of 'emergency' and provides additional powers in support of other Acts.

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- [19] Third reading speech Minister of Civil Defence 8 October 2002

Appendices

## The Purpose of the CDEM Act

The purpose of the Act is set out in section 3 and covers:

- Improve and promote the sustainable management of hazards in a way that contributes to the social, economic, cultural and environmental well-being and safety of the public and the protection of property.
- Encourage and enable communities to achieve acceptable levels of risk by identifying risks and applying risk reduction management practices.
- Provide for planning and preparation for emergencies and for response and recovery in the event of an emergency.
- Require local authorities to coordinate CDEM through regional groups across the '4Rs' and encourage cooperation and joint action between those groups.
- Integrate local and national CDEM planning and activity through the alignment of local planning with a national plan and strategy.
- Encourage the coordination of emergency management across the range of agencies and organisations with responsibilities for preventing or managing emergencies.

## The CDEM Framework

The Act is the overarching element in the CDEM Framework. Other elements include:

- CDEM Regulations made under the Act
- National CDEM Strategy
- National CDEM Plan 2015, and supporting Guide
- CDEM Group Plans
- Director's Guidelines on various aspects of CDEM
- Other legislation relevant to CDEM.

## The role of the Director Civil Defence Emergency Management and MCDEM

The Act provides for the appointment of a Director CDEM, whose functions (set out in section 8) include:

- advising the Minister of Civil Defence
- identifying hazards and risks of national significance
- coordinating national implementation and promotion of civil defence emergency management
- monitoring and evaluating the national civil defence emergency management strategy
- developing, monitoring and evaluating the National CDEM Plan, technical standards and guidelines
- monitoring performance of CDEM Groups
- promoting civil defence emergency management. and
- directing and controlling the resources available for civil defence emergency management during a national disaster.

The Director CDEM is also the director responsible for the Ministry (MCDEM), an executive role in addition to the statutory role.

Appendices

**MCDEM** is a business unit of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC). It is not mentioned in the CDEM Act. The functions and powers of the Director in the Act are enabled by the Ministry. The Ministry is also responsible for managing the operation of NCMC; the 'lead agency' for particular hazards – specifically for natural disasters (earthquake, tsunami, flood, other weather) for infrastructure failure, and the lead agency, for the coordination of welfare services aspects of emergency response and recovery.

## Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups

Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups (Groups) are a core component of the Act. A Group is a consortium of the local authorities (regional and territorial) in a region, working in partnership with emergency services, to undertake CDEM functions within their region.

There are 16 Groups in New Zealand, generally following regional or unitary council boundaries.

The functions of Groups include.

- To identify and understand local hazards and risks and implement cost effective risk reduction measures.
- To appoint at least one suitably qualified and experienced person to be a Group Controller, who would (in the event of an emergency) have access to extraordinary powers under the Act to manage an effective response.
- To provide, or arrange to provide, suitably trained people and an appropriate organisational structure, for effective CDEM.
  - o A number of Groups have initiated a shared services approach, which to different degrees centralises and coordinates activities across the Group area. Many have Emergency Management Offices which oversee functions under the CDEM Act.
  - o MCDEM is developing an integrated training framework with local government to enhance CDEM staff competency.
  - o Some funding for CDEM training comes from the Tertiary Education Commission ($1m for emergency management training each year from Adult Community Education funds).
  - o Professional development and training for controllers is available through Massey University and Auckland University of Technology (AUT). Auckland Council sponsor a separate course for their controllers.
  - o This training is complemented by the national CDEM exercise programme that MCDEM manages – a ten year programme involving central and local agencies.
- To provide, or arrange to provide, other resources necessary for effective CDEM.
- To undertake response and recovery activities.
- If possible, to assist other groups implement CDEM when assistance is requested.
- To promote awareness of the Act and related legislation, and monitor and report on compliance.
- To prepare and implement a Group Plan. Failure to comply with the Plan is an offence under the Act.

(See section 17 for more details on functions, and section 26 for appointment of Group Controllers, and section 85 for Group powers during a state of emergency.)

Groups are established as joint standing committees (of local authority mayors and chairpersons or their delegates) under the Local Government Act 2002. The CDEM Act 2002 gives direction on voting rights and funding liabilities but remains flexible in other administrative aspects to reflect varying Group circumstances.

Appendices

It is important to note the following points about Groups from the Act.

- Member local authorities have equal status.
- As part of the Group each mayor and regional chairperson agrees the plans under which the Group operates
- Individual local authority autonomy remains - mayors still have the right to declare an emergency within their territorial boundary; and each local authority (regional and territorial) is responsible for planning and provision of CDEM within its area, in addition to being part of the Group.
- Groups have discretion in regard to the split of functions between regional and district councils, and the contribution respective councils could make.
- If a territorial authority is split by the boundary between two regional councils, the territorial authority can choose which Group it wishes to belong to.
- Groups can choose to operate collectively, with two or more Groups acting as a single Group.
- Formal linkages are required to be made with emergency service providers.

## Group Plans

Under the Act, every Group must prepare and approve a Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan (CDEM Plan). These plans must state and provide for (refer section 49 for full list):

- the local authorities that have united to establish the Group
- the hazards and risks to be managed by the Group
- the CDEM necessary to manage the hazards and risks
- the objectives of the plan and the relationship of each objective to the National CDEM Strategy
- the apportionment between local authorities of liability for the provision of financial and other resources for the activities of the Group, and the basis for that apportionment
- the arrangements for declaring a state of emergency in the area of the Group
- the arrangements for co-operation and co-ordination with other Groups.

The Act requires that Groups consult with the public over the development of their Group Plan and that interested persons may make submissions about the proposed plan to the Group. Each Group Plan must be reviewed after five years in operation.

- Link to Current Group plans from the MCDEM web site.

It is an offence to fail to comply with a requirement in a civil defence emergency management plan.

## An Emergency, Declarations and associated Powers

The CDEM Act defines an emergency as a situation that:

- is the result of any happening, whether natural or otherwise, including, without limitation, any explosion, earthquake, eruption, tsunami, land movement, flood, storm, tornado, cyclone, serious fire, leakage or spillage of any dangerous gas or substance, technological failure, infestation, plague, epidemic, failure of or disruption to an emergency service or a lifeline utility, or actual or imminent attack or warlike act; *and*
- causes or may cause loss of life or injury or illness or distress or in any way endangers the safety of the public or property in New Zealand or any part of New Zealand; *and*

Item 10

Attachment 2

Appendices

- cannot be dealt with by emergency services, **or** otherwise requires a significant and co-ordinated response under this Act.

The Act provides for local authority delegated representatives, mayors, or the minister, to declare a state of <u>local</u> emergency. The minister also may declare a state of <u>national</u> emergency. Declared emergencies last seven days, although they may be extended multiple times or terminated at any time.

- The Group must appoint one of its members (i.e. a mayor or chair of the regional council) to be authorised to declare a state of local emergency for its area.  The area is the geographic scope of all the district and regional (or unitary) councils that are collectively covered by the particular group of councils.  Commonly, the chair of the regional council is the appointed person.
- Notwithstanding that, any mayor can declare a state of local emergency for their district.  This is one of the few real powers that mayors have by way of the position.
- The Minister of Civil Defence also has authority to declare a state of emergency over the whole of New Zealand or any part (down to a ward). This power has been used once, following the Christchurch 2011 earthquake.

Guidance or factors to consider may be in the relevant Group Plan for the area. The Director guidance is available on the MCDEM web site [DGL13/12].  Making a declaration because the public may derive assurance that everything is in hand is not specifically part of the current guidance.

<u>Emergency powers</u> under the CDEM Act 2002 enable Groups and Controllers to, among other things:

- close or restrict access to roads or public places and regulate land air and water traffic
- remove or secure dangerous structures and materials
- provide rescue, first aid, food, shelter etc.
- conserve essential supplies & regulate traffic
- dispose of dead persons and animals
- enter onto premises
- evacuate premises/places
- remove vehicles, vessels etc.
- requisition equipment, materials and assistance

    Refer section 85 for Group powers during a state of emergency, and Part 5 of the Act (particularly sections 86 to 92) for powers of Controllers.

Importantly, the CDEM legislation is <u>not the only legislation whereby an 'emergency' of some sort triggers extraordinary power</u>. Other Acts also provide powers during emergencies, with the definition of 'emergency' depending on the matter and scope of the related powers. Examples include 'emergency works' under the Resource Management (1991), 'drinking-water emergency' under the Health Act 1956, response to marine oil spills under the Maritime Transport Act (1974) and 'hazardous substances or new organisms emergency' (HSNO Act 1996), and powers under the Fire and Emergency New Zealand Act 2017.

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### Director CDEM and Minister of Civil Defence Powers

The Act provides additional powers to those available during a state of emergency.

- Regulations can be used to prescribe, amongst other things, the level of competence to be met by persons carrying out specified functions, performance standards,  training systems, and regulating

activities that may impede or adversely affect the implementing a civil defence emergency management plan (section 115).

- If a CDEM Group or person fails to commence or to complete the performance of a function or duty under the Act the Director can complete the performance of that function or duty and recover the cost from the relevant CDEM Group or person (section 75).

- In certain situations the Minister may direct the Director or any CDEM Group or person to perform any function or duty or power conferred on that person or Group under the Act (or cease to perform etc) (section 84).

## Command, Control, and Coordination

Definitions (from CIMS)

- Command (authority within an agency) is executed vertically, and includes the internal ownership, administrative responsibility, and detailed supervision of an agency's personnel, tasks, and resources. Command cannot normally be exercised outside an agency.

- Control (authority across agencies) is executed horizontally, and is the authority to direct tasks to another agency, and to coordinate that agency's actions so they are integrated with the wider response. Control authority is established in legislation or in an emergency plan. This is taken as the authority to task another agency towards a certain outcome (or example to achieve a managed evacuation). It is not control over the actual resource – such as personnel or assets.

- Coordination: bringing together agencies and resources to ensure unified, consistent, and effective response. Command and control assist with coordination by defining authority between and within agencies.

### Command

- The authority to command (within an agency/organisation) relies on the agency's hierarchy. The NZDF, police and fires services particularly use the language of 'command'.

- The powers of direction outlined in the CDEM Act from national controller to group controller to local controller can be considered as a command authority within that system. Also the authority from the joint committee (of elected council representatives) down to council executive and staff across all councils is also considered a command authority.

### Control

- The position of (Local, Group, or National) Controller is a statutory role in the CDEM Act under a state of emergency. The extent of authority of the Controller to control in a state of emergency is outlined in the CDEM Act, National CDEM Strategy, the National CDEM Plan Order 2015; and the Group Plans. The Minister of Civil Defence also has control authority in states of emergency.

- The term 'lead agency' is also used to describe the agency with control authority over all agencies involved in the response to an event or hazard. The lead agency for specific events / hazards is identified in Appendix 1 of the National CDEM Plan Order 2015 and in the National Security System Handbook. CIMS notes that *'a lead agency is the agency with a mandate to manage the response to an incident through legislation, under protocols, by agreement, or because it has the expertise and experience.'* The extent of control varies and tends to be limited through legislation. See Chapter 6 for a discussion on the term 'lead agency'.

Appendices

*Coordination*

- The Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) 2nd edition provides a framework that agencies can apply in emergency response. It is a guide, not a standard. CIMS functions include controller, operations, logistics, public information, planning, intelligence and welfare.
- Coordination across different entities (local and central government and emergency services) occurs through the national level ODESC and National Crisis Management Centre, Group level Co-ordinating Executive Group (set up by section 20 CDEM Act), and Emergency Coordination Centres (ECCs) and local Emergency Operation Centres (EOCs).
- References to the involvement of iwi in emergency management coordination and response is varied. There is no reference in legislation.

## CIMS

The Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) 2nd edition provides a framework of principles, structures, functions, processes and terminology that agencies can apply in both emergency and non-emergency incidents. Events might include public parades and marine mammal strandings through to search and rescue, communicable diseases, mass loss of life and disastrous natural hazard events.

CIMS describes how New Zealand agencies (for example government departments, emergency services, Red Cross) coordinate, command, and control incident responses of any scale, It covers how the response can be structured, provides common terminology, practical guidance such as standard colours for designated jobs, and the relationships between different CIMS functions. Functions/positions include: controller, logistics, public information manager, planning and welfare.

It is the primary reference for incident management in New Zealand. It is a guide and a tool, not a regulation that must be followed. It can be applied with different Acts of legislation - Health, Local Government, CDEM, Fire and Emergency NZ, etc. But, it does not provide guidance on the relationship between CIMS terms and statutory positions in New Zealand legislation, for example Group Controller (CDEM Act) or on-scene commander (Maritime legislation).

## Reference to iwi

There is inconsistent reference to the participation of iwi in the key CDEM documents and the role of iwi is different in the various layers of CDEM planning. Current CDEM legislation does not mention iwi.

The National CDEM strategy states: *'Māori have a particular interest in the management of hazards and associated risks, including risks that may be posed to wāhi tapu sites and other sites of significance. It is important that whānau, hapū, iwi and the wider Māori community are involved in CDEM planning. In addition, Māori communities often have important resources for response and recovery, such as marae for use as emergency shelters, and Māori welfare and support services.'*[20]

The National CDEM Plan Order 2015 refers to the role iwi/Māori can play in an emergency as well as the role of Te Puni Kōkiri (TPK) in facilitating and coordinating support to iwi/Maori and providing links between iwi and the emergency management sector.

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[20] National Civil Defence Emergency Management Strategy 2007

Item 10

Attachment 2

TPK has obligations under the National CDEM Plan to:

- prepare for and deliver welfare services as a support agency
- engage with Māori communities to support meeting their needs during and following an emergency, and
- Work with Government agencies/ Groups to facilitate and coordinate support for Māori requiring assistance.

## Welfare

Under CIMS, local authorities have responsibility to plan and deliver welfare services (including shelter and accommodation) in an emergency. Each Group has established a welfare coordination group (or committee) which is comprised of welfare and social service agencies including government agencies and is chaired by the Group Welfare Manager.

The welfare coordination group has commonly developed a Group Welfare Plan and, where needed, sub-committees. Various government agencies sit on the committee. TPK is commonly listed as the 'iwi representative' entity on Group welfare coordination groups.

MCDEM currently has the lead for coordinating welfare services across the 4R's (including response).

Animal welfare, domestic and farm, is also part of the welfare function, and the responsibility of the Ministry for Primary Industries.

## Public information and Education

MCDEM and CDEM Groups promote emergency preparedness during 'peacetime' through public information and education. This helps to ensure that people are aware of and understand the hazards in their area, and know what to do before, during, and after an emergency.

The aim is to help communities be better equipped to take care of themselves and others, relieving pressure on response personnel.

To ensure consistency, this public information often promotes messages and campaign resources developed at the national level, with locally specific messaging and material incorporated as appropriate.

## Intelligence and Situational Awareness

Decision making for coordination, command, and control rely on shared situational awareness and intelligence.

- At present there is one National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC). When an all-of-government response is called for, following activation of the national security system, it is expected that this will be led out of the NCMC.
- Most agencies involved in emergency response also have their own coordination centres.
- There is no shared system for a common operating picture.
- Many agencies also have 24/7 monitoring and response function, including NZ Police, NZDF, FENZ, the New Zealand Rescue Coordination Centre, ambulance services, utility operators, Met Service and others.

Appendices

- MCDEM, local government and GNS Science have duty rosters of people on call if an event happens. Duty Teams assess information about hazards, decide actions (such as issuing warnings) and commence a response.

## Guidelines

The Act provides the Director with the authority to issue technical standards and guidelines. The purpose of these guidelines is to assist organisations with responsibilities under the Act to properly exercise those responsibilities. The Act requires that CDEM Group Plans 'must take account of' the guidelines, codes, or technical standards issued by the Director (section 53(2)).

The Director has issued guidelines and standards on a range of CDEM – related issues. They are grouped in different series as follows:

- Director's Guidelines (DGLs)
- Best Practice Guides (BPGs)
- Technical Standards (TS)
- Information Series (IS)
- Supporting Plans (SPs)

## Other CDEM Related Legislation

Legislation relating to CDEM is not just limited to the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002. A number of other Acts also play a role in CDEM by, for example, regulating activities of particular CDEM participants. They include (but are not limited to) the:

Biosecurity Act 1993

Building Act 2004

Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011

Defence Act 1990

Earthquake Commission Act 1993

Epidemic Preparedness Act 2006

Fire and Emergency New Zealand Act 2017

Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996

Health Act 1956

Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992

Local Government Act 2002

Maritime Transport Act 1994

Public Works Act 1981

Resource Management Act 1991

Better Responses Review – 17 November 2017

54

Item 10

Attachment 2

Appendices

# Appendix 3: List of submissions

| Name | Submission # |
|------|--------------|
| Alan Thompson | 0015 |
| Alison Prins | 0024 |
| Allan Jenkins | 0001 |
| Ambulance New Zealand | 0035 |
| Auckland Council | 0028 |
| Bay of Plenty CDEM Group | 0041 |
| Blind Citizens NZ | 0069 |
| Breaker Bay Wellington | 0048 |
| Canterbury CDEM Group | 0073 |
| Chris Carding | 0011 |
| Chris Hibbert | 0078 |
| Clinton Naude | 0065 |
| David Beatson | 0051 |
| Derek Phyn | 0062 |
| Dr Alastair Barnett | 0021 |
| Dr Peter Tillmann | 0004 |
| Drew Mehrtens | 0060 |
| Emergency Media and Public Affairs | 0067 |
| Engineering Leadership Forum | 0053 |
| Federated Farmers | 0063 |
| Gavin Treadgold | 0070 |
| Gisborne District Council | 0044 |
| Gordon Payne | 0008 |
| Hamish Keith | 0057 |
| Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group | 0022 |
| Hon Te Ururoa Flavell | 0049 |
| Insurance Council of New Zealand | 0071 |
| International Association of Emergency Managers | 0046 |
| Jake Brookie | 0076 |
| John Coburn | 0017 |
| John Meeuwsen | 0050 |
| Jon Mitchell | 0074 |
| Katrina Banks | 0007 |
| Keith Suddes | 0029 |
| Mark Constable | 0018 |
| Marlborough CDEM Group | 0037 |
| Matthew Nolan | 0019 |
| Mere Taito | 0068 |
| Ministry for Primary Industries | 0031 |
| Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment | 0036 |

**Item 10**

**Attachment 2**

Appendices

| | |
|---|---|
| Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management | 0055 |
| Ministry of Health | 0061 |
| Ministry of Transport, transport Crown Entities & transport State-Owned Enterprises | 0052 |
| Murray Dudfield | 0014 |
| Neville Hudson | 0030 |
| New Zealand Institute of Animal Management | 0026 |
| New Zealand Red Cross | 0072 |
| Ngāti Awa Volunteer Army | 0079 |
| Nick Watson | 0006 |
| Northland Coordinating Executive Group | 0059 |
| NZ Airports Association | 0038 |
| Otago CDEM Group | 0043 |
| Pat Ingram | 0003 |
| Peter Davies | 0013 |
| Robert Barlin | 0042 |
| Royal New Zealand SPCA | 0033 |
| Science New Zealand | 0058 |
| Selwyn District Council | 0032 |
| Shaun | 0002 |
| Shell Sanerive-Pere | 0012 |
| Simon Fleisher | 0016 |
| Southland CDEM Group | 0039 |
| St John New Zealand | 0020 |
| Statistics NZ | 0056 |
| Stephen Ward | 0023 |
| Steve Critchlow | 0025 |
| Steve Glassey | 0009 |
| Tane Woodley | 0027 |
| Taranaki CEG & Rural Advisory Group | 0080 |
| Te Kaahui o Rauru | 0034 |
| Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu | 0075 |
| Te Runanga o Ngati Awa | 0040 |
| Toi Moana - Bay of Plenty Regional Council | 0064 |
| Vanessa McDonald | 0047 |
| Volunteering New Zealand | 0066 |
| Waikato CDEM Group | 0045 |
| Wellington Free Ambulance | 0054 |
| Wellington SPCA | 0010 |
| Whakatane and District Federated Farmers | 0077 |

**Item 10**

**Attachment 2**

Better Responses Review – 17 November 2017

56

Appendices

# Appendix 4: List of engagements

By regional/unitary area, in alphabetic order, followed by national entities.

| Auckland | |
|---|---|
| **Auckland Council** | |
| Mayor, Chief Executive and Director Civil Defence and Emergency Management | |
| Waikato | |
| **Taupo District Council** | |
| Mayor, Chief Executive and Councillors | |
| **Thames Coromandel District Council** | |
| Mayor and Chief Executive | |
| Bay of Plenty | |
| **Bay of Plenty Emergency Management** | |
| Director Emergency Management Bay of Plenty | |
| **Bay of Plenty Regional Council** | |
| Chairman and Chief Executive | |
| **Ngāti Awa** (mana whenua for Whakatane) | |
| Chief Executive Officer, Manager Policy & Strategy, Chief Executive Officer for Ngāti Awa social and health organisation | |
| **Te Uru Taumatua (Tuhoe)** (mana whenua for Te Uruwear, Ruatoki, Rua Tahuna) | |
| Chief Executive Officer | |
| **Ngāti Manawa** (mana whenua for Rangipo) | |
| Chairman | |
| **Te Puni Kōkiri** | |
| Regional Manager and Senior Advisor | |
| **Opotiki District Council** | |
| Mayor | |
| **Tauranga City Council** | |
| Mayor, Chief Executive and GM Community Services | |
| **Whakatane District Council** | |
| Mayor, Chief Executive and Controller | |
| Hawke's Bay | |
| **Hastings District Council** | |
| Mayor | |
| Manawatu-Whanganui | |
| **Horizons Regional Council** | |
| Chief Executive, Controller and Manager EMO | |
| **Horowhenua District Council** | |
| Mayor and Councillor | |
| **Rangitikei District Council** | |
| Mayor and Chief Executive | |
| **Whanganui District Council** | |
| Mayor, Chief Executive, CD Emergency Manager and Controllers | |
| **Whanganui Iwi Chairs** | |
| Chair of Ngā Tāngata Tiaki, General Manager of Ngā Rauru, trustee of Ngā Tāngata Tiaki board, TPK and organisation spokesperson for Te Oranganui, Chair of Te Rūnanga o Ngāti Apa | |
| Wellington | |
| Dame Margaret Bazley | |
| **Emergency Media and Public Affairs** | |
| Chief Executive | |
| **Engineering Leadership Forum** | |

**Item 10**

**Attachment 2**

| |
|---|
| Secretary, Engineering Leadership Forum and Chief Executive Officer, Water New Zealand |
| **Kapiti Coast District Council** |
| Mayor and Chief Executive |
| **NZ Response Team** |
| Representatives from the NZ Response Team |
| **Readynet** |
| Founder |
| **Wellington SPCA** |
| Chief Executive |
| **Wellington City Council** |
| Mayor, Chief Executive and Controller |
| **Wellington Free Ambulance** |
| Chief Executive |
| **Wellington region's Coordinating Executive Group** |
| Group consisting of representatives from Hutt City Council, Wairarapa DHB, Hutt Valley DHB, Upper Hutt City Council, MSD, Kapiti Coast District Council, Porirua City Council, Carterton District Council |
| Associate Professor, Translation Studies (University of Auckland), Lecturer in Translation Studies (Dublin City University), Director Centre for Translation & Textual Studies (Dublin City University), Lecturer in Translation & Technology (University College London) |
| Nelson-Tasman |
| **Tasman District Council** |
| Mayor and Chief Executive Officer |
| West Coast |
| **West Coast Regional Council** |
| Chairman and Chief Executive |
| Canterbury |
| **Christchurch City Council** |
| Mayor and General Manager Customer and Community/Manager Civil Defence |
| **Environment Canterbury** |
| Chief Executive |
| **Hurunui District Council** |
| Mayor, Chief Executive and Controller |
| **Kaikoura District Council** |
| Mayor, Chief Executive, Controller, Emergency Management Officer and Advisor to the CE |
| **Ngāi Tahu** |
| Director, Earthquake Response & Recovery, Project Advisor, GM Oranga, GM Strategy and Influence |
| **Selwyn District Council** |
| Mayor and Chief Executive |
| **Student Army** |
| Co-founder |
| **Waimakariri District Council** |
| Mayor, Chief Executive and Controller |
| Otago |
| **Central Otago District Council** |
| Mayor |
| **Dunedin City Council** |
| Mayor and Chief Executive/Controller |
| **Otago Civil Defence Emergency Management Group** |
| Chris Hawker – Group Manager/Controller |
| **Otago Regional Council** |
| Chief Executive |
| **Waitaki District Council** |
| Mayor |

**Item 10**

**Attachment 2**

Appendices

| National |
|---|
| **Clare Curran MP** – Labour for Dunedin South |
| **Coordinating Executive Group (CEG) Chairs** |
| A forum bringing together Chairs from around the country |
| **Cross Party Reference Group** (Nominated members below, although other party members also attended) |
| Jan Logie, Ron Mark, Clayton Mitchell, Marama Fox, David Seymour, Hon Peter Dunne and Clare Curran |
| **Fire and Emergency NZ** |
| Representatives from Fire & Emergency NZ consisting of the Fire Region Manager (member of the TAG), Chair of Fire Service Board, Chief Executive, National Commander Urban, Fire Region Manager, Assistant National Commander, Fire Region Manager, Fire Region Manager, Area Commander |
| **Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand (NZDF)** |
| Representatives of Joint Forces NZ consisting of the Commander Joint Forces NZ (member of the TAG), Deputy Commander Joint Forces NZ, Maritime Component Commander, Land Component Commander, Air Component Commander, Joint Services Component Commander, Special Operations Component Commander, Operations, Plans, Logistics and Commander of Joint Forces Combined Task Group |
| **Hon Te Ururoa Flavell** - Māori Development Minister |
| **LINZ** |
| Group Manager |
| **LGNZ advisory group** |
| Representatives consisting of the Chief Executive - LGNZ (member of the TAG), Community Resilience Manager - Northland Regional Council, Chief Executive - Hauraki District Council, Chief Executive - Napier City Council, Chief Resilience Officer - Wellington City Council, CEO Ruapehu District Council. Group Controller – Canterbury |
| **Media representatives** |
| Representatives from Radio NZ, Radio Broadcasters Association, Three and Community Access Radio |
| **Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment (MBIE)** |
| General Manager Commercial, Consumers & Communications and Policy Director |
| **Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management** |
| Representatives from the Leadership Team consisting of the Director (member of the TAG), Manager Development, Manager Capability & Development, Manager Analysis & Planning, Principal Advisor Emergency Management, Principal Advisor to Director and Communications Manager |
| **Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade (MFAT)** |
| Manager Emergency Management Programme and Director Humanitarian |
| **Ministry of Health** |
| Director - Emergency Management, Director of Public Health, Director Protection, Regulation and Assurance |
| **Ministry for Primary Industries** |
| Response Manager, Principal Advisor, South Island Manager, Manager North Island Regions, Animal Welfare and Animal Products and National Animal Welfare Emergency Management Coordinator |
| **National party MPs** |
| Stuart Smith MP (for Kaikoura), Andrew Bayly MP (for Hunua), Maureen Pugh MP (based in West Coast-Tasman) and Ian McKelvie MP (for Rangitikei) |
| **NZ Collective of Group Controllers** (represented by a nominated subset) consisting of: |
| Bruce Pepperill (Wellington), Michael McCartney (Horizons) and Chris Hawker (Otago) |
| **NZ Police** |
| Representatives from NZ Police consisting of the Assistant Commissioner – Response and Operations (member of the TAG), National Manager Response and Operations, District Commander Bay of Plenty, Manager Command and Emergency Management, Manager Operations Planning, District |

Better Responses Review – 17 November 2017　　　　59

Appendices

| |
|---|
| Manager Ops Support, District Deployment Coordinator, District Operations Manager, Area Commander Eastern Waikato, District Manager Operations Support Bay of Plenty and District Operations Manager Northland District |
| **ODESC Hazard Risk Board** |
| Consisting of representatives from DPMC, Defence, Police, Ministry for Primary Industries, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Department of Internal Affairs |
| **Office of the Prime Minister,  Chief Science Advisor** |
| Chief Science Advisor to the Prime Minister and Research Analyst |
| **Red Cross** |
| International and National Disaster Management Officer and International Programme Manager |
| **St Johns** |
| Chief Executive and Clinical Manager |
| **Te Puni Kōkiri** |
| Deputy Chief Executive, Regional Partnerships and Senior Advisor |
| **TOLL** |
| Group General Manager |
| **Transport Agencies** |
| Representatives from various transport agencies consisting of Deputy Chief Executive - Civil Aviation Authority, Project Director - Wellington Transport Operations Centre NZTA, General Manager Safety and Response - Maritime New Zealand, National Control Centre Manager – KiwiRail, Manager Operations Development – KiwiRail, General Manager Aviation and Maritime - Ministry of Transport, Policy Advisor - Ministry of Transport, Manager People and Environment - Ministry of Transport, Manager Aviation & Security - Ministry of Transport |

| **International** |
|---|
| Director-General Emergency Management Australia |
| Senior Fellow in Civil Protection, United Kingdom |

**Item 10**

**Attachment 2**

Appendices

# Appendix 5: List of declarations of state of emergency

| Region | Hazard Type | Locality | When and declared days | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2002 – 1 event, 2 declarations | | | | |
| Waikato | Flooding | Putaruru & Tirau Wards | 21/06/2002 (2 day) | 'Weather Bomb', water supply issues, road closures, no evacuations |
| Waikato | Flooding | District | 21/06/2002 (2 days) | Up-scaled to District SOE, 1 death, evacuations required |
| 2003 – 1 event | | | | |
| Wellington | Flooding | District | 4/10/2003 (5 days) | Damage to Paekakariki, evacuations required, duration of SOE due to clean-up |
| 2004 – 2 events. 7 declarations | | | | |
| Marlborough | Flooding | Picton Ward | 17/02/2004 (1 day) | Evacuations due to fear of landslip-induced dam break |
| Manawatu-Wanganui | Flooding | District | 16/02/2004 (1 day) | Up-scaled to Regional SOE |
| Manawatu-Wanganui | Flooding | Marton Ward | 16/02/2004 (1 day) | Up-scaled to Regional SOE |
| Manawatu-Wanganui | Flooding | Region | 17/02/2004 (8 days) | 'Weather Bomb', infrastructure disruptions, evacuations required |
| Taranaki | Flooding | Patea Ward | 17/02/2004 (10 days) | Water supply issues, road closures, evacuations required |
| Bay of Plenty | Flooding | Waiotahi Ward | 17/07/2004 (6 days) | Road closures, 1 death, evacuations required |
| Bay of Plenty | Flooding | Whakatane Ward | 17/07/2004 (13 days) | Infrastructure disruptions, 1 death, evacuations required |
| 2005 - 1 event – 2 declarations | | | | |
| Bay of Plenty | Landslides | Edgecumbe-Tarawera Ward | 17/05/2005 (13 days) | Matata township damage due to debris flows |
| Bay of Plenty | Landslides | Tauranga City | 18/05/2005 (1 day) | Evacuations required, formally declared (?) |
| 2006 - 1 event | | | | |
| Manawatu-Wanganui | Flooding | Region | 7/07/2006 (1 day) | SOE declared overnight to enforce evacuations |
| 2007 4 events | | | | |
| Taranaki | Tornado | Region | 5/07/2007 (2 days) | Dwelling and property damage |
| Northland | Flooding | Far North District | 10/07/2007 (3 days) | Far North District area, dwelling damage |
| Otago | Flooding | Milton Ward | 30/07/2007 (1 day) | Localised township flooding, but SOE declared |
| Gisborne | Earthquake | Gisborne City | 21/12/2007 (1 day) | Building damage and power supply issues |
| 2008 – 1 event | | | | |
| Marlborough | Flooding | Picton Ward | 30/07/2008 (1 day) | SOE declared to assist Police with evacuations |
| 2009 – 1 event | | | | |
| Waikato | Landslides | Taupo Ward | 29/06/2009 | Village of Waihi evacuated |

Item 10

Attachment 2

Appendices

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|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | (1 day) | |
| **2010 – 1 event** | | | | |
| Canterbury | Earthquake | Region | 4/09/2010 (11 delays) | Dwelling and property damage, infrastructure damage |
| **2011 – 4 events** | | | | |
| Canterbury | Earthquake | Christchurch City | 22/02/2011 (superceded) | 181 deaths, major infrastructure and dwelling and property damage |
| | | National | 23/02/2011 (66 days) | |
| Hawke's Bay | Flooding | Central Hawke's Bay District | 28/04/2011 (5 days) | Central Hawke's Bay District area |
| Nelson-Tasman | Flooding | District | 13/12/2011 (15 days) | Dwelling damage, infrastructure damage, evacuations required |
| Canterbury | Earthquake | Region' | 23/12/2011 (1 day) | NCMC activated, but stood down shortly thereafter |
| **2012 – Nil [Mt Tongariro unrest; no SOE's declared]** | | | | |
| **2013 – 1 event** | | | | |
| Manawatu-Wanganui | Flooding | Whanganui Ward | 14/10/2013 (1 day) | Whanganui river threat |
| **2014 - Nil [ Auckland power outage; no SOE's declared]** | | | | |
| **2015 – 2 events 4 declarations** | | | | |
| Chatham Islands | Cyclone | Chatham Islands | 16/03/2015 (3days) | Cyclone Pam and rural fires |
| Manawatu-Wanganui | Flooding | Rangitikei District | 20/06/2015 (2 days) | Dwelling damage, road closures |
| Manawatu-Wanganui | Flooding | Whanganui District | 20/06/2015 (12 days) | Largest ever recorded flood in the Wanganui District; Dwelling damage, infrastructure damage, evacuations required |
| Taranaki | Flooding | South Taranaki District | 20/06/2015 (7 days) | Flooding in Waitotara township in South Taranaki; evacuations required |
| **2016 – 2 events. 4 declarations** | | | | |
| West Coast | Flooding | Westland District | 24/03/2016 (1 day) | Waiho River flooding at Franz Josef township; water supply issues, tourism impacts (i.e. loss of revenue) |
| Otago | Earthquake | Dunedin City | 14/11/2016 ( <1 day) | Kaikoura Earthquake |
| Canterbury | Earthquake | Kaikoura District | 14/11/16 (1 day) | Overtaken by later regional declaration |
| Canterbury | Earthquake | Hurunui District | 14/11/16 (1 day) | Overtaken by later regional declaration |
| Canterbury | Earthquake | Region | 15/11/2016 (22 days) | Kaikoura Earthquake |
| Canterbury | Earthquake | Kaikoura District | 06/12/2016 (4 days) | Kaikoura Earthquake |
| **2017 (to date) - 5 events 13 declarations** | | | | |
| Hawke's Bay | Fire | Hastings District | 13/02/2017 (3 days) | Hawke's Bay fires |
| Canterbury | Fire | Christchurch & Selwyn | 15/02/2017 (15 days) | Christchurch Port Hills fires |

**Item 10**

**Attachment 2**

Appendices

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|---|---|---|---|---|
| Manawatu-Wanganui | Flooding | Whanganui District | 04/04/2017 (3 days) | Declared in advance of expected impacts from Ex Tropical Cyclone Debbie |
| Manawatu-Wanganui | Flooding | Rangitikei District | 04/04/2017 (3 days) | Declared in advance of expected impacts from Ex Tropical Cyclone Debbie |
| Bay of Plenty | Flooding | Whakatane District | 06/04/2017 (6 days) | Edgecumbe flooding. State of local emergency overriden by Bay of Plenty declaration on 11 April 2017. |
| Bay of Plenty | Flooding | Bay of Plenty | 11/04/2017 (4 days) | Declaration covering the whole Bay of Plenty area in anticipation of heavy rainfall. This overrode previous, more limited state of emergency over Whakatane District. |
| Waikato | Severe weather | Thames Coromandel District | 12/04/2017 (3 days) | Declared in advance of expected landfall of Cyclone Cook |
| Bay of Plenty | Severe Weather | Whakatane District | 14/04/2017 (7 days) | Declared to enable the continued response to Edgecumbe and the surrounding areas. |
| Canterbury | Flooding/severe weather | Timaru District | 21/07/2017 (1 day) | Declared due to significant rainfall and flooding. Evacuations required |
| Canterbury | Flooding/severe weather | Selwyn District | 21/07/2017 | Declared locally due to flooding and Selwyn River overtopping its banks |
| Canterbury | Flooding/severe weather | Christchurch city | 21/07/2017 | Declared locally due to Heathcote river bursting its banks and flooding in parts of the city |
| Otago | Flooding/severe weather | Dunedin City | 21/07/2017 (3 days) | Declared locally and up-scaled to cover three coastal districts in Otago region; roads affected by flooding and evacuations required in low-lying areas |
| Otago | Flooding/severe weather | Waitaki District | 21/07/2017 (3 days) | Declared locally and up-scaled to cover three coastal districts in Otago region; widespread flooding and breached banks. |

**Item 10**

**Attachment 2**

Appendices

# Appendix 6: Glossary of key terms

| Term / Acronym | Definition |
|---|---|
| 4R's | The four parts of emergency management, being reduction, readiness, response and recovery ['recovery' is defined in the CDEM Act section 4, and all 4Rs are defined in the National CDEM Plan Order 2015 clause 2]: <br><br> a. **Reduction**: identifying and analysing long-term risks to life and property from hazards, taking steps to eliminate those risks if practicable, and, if not, reducing the magnitude of their impact and the likelihood of their occurrence to an acceptable level; <br> b. **Readiness**: developing operational systems and capabilities before an emergency happens, including self-help and response programmes for the general public and specific programmes for emergency services, lifeline utilities, and other agencies; <br> c. **Response**: actions taken immediately before, during, or directly after an emergency to save lives and property, and to help communities recover; and <br> d. **Recovery**: means the co-ordinated efforts and processes used to bring about the immediate, medium-term, and long-term holistic regeneration and enhancement of a community following an emergency |
| CDEM | (Pronounced sea-dim) Civil Defence Emergency Management — a phrase or acronym generally used alongside entities or documents established by, or required by, the CDEM Act 2002. |
| CIMS | Refer to **Coordinated Incident Management System** |
| **Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Group** | A Group established under section 12 of the CDEM Act 2002, members being the mayor or chairperson of that local authority or delegate elected councillor <br><br> 'every regional council and every territorial authority within that region must unite to establish a Civil Defence Emergency Management Group for the purposes of this Act as a joint standing committee under clause 30(1)(b) of Schedule 7 of the Local Government Act 2002' |
| **Common operating picture** | An understanding of a situation based on the best available information, shared among all agencies. |

Appendices

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| **Controller** | The person in charge of a response element who directs response activities, and fulfils management functions and responsibilities and exercises control.<br><br>References in this report to a **Group Controllers** and **Local Controller** as those who are appointed by the CDEM Group under section 26 and section 27 respectively of the CDEM Act 2002, and reference to **National Controller** is a person with functions and powers in a national state of emergency under section 10 of the CDEM Act. |
| **Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS)** | (Pronounced sims) The Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS), now in its 2nd edition, provides a framework of principles, structures, functions, processes and terminology that agencies can apply in in both emergency and non-emergency incidents. |
| **Coordinating Executive Group (CEG)** | (pronounced keg) CDEM Coordinating Executive Group established under section 20 of the CDEM Act 2002, and comprising of generally senior officials from each member local authority, Police, Fire and Emergency New Zealand, and a provider of health and disability services (generally represented by the District Health Board) and other co-opted members. |
| **Declaration** | Used as short hand for a declaration under the CDEM Act 2002, refer to **state of emergency** |
| **DHB** | District Health Board |
| **Director** | Director CDEM, a statutory position appointed under section 8 of the CDEM Act |
| **DPMC** | The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet |
| **Emergency** | In general, an emergency is a situation that poses an immediate risk to life, health, property, or the environment that requires a significant and coordinated response.<br><br>It has a specific meaning under the CDEM Act 2002 section 4 as it is relevant to the decision to declare a 'state of emergency'. See Appendix 2, Current Approach and discussion under 'An emergency Declarations and associated Powers'. |
| **Emergency Management Information System (EMIS)** | (Pronounced e-miss) A software tool and workflow system aimed at managing requests, tasks and resources, logging information, and the collation and filing of developed datasets such as action plans and situation reports. It is supported by MCDEM and used by local government in relation to CDEM activities and events. |
| **Emergency Operation Centre (EOC)** | In this report an EOC refers to a facility, generally operated by a local authorities, which when activated acts as a coordination and control centre for local (as opposed to national) emergency response and |

Item 10

Attachment 2

Appendices

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| | support. The term is used in CIMS, and in CDEM guidance, but not in the CDEM Act 2002. |
| **FEMA** | Federal Emergency Management Agency (USA) |
| **FENZ** | Fire and Emergency New Zealand - established on 1 July 2017: the amalgamation of the New Zealand Fire Service, the National Rural Fire Authority, 12 enlarged rural fire districts and 26 territorial authority rural fire authorities. |
| **GNS Science** | Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences Ltd (NZ), Te Pū Ao, a Crown Research Institute providing earth, geoscience and isotope research and consultancy services |
| **Group** | Refer to **Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Group** |
| **Group Plan** | A statutory document produced by the CDEM Group under the CDEM Act 2002 - section 49 set outs its contents. |
| **Intelligence** | 1. The function that collects and analyses response information, particularly that related to status, hazards, consequential risks, and the context of the incident.<br>2. The collection, evaluation, and analysis of response information, aimed at producing forecasts on how the response may develop |
| **Joint Committee** | A joint standing committee under section 12 of the CDEM Act comprising the regional council and territorial authorities within the region. |
| **Lead agency** | This report recognises that there are various definitions. Refer to Chapter Six for discussion |
| **Lifeline utility** | Any organisation named or described in Schedule 1 of the CDEM Act 2002. This includes airports, ports, railways, and providers of gas, electricity, water, wastewater or sewerage, storm water, telecommunication, roading networks and petroleum products. |
| **Local government** | Collectively regional councils, unitary councils, district councils and city councils - a total of 78 in New Zealand. Also called local authorities. |
| **Major incident** | A proposed new status of activity – an incident or event which meets the threshold for initiating a response but does not require extraordinary powers under the CDEM Act 2002. Refer to Chapter 3 for discussion |
| **MBIE** | Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment |
| **MCDEM** | Refer to **Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management** |

Appendices

| | |
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| **Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management (MCDEM)** | The central government agency, a Ministry set up by Cabinet, to give effect to the functions of the Director CDEM. It is responsible for providing leadership, strategic guidance, national coordination and facilitation, and the promotion of various key activities, taking an 'all-hazards approach' across the 4R's. |
| **MSD** | Ministry of Social Development |
| **National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC)** | A secure all-of-government facility maintained in a state of readiness to manage the national response to emergencies, sometimes colloquially referred to as 'the bunker'. |
| **National Security System Handbook** | A DPMC produced handbook that sets out New Zealand's arrangements with respect to both to the governance of national security and in response to a potential, emerging or actual national security crisis |
| **NZDF** | New Zealand Defence Force |
| **NZRT** | New Zealand Response Team |
| **OAG** | Office of the Auditor-General New Zealand |
| **Public Information Management (PIM)** | The function that, during an incident, prepares, distributes, and monitors information to and from the media and public. |
| **Regional council** | A regional council named in Part 2 of Schedule 2 of the Local Government Act. |
| **State of Emergency** | Used in this report to refer to the 'state of emergency' that results from a declaration under the CDEM Act 2002. A **state of local emergency** is declared under section 68 or section 69. <br><br> A **state of national emergency** can only be declared by the Minister of Civil defence under section 66. |
| **TAG** | Technical Advisory Group set up to conduct this review |
| **Territorial (Local) Authority (TLA)** | A city council or a district council named in Part 2 of Schedule 2 of the Local Government Act. |
| **TPK** | Te Puni Kōkiri |
| **Unitary authority (Council)** | A territorial authority that has the responsibilities, duties, and powers of a regional council conferred on it. |

Appendices

# Appendix 7: Secondary matters

In the course of this review, the Technical Advisory Group were made aware of a range of more secondary matters that are not specifically dealt with in this report. The most material of these are listed here (in no particular order). They may be usefully considered as part of future work.

1. *White Island.* For White Island and a number of other offshore islands, the Local Authority is the Minister of Local Government by default. As these islands are not within any territorial local authority boundaries, this can create an issue for resourcing response activities.

2. Variation in *geographic boundaries of response agencies* – the difference in boundaries (Fire and Emergency New Zealand, Police, CDEM Groups, Rural support etc.) can create confusion and require multiple points of liaison.

3. Administrative restrictions - under standing orders (Local Government Act 2002) a *CDEM Group can't make a decision without physically meeting*, adding cost and time.

4. *Liability* of council chief executives due to the fact that they employ CDEM staff and have PCBU ('person conducting a business or an undertaking') responsibilities. Submissions also raised liability of Controller decisions.

5. Confusion over responsibilities for *animal welfare and rescue* (including companion animals) and respective roles.

6. The relationship between *state of emergency declaration and insurance policies* – noting the variation in policies and practice. Business continuity insurance was particularly raised.

7. Review of the *financial arrangements* by which response and recovery costs are covered and reimbursed.

8. A *number of recovery matters*, including dealing with land affected by events and increasing the hazard risk, but the associated buildings remained structurally sound.

9. Multiple agencies involved in provision of *temporary housing,* with a potential for confusion and/or reduced efficiency.

10. Need for *business continuity planning* generally.

11. Better *privacy / information sharing protocols* for collecting and sharing personal information during an event.

**Item 10**

**Attachment 2**

Appendices

# Appendix 8: References

2016 Waroona Inquiry SESVA Position Paper

A Report on the Role of the Media in the Information flows that Emerge during Crisis Situations

ACSES Performance Indicators 2012

An Emergency Management Framework for Canada - Third Edition

Briefing to the incoming Minister of Civil Defence

British Columbia Emergency Management System

CDEM National Capability Assessment Report

Copernicus Emergency Management Service Factsheet

Corrective Action Plan - following the Review of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Response to the 22 February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake

Crisis Communication: Saving Time and Lives in Disasters through Smarter Social Media

Declarations – Director's Guidelines for the CDEM Sector

Emergency Management Performance Standards

Exercise Whakautu II Post- Exercise-Report

FEMA - Logistics Partners, could strengthen implementation of capability assessment tool

FEMA Has Made Progress since Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, but Challenges Remain

Havelock North Drinking Water

How Social Media Is Changing Disaster Response

Inquiries into Recent Natural Disasters in Australia - Canberra Firestorm

INSARAG Guidelines 2012

Independent Operational Review – Port Hills fires February 2017

International Disaster Response

Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles Review

Kaikoura Earthquake Response Review

Maritime NZ Oil Spill Response Strategy

Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management Business Plan 2016-2020

Modernize North Carolina Emergency Management Act

National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order 2015

National Civil Defence Emergency Management Strategy

National Response Framework (FEMA)

National Security System Handbook

Next-Generation Incident Command System Fact Sheet

Office of the IGEM Strategic Plan 2017-2021

Rangitāiki River Scheme Review – April 2017 Flood Event

Responses to, and lessons learnt from, the January and February 2016 bushfires in remote Tasmanian wilderness

Review 2010-2011 flood warnings and response - Victoria

Review of the Actions taken by Whakatāne District Council - Flooding events April 2017

Better Responses Review – 17 November 2017

69

Item 10

Attachment 2

Appendices

**Whole of Government: the Solution to Managing Crises?**
Carayannopoulos, G. (2017), Whole of Government: the Solution to Managing Crises? Australian Journal of Public Administration, 76: 251–265. doi:10.1111/1467-8500.12227

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**Emergency Management Research and Practice in Public Administration: Emergence, Evolution, Expansion, and Future Directions**
Comfort, L. K., Waugh, W. L. and Cigler, B. A. (2012), Emergency Management Research and Practice in Public Administration: Emergence, Evolution, Expansion, and Future Directions. Public Administration Review, 72: 539–547. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2012.02549.x

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2012.02549.x/abstract

**Lessons We Don't Learn: A Study of the Lessons of Disasters, Why We Repeat Them, and How We Can Learn Them**
Donahue, Amy, and Robert Tuohy. "Lessons We Don't Learn: A Study of the Lessons of Disasters, Why We Repeat Them, and How We Can Learn Them." *Homeland Security Affairs* 2, Article 4 (July 2006). https://www.hsaj.org/articles/167

**Agility and Discipline: Critical Success Factors for Disaster Response**
Harrald, John R. George Washington University (GWU) Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management, GWU School of Engineering and Applied Science *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* Vol 604, Issue 1, pp. 256 - 272 First published date: September-08-2016 *10.1177/0002716205285404*
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0002716205285404

**Organizing for the Big One**
Steigenberger, N. (2016), Organizing for the Big One: A Review of Case Studies and a Research Agenda for Multi-Agency Disaster Response. J Contingencies Crisis Man, 24: 60–72. doi:10.1111/1468-5973.12106

**Towards New Disaster Governance: Subsidiarity as a Critical Tool**
*Melo Zurita, M. L., Cook, B., Harms, L., and March, A. (2015) Towards New Disaster Governance: Subsidiarity as a Critical Tool. Env. Pol. Gov., 25: 386–398. doi:* 10.1002/eet.1681.

Item 10

Attachment 2

-1-

## Ministerial Review - Better Responses to Natural Disasters and other Emergencies in New Zealand

## Position Paper

**From:**    Regional Managers, Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups

**To:**       Clare Ward, Team Lead, Technical Advisory Group (TAG) Implications Project

**Info:**      Mike Meehan, Chief Executive, West Coast Regional Council (RCEOG Sponsor)

**Date:**     6 April 2018

### Introduction:

Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups (CDEM Groups) are a core component of the CDEM Act 2002 and are the main deliverers of CDEM to the communities of New Zealand. There are 16 CDEM Groups across New Zealand. The Groups vary in structure from unitary authorities to combinations of Regional and City/District Councils. A detailed breakdown of CDEM Groups is provided at Appendix 1.

The professional delivery of CDEM around the country is led by the Regional Managers of the CDEM Groups. All 16 CDEM Groups meet annually at the Regional CDEM Group Managers Special Interest Group (SIG) Forum. On 19–20 March 2018 the Regional CDEM Group Managers met members of the TAG Implications Project Team and participated in two workshops regarding the recommendations arising from the Ministerial Review - Better Responses to Natural Disasters and other Emergencies in New Zealand. All of the CDEM Group Managers have agreed to the following as the collective position of the CDEM Group Managers regarding the recommendations, noting that Groups also have the ability to respond individually to the recommendations (some already have).

### CDEM Groups:

1. Auckland CDEM Group
2. Bay of Plenty CDEM Group
3. Chatham Islands CDEM Group
4. Canterbury CDEM Group
5. Hawke's Bay CDEM Group
6. Marlborough CDEM Group
7. Manawatu Wanganui CDEM Group
8. Nelson Tasman CDEM Group
9. Northland CDEM Group
10. Otago CDEM Group
11. Southland CDEM Group
12. Tairāwhiti CDEM Group
13. Taranaki CDEM Group
14. Waikato CDEM Group
15. Wellington Region CDEM Group
16. West Coast CDEM Group

-2-

## National Level Functions and Structure (Chapter 1)

| Recommendation | Supported/Not Supported | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0    Agree to establish a new National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) as a departmental agency hosted by DPMC, to replace MCDEM. | Supported | This is fundamental to bringing about the required change. It must be more than just a re-naming of MCDEM and must involve staff changes to bring about the required change in culture. Careful consideration should also be given to how the transition is made from one organisation to another. |
| 2.0    Agree that the core function of NEMA is to enable the Director CDEM to meet their functions and duties and exercise their powers under relevant emergency management legislation, including: | Supported | |
| 2.1    As the national authority for support and coordination in states of local emergency, and control in national emergencies. | Supported | |
| 2.2    Taking an oversight role through developing, monitoring and evaluating the all hazards-all risks national CDEM Strategy and Plan, and addressing matters of national interest in Groups' and other agencies' plans and activities. | Supported | "Matters of national interest" need to be clearly defined and understood. |
| 2.3    Assuring system capability and performance through setting standards and monitoring that those standards are being met. | Supported | |
| 3.0    Note that this will require more proactive leadership of the sector, and an assertive, and when required, directive stance, as envisaged in the provisions of the CDEM Act. | Supported | Noting that there are currently different structures and approaches being used around the country and a single position for all may not always be the best option. |
| 4.0    Retain the 4R's all hazards—all risks perspective within NEMA, with a focus on operational responsibilities, and consider shifting strategic policy advice responsibilities to a separate part of DPMC. | Supported | |
| 5.0    Agree that the NEMA's monitoring responsibilities, and OAG audit responsibilities, will be used to full effect through publication of results. | Supported | This should be amended to reflect that any monitoring and audit of CDEM must include monitoring and audit of NEMA as well as that of CDEM Groups. |

**Item 10**

**Attachment 3**

-3-

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 6.0    Agree that lead agency responsibilities are allocated to appropriate agencies, and that: | Supported | On the condition that the agencies identified to lead are appropriately trained and resourced to carry out the roles expected of them. This needs more work. |
| 6.1    MBIE is specified as lead agency with responsibility for infrastructure failure. There are also calls to be made in relation to responsibility for transport and water. | Supported in part | It is unclear whether MBIE is best placed to be the lead agency for all infrastructure failure. There are also concerns around whether they are structured and resourced to do so. This subject needs further consideration. |
| 6.2    Responsibility for assessing, monitoring, and alerting the hazard risk in relation to geological and meteorological risks (earthquake, tsunami, flood, other weather) is clarified. | Supported | Agree that clarification in this area is key – there should be one source of the truth. |
| 6.3    MSD is specified as lead agency with responsibility for welfare aspects of response. | Not supported | MSD have struggled in this area in the past when they have been lead agency. CDEM, since taking over lead agency for this aspect, have worked hard to gain and maintain public confidence. It is recommended that CDEM retain lead agency for welfare in a response. Further consideration should be given to MSD taking over as the lead agency for welfare in the recovery phase. |
| 7.0    Ensure that NEMA has the resources and the capability to credibly do the job expected of it. | Supported | This should be expanded to include all national / central government agencies with lead / support agency responsibilities. |
| 8.0    Strengthen incentives and accountability for system stewardship, through: | Supported | While the general direction of these three recommendations is supported, more work is required around how they are going to be achieved. |
| 8.1    Developing transparency, governance, and structural approaches to strengthen collective action and stewardship in this sector, and | Supported | |
| 8.2    Considering joint accountabilities in departmental CE's performance agreements, backed up in Ministerial letters of expectation. | Supported | |

## Regional Structure (Chapter 2)

| Recommendation | Supported/Not Supported | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0    Require Groups to take a regional approach consistent with the intent of the CDEM Act | Supported | More clarity is required around what exactly is the intent of the CDEM Act regarding Groups and individual local authority members. |

Item 10

Attachment 3

-4-

| 2.0 Require Groups to provide adequate funding and resourcing for effective CDEM activities | Supported | Noting that there are currently various approaches being used by Groups to meet this requirement. The different approaches are producing different results around the country. More consistency in outputs and outcomes is preferred. |
|---|---|---|
| 3.0 Strengthen national standards over minimum requirements (for example, capability, operating practice as outlined in Chapter One) | Supported | Noting that the way in which it is delivered may differ around the country. |
| 4.0 Strengthen Group (joint committee) governance (for example, requirements on members to participate, limits on ability to delegate), and | Supported | Noting that Mayors should attend and have limits on their ability to delegate to others. |
| 5.0 Strengthen accountability for Group performance (through NEMA monitoring and OAG audit, as outlined in Chapter One) | Supported | Must include strengthening accountability for NEMA performance. |
| The majority recommend that you:<br>6.0 Require the development of shared emergency management services across the CDEM regions, covering: | Supported in part | This needs further consideration, taking into account the varied council structures of CDEM Groups as well as any specific local regional/local legislation applicable. |
| 6.1 The regional or unitary council responsible for resourcing and administration. | Supported in part | This needs further consideration taking into account the varied council structures of CDEM Groups as well as any specific local regional/local legislation applicable. |
| 6.2 Consistent Emergency Management Office structures, with EOCs across the Group area. | Supported in part | This needs further consideration taking into account the varied council structures of CDEM Groups as well as any specific local regional/local legislation applicable. |
| 6.3 Regional appointment and oversight of all Controllers, with clear line management and an emphasis on appointments embedded within territorial authorities. | Supported in part | This needs further consideration taking into account the varied council structures of CDEM Groups as well as any specific local regional/local legislation applicable. |
| 6.4 Defined functions and responsibilities for respective territorial and regional councils. | Supported | Clarification of functions and responsibilities is key. Clear definition in legislation is preferred. |

**Declarations (Chapter 3)**

| Recommendation | Supported/Not Supported | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0 Clarify that elected representatives (the mayors) have primary authority to declare states of local emergency for their respective districts. | Supported | |

**Item 10**

**Attachment 3**

-5-

| 1.1 Revise section 25 of the Act to give mayors the primary role. | Supported | |
|---|---|---|
| 1.2 While mayors have primary authority, provide for the Chair of the Joint Committee to be able to declare in appropriate circumstances (consulting with affected mayors where practicable) as a multi-district or Group wide declaration may be most appropriate. | Supported | |
| 2.0 Require training and advice as a precondition for any person (primarily the mayors) using their authority to declare a state of local emergency. | Supported | Noting the potential for gaps to exist in the ability to declare when new people are elected. Consideration should be given to ensuring this training is a priority for any new elected official. |
| 2.1 If a mayor is not trained then another trained representative of the elected members of the Joint Committee (the Group) will need to declare. | Supported | |
| 3.0 Retain the ability for the Minister of Civil Defence to declare any state of emergency (local or national). No change to the current Act is proposed. | Supported | Noting that recommendation 1.2 (above) requires the Chair of the Joint Committee to consult with affected mayors where practicable. This being the case, it should be considered that the Minister of Civil Defence consult with affected Chairs of Joint Committees / mayors where practicable. |
| 4.0 Amend guidance to include 'public confidence' as a factor to consider in deciding to declare a state of emergency. | Supported | Noting that 'public confidence' would be one of multiple factors to be considered in deciding to declare a state of emergency. |
| 5.0 Provide the option of the mayor declaring a 'major incident'. | Not supported | It is unclear what benefit the introduction of declaring a 'major incident' will have. It is believed that it will be a challenge to define what constitutes a 'major incident' and may lead to public confusion rather than public confidence. The preferred option is use existing terminology: a non-declared and a declared state of emergency. This needs further consideration. |
| 5.1 Under a major incident the legislative powers available are limited to those that the councils and emergency services (such as Police) can use under other Acts. | Not supported | The creation of a class of emergency called a Major Incident is not supported. The legislative powers available to councils and emergency services (such as Police) under other Acts are available in any emergency |

**Item 10**

**Attachment 3**

-6-

## Role of Iwi (Chapter 4)

| Recommendation | Supported/Not Supported | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0     Recognise the capability that iwi bring to emergency management. | Supported | Noting that currently is no reference to the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, which should be included. |
| 2.0     Legislate to enable iwi to participate in planning for and responding to a natural disaster or other emergency, and to bring more clarity to their role: | Supported | Noting that the make-up of iwi across New Zealand and across CDEM Groups varies with some CDEM Groups having multiple iwi which will be a challenge for determining a model for representation. Needs further consideration in respect of the how. |
| 2.1:     Appropriate iwi representatives to be part of the Groups' Coordinating Executive Group (CEG). | Supported | As stated above this needs further consideration in respect of the how. It also requires clarification of roles and responsibilities for TPK. |
| 2.2:     Appropriate iwi representatives to be included on the Group Joint Committee. | Supported in part | While some Groups are supportive of this recommendation, others are not. The main concern for most Groups is the how – particularly where Groups have large numbers of iwi to deal with (eg 35 for the Bay of Plenty). |
| 3.0     Look to the recent Mana Whakahono-a-Rohe amendments to the RMA as a model for a future CDEM Act amendment. Both the Local Government Act and recent amendments to the RMA provide examples of legislative changes sought. | Supported in part | While on the face of things this may appear to be an option given how new these amendments are, it is not yet clear whether this has in fact proven to be a successful model and requires further consideration. |

## Capability and Capacity (Chapter 5)

| Recommendation | Supported/Not Supported | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0     Strengthen the professionalism of emergency management, with a particular focus on Controllers. | Supported | Supported in principle. How needs to be worked through. What is needed is consistency. |
| 1.1.     Require all Controllers (Group and National) to meet one mandatory national standard of technical and personal competency, prior to their being accredited as a CDEM Controller. | Supported | Also to include Local Controllers.<br><br>Training may be provided by more than one provider. |

**Item 10**

**Attachment 3**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1.2.     Confirm that only accredited Controllers are permitted to act as Controllers during any declared state of emergency. | Supported in part | Agree that only accredited Controllers are permitted to act as Controllers, but that this should be during <u>any</u> emergency (as defined in the Act) - not just during a declared state of emergency. This is because the majority of emergencies led by Controllers are not declared. A transition plan is required covering Controllers who have experience, but not accredited, being able to control an emergency situation until all Controllers can be trained and accredited. |
| 1.3.     Investigate the ability to leverage off Australian Emergency Management experience. | Supported in part | This should be expanded to International Emergency Management experience and not be limited to Australia. |
| 1.4.     Require the Director to personally confirm that a Group Controller meets the expected standard prior to formal accreditation. | Supported | This needs to be expanded to include Local Controllers and allow for the accredited Group Controller to personally confirm that Local Controllers meet the expected standard prior to formal accreditation. All processes should be transparent and have a clear appeal process. They should also give some consideration to controllers who have experience but no formal qualification. Some sort of transition plan is required covering the ability to fly in teams from other regions. |
| 1.5.     Investigate a process by which the status of someone as an accredited Controller is reviewable. | Supported | |
| 1.6.     Develop national training and professional competency for all the relevant CIMS functions. | Supported | Noting that opportunities should also exist for innovation to provide ongoing improvement of the CIMS operating model. |
| 2.0      Establish 'Fly-in' Teams | Supported | Agreed to in principle. How needs to be worked through. |
| 2.1.     Have national teams of professional CDEM Controllers and other essential roles (such as CIMS functions, strategic communications, science) that can be immediately deployed (either on request of the Group Controller, or on the discretion of the Director). | Supported | Noting that professional controllers and other essential roles should have a good understanding of community engagement and the need to work <u>with</u> communities to achieve successful outcomes. |
| 2.1.1    Provide for professionals to be on the 'Fly in' roster from a variety of agencies. | Supported | |
| 2.1.2    Recognise that some or all of national support roles are likely to be required with any state of emergency that is more than minor. | Supported | |
| 2.1.3 Investigate where these priority roles can be sourced from (secondments are a possibility). | Supported | |
| 3.0      Ensure a consistent high standard of volunteer competence. | Supported | Work is required on a wider CDEM volunteer framework and identification of the roles carried out by volunteers. |

-8-

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 3.1    During an emergency response when deployed for the purposes of urban light rescue, shift oversight of trained and accredited NZRTs to FENZ as the agency with the most appropriate functional alignment with this volunteer capability. | Supported | Consideration must be given to a shift of oversight to FENZ as lead agency in readiness, not just in response. |
| 3.2    NEMA to work with WorkSafe New Zealand to get clarity on its accountability when Groups engage volunteers (and other employees) in response. | Supported | |
| 3.3    For NZ Response Teams: | | |
| 3.3.1   Agree that during an emergency response, when deployed for the purposes of urban light rescue, FENZ have control of the teams if they are trained, equipped and resourced to an agreed accredited level. | Supported | Consideration must be given to a shift of oversight to FENZ as lead agency in readiness, not just in response. |
| 3.3.2   FENZ and NEMA to work with CEG chairs and NZRTs on how the teams can be recognised as being trained for responsibilities that they can appropriately assist with during emergencies. | Supported | Consideration must be given to a shift of oversight to FENZ as lead agency in readiness, not just in response. |
| 3.4    Identify how New Zealand can incorporate best practice from Australia's State and Territorial Emergency Services (SES) in recognising/training/accrediting volunteers, including assessment of volunteers' existing qualifications. | Supported | This should be expanded to International Emergency Management practice and not just be limited to Australia. |
| 3.5    Explore how best to protect volunteers from liability if they are 'in the system' i.e. NZRT, USAR. | Supported | |

## Authority for Command, Control, and Coordination (Chapter 6)

Command within the CDEM Structure.

| Recommendation | Supported/Not Supported | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0    Enable the Director to direct Group Controller(s) during an emergency under the CDEM Act when there are matters of national interest | Supported in part | Change reference from Director to National Controller, and from an emergency to a declared emergency. Matters of national interest also need to be defined. |

-9-

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1    Include appropriate checks and balances to this command authority: | Supported | |
| 1.1.1    Setting out circumstances of national interest requiring intervention | Supported | |
| 1.1.2    A requirement that any use of the authority is transparently reported. | Supported | Including full disclosure to local authorities, elected members and group committees, with open and honest communication. |
| 2.0    Create generic authorisation of accredited Controller appointments | Supported | Supported in principle. How needs to be worked through. In accordance with international best practice? |
| 2.1    Provide for qualified people to be brought in during events (fly-in teams – see Chapter Five) and be able to: | Supported | |
| 2.1.1    Access the relevant CDEM Act powers of a Controller, and | Supported | |
| 2.1.2    Enable them to act in the role of CDEM Controller anywhere in the country. | Supported | Noting that in certain CDEM Groups there may be specific local legislation which needs to be considered. |
| 3.0    Require clear command authority at Group level. | Supported | |
| 3.1    Require any 'local' or secondary Controllers to be under the clear command authority of the Group Controller in charge of an event (noting there will be roster changes). They do not have independent powers. | Supported | |
| 4.0    Confirm the authority of Group Controller | Supported | |
| 4.1    Reinforce that there is no mandate for the Group Controller to be subject to direction by those that might have a different relationship to them outside a state of emergency. | Supported | |

Control Across Agencies During Response

| Recommendation | Supported/Not Supported | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| 5.0    Require clear control authority for Group Controllers | Supported | |
| 5.1    Ensure that when a state of emergency is declared under the CDEM Act the Group Controller has control over the emergency response. This includes being able to task other agencies. | Supported | Clarity is required as to the level of control that a Group Controller can exercise over an emergency response when there is not a declared state of emergency. |

**Item 10**

**Attachment 3**

-10-

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 5.1.1    Develop and set out parameters of agency tasks – such as appropriate limits and preconditions – in the relevant Plans (National CDEM Plan Order for nationally managed hazards and Group CDEM Plans), and | Supported | |
| 5.1.2    Develop effective mechanisms to bind and clarify responsibilities. | Supported | |
| 6.0      Assign default tasking to agencies | Supported | Stronger language is required. Legislate? |
| 6.1      Require that relevant agencies specifically consider likely emergency response tasks and assign responsibilities, including: | Supported | Requires stronger direction for relevant agencies to deliver not just consider. |
| 6.1.1    The CIMS functions (for example, logistics, planning, intelligence) within operation centres. | Supported | |
| 6.1.2    Commonly experienced short-term tasks of manning cordons, rapid assessment and air traffic control. | Supported | |
| 6.1.3    Roles and responsibilities as part of the fly-in team discussed in Chapter Five. | Supported | |
| 7.0      Clarify and review lead agencies descriptions | Supported | |
| 7.1      Review the list of lead agencies so that it covers agencies with the primary mandate for overseeing a particular hazard or risk across the 4R's (including who manages the response to an incident) and ensure consistent expression through relevant documents. | Supported | |
| 7.2      Change references to lead agency to clarify that, when a state of emergency is declared under the CDEM Act: | Supported | |
| 7.2.1    A Controller (Group or National) has overall control to manage the emergency, and | Supported | |
| 7.2.2    The agency managing the hazard continues to have responsibility for managing the specific incident. | Supported | |

Coordination

| Recommendation | Supported/Not Supported | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| 8.0      Require use of CIMS (2nd edition) | Supported | Expand to include "and any enhancements and future editions". |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 8.1  NEMA to require all entities listed at the front of the CIMS 2nd Edition to commit to using it, and collectively updating it to add clarity and reflect NZ legislative roles and authority. | Supported | Legislate to stop individual agencies opting out.<br><br>Its content should be periodically reviewed for relevance and ongoing improvement. |
| 9.0  Extend membership to key entities required to coordinate an effective response | Supported | |
| 9.1  Extend CEG membership to include ambulance as emergency services and also iwi (see separate recommendation in Chapter Four) as appropriate for the area. | Supported | Note comments regarding the practicality of including iwi in Chapter 4. |
| 9.2  Emphasise the role of the Regional Emergency Management Advisors (currently with MCDEM) and recognise them as full members of the CEGs. | Not supported | Consideration of MCDEM as a full member would require representation at the same level as that of other members (CEO/Tier 2 level). The current view is that Regional Emergency Management Advisors (REMAs) should only be recognised as non-voting members (one per CEG). This is currently the case in most Groups. There are differing views as to whether REMAs should be full participating members of CEG. |
| 10.0  Representatives from agencies in the CEG to attend emergency operation centres | Supported in part | Change reference from 'agencies' to 'partner agencies', delete 'in the CEG', and add 'and/or emergency coordination centres' after 'emergency operations centres'.<br><br>In many Groups partner agencies are unable to deploy senior staff into each EOC and the ECC. The above changes require attendance but in a form that suits their level of resourcing. |
| 10.1  Emphasise the importance of the liaison role when there is a declared CDEM state of emergency: | Supported | There is also importance in having the liaison role in an emergency event which is not declared. |
| 10.1.1  For services such as Police, FENZ, Ambulance, iwi, DHBs, and | Supported | |
| 10.1.2  Ensure they are represented at the activated operation centre following a catastrophic event (such as a large earthquake) or when it is activated to respond to a developing event (such as a weather event). | Supported | |

**Item 10**

**Attachment 3**

-12-

## Intelligence (Chapter 7)

| Recommendation | Supported/Not Supported | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0      Establish a new national emergency management facility (replacing the Bunker) with a fit-for– future physical layout and technological functionality | Supported | |
| 1.1      Enable a national emergency to be controlled and managed from the new facility. | Supported | |
| 1.2      Provide for all current CIMS functions, along with a common operating picture and strategic communications. | Supported | |
| 1.3      For national resilience, provide for two facilities and/or easy transfer of base operations. | Supported | |
| 1.4      Maintain effective technological links with other operating centres (Groups, Police, FENZ, Defence, Ministry of Health, and Transport for example). | Supported | |
| 1.5      Systems to be adaptable so that all central government organisations can effectively operate out of the central facility if required. | Supported | |
| 2.0      Invest in the technology to ensure a fit-for-purpose Common Operating Picture | Supported | |
| 2.1      Investigate technology needed for a Common Operating Picture based on international best practice models as a strong contender for New Zealand's common operating model. | Supported | |
| 2.2      Expect all entities with emergency operations functions to collectively solve the challenge of cross agency systems to share intelligence, and situational assessment. | Supported | |
| 3.0      Establish an integrated 24/7 operation for the monitoring, alerting and warning of emergencies | Supported | Consideration needs to be given as to how this 24/7 operation will link with CDEM Group operational capability, which is not a 24/7 staffed capability but 24/7 duty systems. |
| 3.1      Investigate the benefit of using the new national emergency management facility (see rec 1.0 above) as part of the 24/7 operation. | Supported | |

**Item 10**

**Attachment 3**

-13-

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 3.2    Utilise and integrate with existing 24/7 capabilities to provide intelligence and assessment of developing or shock emergencies (with an all hazards and risks approach). | Supported | |
| 3.3    Increase the speed by which alerts are provided and distributed, particularly in regard to simplifying or shortening current practice and providing timely and geographically accurate tsunami warnings. | Supported | Key is clarification around roles and responsibilities of the national 24/7 operations centre and the 16 CDEM Groups 24/7 duty systems. |
| 4.0    Recognise the importance of science intelligence as part of situational awareness: | Supported | |
| 4.1    Develop an expert group based on the UK SAGE model. | Supported in part | More information on this model is required. Consideration should also be given to other overseas models that provide a similar function to identify international best practice. |
| 4.2    Enable relevant science capability to be embedded as part of the fly-in team. | Supported | |

**Information and Communication (Chapter 8)**

| Recommendation | Supported/Not Supported | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0    Confirm local Mayor as primary spokesperson | Supported | |
| 1.1    Provide the mayor with supported strategic communications advice. | Supported | |
| 1.2    Require Group plans to identify arrangements for a regional spokesperson when managing an event that crosses territorial boundaries. | Supported | |
| 2.0    Recognise Strategic Communications as an essential element of effective response | Supported | |
| 2.1    Deploy strategic communications support immediately for all sudden onset emergencies such as earthquakes, and other disasters depending on scale. | Supported | |
| 2.2    Provide communications advice and support for the Minister(s), local MPs, Mayors and Chief Executives/Director. | Supported | |
| 2.3    Liaise with their counterparts in other agencies (such as Police, Fire, MFAT, and NZDF) to shape a comprehensive situation report for national and international media. | Supported | |

**Item 10**

**Attachment 3**

-14-

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 2.4    Work from both the NCMC and 'on the ground', to cover strategic communications needs. | Supported | |
| 3.0    Include and deploy trained and experienced PIMs and Strategic Comms in 'Fly In Team' | Supported | |
| 3.1    Allocate the task of maintaining the database of people with strategic communications, and other specialist communications capability, for deployment as part of the fly-in-team. | Supported | |
| 3.2    Resource capability for social media monitoring and use. | Supported | |
| 4.0    Ensure timely, consistent, and proactive use of the range of appropriate media channels both for communication, and for gathering intelligence. | Supported | |

**Additional Considerations:**

In addition to the position stated above it is submitted that the Ministerial Review - Better Responses to Natural Disasters and other Emergencies in New Zealand has not addressed the following key areas;

- International Assistance – A key factor in any significant disaster event is the international assistance which will be provided to New Zealand by other countries. This needs to be addressed in terms of the planning and operational considerations at the National, Group and Local level. At a National Level issues such as foreign policy, immigration, customs and bio-security need to be planned for. At the Group and Local levels planning and preparations must be undertaken for the operational deployment of the international assistance teams which may include tasking, accommodation, logistical support, assigning liaison and interpreters.

Community – The community are key to all that CDEM delivers. While the report makes repeated reference to the importance of community confidence it makes no recommendations regarding engagement with communities in a response. This area needs consideration.

-15-

## Appendix 1: National CDEM Groups

**Northland CDEM Group**
Northland Regional Council
Far North District Council
Kaipara District Council
Whangarei District Council

**Waikato CDEM Group**
Waikato Regional Council
Hamilton City Council
Otorohanga District Council
Hauraki District Council
Matamata-Piako District Council
South Waikato District Council
Taupō District Council
Thames Coromandel District Council
Waipa District Council
Waikato District Council
Waitomo District Council

**Auckland CDEM Group**
Auckland Council

**Bay of Plenty CDEM Group**
Bay of Plenty Regional Council
Kawerau District Council
Ōpōtiki District Council
Rotorua Lakes Council
Tauranga City Council
Western Bay of Plenty District Council
Whakatāne District Council

**Tairāwhiti CDEM Group**
Gisborne District Council

**Taranaki CDEM Group**
Taranaki Regional Council
New Plymouth District Council
South Taranaki District Council
Stratford District Council

**Hawke's Bay CDEM Group**
Hawke's Bay Regional Council
Napier City Council
Central Hawke's Bay District Council
Hastings District Council
Wairoa District Council

**Manawatu Wanganui CDEM Group**
Horizons Regional Council
Palmerston North City Council
Horowhenua District Council
Manawatu District Council
Rangitikei District Council
Ruapehu District Council
Tararua District Council
Whanganui District Council

**Wellington Region CDEM Group**
Greater Wellington Regional Council
Wellington City Council
Hutt City Council
Porirua City Council
Upper Hutt City Council
Kāpiti Coast District Council
Masterton District Council
Carterton District Council
South Wairarapa District Council

**Nelson Tasman CDEM Group**
Nelson City Council
Tasman District Council

**Marlborough CDEM Group**
Marlborough District Council

**West Coast CDEM Group**
West Coast Regional Council
Buller District Council
Grey District Council
Westland District Council

**Chatham Islands CDEM Group**
Chatham Islands Council

**Canterbury CDEM Group**
Environment Canterbury
Christchurch City Council
Ashburton District Council
Hurunui District Council
Kaikoura District Council
Mackenzie District Council
Selwyn District Council
Timaru District Council
Waimakariri District Council
Waimate District Council

**Southland CDEM Group**
Environment Southland
Invercargill City Council
Gore District Council
Southland District Council

**Otago CDEM Group**
Otago Regional Council
Dunedin City Council
Waitaki District Council
Central Otago District Council
Queenstown Lakes District Council
Clutha District Council

**Item 10**

**Attachment 3**

2017

Item 13

Attachment 1

# Hawkes Bay Civil Defence Group

# Volunteer Needs Analysis Report

# February 2018

**Item 13**

**Attachment 1**

**Item 13**

**Attachment 1**



# Hawkes Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group

# Volunteer Needs Analysis Report

## February 2018

**Item 13**

**Attachment 1**

Hawke's Bay CDEM Group Volunteer Needs Analysis Report Version 1.2 Final

# Contents

Hawke's Bay CDEM Group Volunteer Needs Analysis Report Version 1.2 Final                    1

# Introduction

## Background to the Volunteer Needs Analysis

Hawke's Bay CDEM Group currently invests around $50,000 per annum in direct costs and 1FTE equivalent in support of volunteering under the CDEM Group banner. At a CEG meeting in November 2016 a directive was given to look at how we use volunteers to supplement our response capability and develop options to consider if the Group should be investing the allocated budget in other areas of CDEM, better utilising the money through targeted volunteer activities, or increasing our investment to ensure we can cover all areas of CDEM volunteering. In order for a range of options to be presented to CEG for the future use of volunteers, HB CDEM Group is conducting a needs analysis of volunteering in CDEM within Hawkes Bay.

Currently in Hawke's Bay the use of volunteers in emergency management can be placed into 4 main categories:



Figure 1 – Types of CDEM Volunteer

Whilst we currently have a pool of volunteers within Hawke's Bay, the majority of these are community volunteers with a relatively low level of training whom we mostly engage with during response activities. An Emergency Response Team has recently been established following the identification of a need for additional rescue support. In addition there are 2 communications teams currently operating as part of the existing Napier City Council and Hastings volunteer pools.

## Project overview

### Scope

This needs analysis will look at all current areas of volunteering with a view to establishing a current state of volunteering across the HB CDEM Group.

### Scope exclusions

Whilst included within the analysis, the recently formed Hawke's Bay Emergency Response Team will not be analysed for need, as this was established during a separate process. However, they will be included in potential future options for the uses and management of volunteers within the HB CDEM Group.

Hawke's Bay CDEM Group Volunteer Needs Analysis Report Version 1.2 Final

## Goal and Objectives

The goal of this project is:

**To ensure the Hawkes Bay CDEM Group understands volunteering requirements and effectively utilises budget allocations to ensure an effective capability to respond to adverse events**

The objectives of this project include:

- The current and appropriate use of volunteers across the Group is understood

- The sources of current volunteers is identified

- Current volunteer capability within the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group is identified

- Current staff input to volunteering is understood

- Potential future volunteer use and needs are identified

- Identifying the potential investment requirements for an effective volunteer pool

# Project methodology

## Focus of the Needs Analysis

In order to achieve the goals of the needs assessment information was sought in nine key areas:

- Is it appropriate to use volunteers?
- Who are our CDEM Volunteers?
- What are we currently using them for in CDEM?
- What could we be using volunteers for in CDEM?
- Could other agencies potentially provide the services that our volunteers do?
- How do we currently manage our volunteers?
- What are the costs of using volunteers?
- Where do we need volunteers in the HB CDEM Group to strengthen our response capability?
- What options exist to fill gaps in capability?

## Data Collection methods

Data and information was collected in several ways:

### Literature Review

The literature review was conducted using the following documents:

- Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management – Guide to the National Plan
- Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management Director's Guideline [DGL11/15] – Welfare Services in an Emergency
- Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management – Director's Guideline [DGL15/13] – Volunteer Coordination in CDEM

Hawke's Bay CDEM Group Volunteer Needs Analysis Report Version 1.2 Final      3

- Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management – Director's Guideline [DGL12/12] – Guidance for Establishing and Operating New Zealand Response Teams (NZ-RT's) – Document recently revoked
- Review of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Response to the 22 February Christchurch Earthquake – 29 June 2012
- Australian Journal of Emergency Management – Centralised coordination of spontaneous emergency volunteers: the EV CREW Model
- Volunteering New Zealand – State of Volunteering in New Zealand Report 2016
- Volunteering New Zealand – Best Practice Guidelines for Volunteer-involving Organisations
- An Incident Control Centre in action: Response to the Rena oil spill in New Zealand – Hunt, Smith, Hamerton, Sargisson
- Forum Magazine – The self-organisation of volunteering youth during crisis events – Sarah Lockwood
- Glimpses of a Better World: The role of tangata whenua, community and voluntary sector in the Canterbury earthquake recovery – Garth Nowland-Foreman
- Legal opinion on Health and Safety implications in the event of emergency activations and Overlapping PCBU duties, and duties of Trusts in a Civil Defence Context for the Bay of Plenty CDEM Group – Simpson Grierson Barristers and Solicitors

## Volunteer Survey

A 10 question survey was sent out to all volunteers currently on record with the HB CDEM Group. The survey was sent to 156 people and received a return of 50 responses. The questions asked in the survey are shown in Appendix

## Volunteer organisations interviews

A series of questions were used to prompt the participants (shown in Appendix 2 pg. 23), however, these were not rigidly stuck to if the interviewee raised something that was not covered by the questions and was relevant to the needs assessment. All conversations were recorded to enable the identification of key themes from the conversations and to refer to as part of the future training development.

## Survey of other CDEM Groups

A 10 question survey was sent out to all other CDEM Groups to build a picture of how volunteers were being utilised and managed elsewhere in New Zealand. The survey was sent to 15 Groups and received a return of 7 responses. The questions asked in the survey are shown in Appendix 3, page.

## Ministry of CDEM Questionnaire

The Ministry was sent a series of questions regarding volunteering

- Does MCDEM see the development of a pool of trained CDEM volunteers as a high, medium or low priority for CDEM Group work programmes? (Excluding NZRT's)
- If it is seen as a low priority, what does MCDEM see as a better use of the money we have been investing in volunteers?
- If volunteering is seen as a high priority, what areas does MCDEM see as a lower priority that CDEM Groups can divert time and funding from?
- Beyond welfare response, what does MCDEM see CDEM Groups realistically being able to use volunteers for in response? (NZRTs' excluded)
- What challenges and risks does MCDEM see for the sector in using and training CDEM volunteers?
- What does MCDEM see as the challenges and risks of CDEM Groups not using trained CDEM volunteers?
- Has MCDEM had any discussions with volunteer organisations at a national level with regards to MOU's around supply of volunteers for response etc? (That we can then use locally)
- Does MCDEM see there being more co-ordination of CDEM volunteering nationally in the future? E.g. standardised training, volunteer advisory groups, national volunteer coordinator role etc

## EMO / EMA Focus Group

A focus group of the EMO's and EMA's was held to discuss the results of the staff survey and identify where training had been successful in the past and how it could be improved to develop the capability of staff in the future. The staff present at the focus group were:

| Organisation | Interviewee name |
|---|---|
| Hawke's Bay CDEM Group Office | Teresa Simcox<br>Alison Prins<br>Jae Sutherland<br>Michelle Beedell<br>Lisa Pearse |
| Napier City Council | Marcus Hayes-Jones |
| Central Hawke's Bay District Council | Bruce Kitto |
| Wairoa District Council | Denal Meihana |

*Figure 2 – Participants in the EMA / EMO Focus Group*

## Data Analysis

The data collected has been analysed to identify any recurring themes and the existing levels of capability across the group. This information has then been used to form the basis of the conclusions in this report.

Hawke's Bay CDEM Group Volunteer Needs Analysis Report Version 1.2 Final      5

**Item 13**

# Results of the Needs Analysis

## Is it appropriate to use volunteers?

The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management sees it as appropriate to utilise volunteers, as their use is stipulated in the CDEM Act 2002. However, they did not provide any expectation that they have upon groups to involve volunteers in a response, instead stating that the decision of whether to use volunteers to assist in a response was a decision of the Group.

There is a lot of evidence to support the use of volunteers in an emergency from previous experience. The review into the Canterbury earthquake response found that in some cases the response by spontaneous volunteer groups was better than the official response in meeting the needs of the community. In addition to this, the other CDEM Groups surveyed during this analysis had all used volunteers during real responses and rated their effectiveness highly. However, they did note that there was a variance between different areas of volunteering in terms of the quality of the response and noted that their effectiveness related heavily to their levels of preparedness.

The other volunteer organisations within Hawke's Bay (and nationally) provide cover and skills to assist in a response. The training of these volunteers is left to the organisations in the most part, but specific training for response is coordinated with the CDEM Group, albeit via a very informal arrangement.

There is some concern regarding the Health and Safety requirements for using volunteers from other organisations. Whilst a CDEM Volunteer employed with the CDEM Group is covered by the health and safety policies of the parent organisation alone, there is some duplication of the health and safety responsibilities when using volunteers from another organisation e.g. Citizens Advice Bureau or the Salvation Army. A legal opinion by Harrison Greerson Associates sought by the Bay of Plenty CDEM Group states that whilst these volunteers are acting under the Group, and therefore the health and safety policies of that Group, this does not diminish their own organisations responsibilities to ensure the health and safety of their volunteers. This is normally as an agreement before a response that the health and safety policies of the responding organisation (in this case HB CDEM Group) will satisfy the requirements of the organisation providing volunteer support.

Another area of concern regarding the use of volunteers that was common across all the areas of research was training. It is clear that there needs to be a clear structure for training that ensures volunteers are engaged and have the appropriate skills to provide effective support. The report into the Christchurch earthquakes noted that the NZRT's level of training varied greatly and therefore their capability to provide support also varied.

Finally the availability of volunteers is something that needs to be factored into the use of volunteers to assist in response. Across all the areas of research there is evidence that the availability of volunteers to assist has several barriers to becoming an effective resource. The volunteer survey found that work commitments and family commitments were two of the main barriers that restrict volunteer availability (see figure 1). In addition to these other volunteer commitments that they are committed to is another significant barrier to their availability.

**Attachment 1**

Barriers to volunteering



*Figure 1 – Barriers to volunteering within the HB CDEM Group volunteers*

In addition to the volunteer survey there were references to the availability of people to volunteer throughout the literature review. In particular the State of Volunteering in New Zealand Report 2016 notes that there has been a large shift from the traditional long-serving volunteer towards more time sensitive volunteers who will fit their volunteer commitments around their lives. They are generally busier and looking for short-term commitment in volunteering. In addition, the report noted that only 3% of organisations in Hawke's Bay use volunteers, which means that there is either little appetite amongst the population to volunteer, or there are not the opportunities available for people to volunteer.

## Who are our CDEM volunteers?

Hawkes Bay CDEM Group has historically engaged with volunteers at the local level to assist in several areas of readiness and response. These volunteers are identified as HB CDEM Group volunteers, however, there is still some division due to the way volunteers were managed by each territorial authority historically. Currently the CDEM Group has the following number of volunteers:

| | |
|---|---|
| **Hawke's Bay Emergency Response Team** | 24 |
| **Welfare (Formerly Napier CDEM Volunteers)** | 13 |
| **Team Leadership (Formerly Napier CDEM Volunteers)** | 5 |
| **Communications (VHF, Satellite)** | 12 (NCC) and 5 (HDC) |
| **Community volunteers (E.g. Cape Coast CRT's)** | Approx. 100 |
| **Total number of HB CDEM volunteers** | 160 |

*Figure 2 – Volunteer numbers within HB CDEM Group*

We received 50 response to the volunteer survey and each group of volunteers was fairly evenly represented (see fig.3). Other volunteer roles included community volunteers who did not identify with a specific response role.

## Areas of volunteering



*Figure 3 – Areas of CDEM volunteering represented by respondents of the volunteer survey*

Our volunteers come from a range of backgrounds and age groups. The recent volunteer survey showed that the vast majority of our volunteers are over the age of 50 (See fig. 4), with less than 4% of volunteers aged below 30.

## Age Range



*Figure 4 – Age range of the volunteer survey respondents*

The ethnicity of the majority of our volunteers is New Zealand European, with only a small percentage identifying as Maori and very few other ethnic groups represented (See graph below).

## Ethnicity



*Figure 5 – Ethnicities of the volunteer survey respondents*

Hawke's Bay CDEM Group Volunteer Needs Analysis Report Version 1.2 Final                8

The volunteer survey also showed that we have a reasonably good retention rate for our volunteers, with nearly half being a volunteer for more than 1 year and over a quarter volunteering for 6 years or more.

## Years served



Figure 6 – Years served by the volunteer survey respondents

In addition we asked volunteers why they volunteered for Civil Defence. As you can see on the graph below the majority responded that they were volunteering to serve their immediate community and because they felt they had skills to offer. In addition to this they wanted to help others and to serve the wider Hawke's Bay communities. Very few respondents were concerned about the social aspect of being a volunteer (see fig. 7).

## Reason to volunteer



Figure 7 – Reasons given to volunteer by survey respondents

Hawke's Bay CDEM Group Volunteer Needs Analysis Report Version 1.2 Final                                      9

## What is the capability of our local volunteer agencies?

| Name of organisation | Areas of CDEM Support | No of volunteers | Deployment time |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Red Cross Disaster Welfare Response Team** | Welfare, CDC Support, Out Reach and Psychosocial Support, Rural Outreach, Medical and Mass Casualty incidents, Ground based rescue and casualty handling, Child Protection / care of unaccompanied children (In emergencies), Surge activities, Restoring Family Links (Reunification), WASH support, Communications support, Relief Distribution | 13 members in the Hawke's Bay Disaster Welfare Team<br><br>Other teams in regions across NZ | 1-2 hours for liaison in the GECC<br><br>Initial Response in 2-4 hours<br><br>Full deployment in 6-8 hours<br><br>National Teams deployed in 24 hours |
| **Red Cross Humanitarian Volunteers** | General tasks (goods distribution etc), Liaison roles | 60+ (Exact number not confirmed) | Unknown |
| **Victim Support** | Psychosocial Support | 18 | 1 hour |
| **Salvation Army** | Mass catering Registration Psychosocial Support General CDC Support | 30 (Trained) 60 untrained | 1 hour basic response<br><br>1 – 4 hours for food truck etc |
| **Volunteering HB** | General tasks e.g. delivery, manual labour | Unknown – depends on how many people are interested through their site | Unknown |
| **St. John** | Medical Support to a CDC | No volunteers as of June 2018. Can provide a 2 person crew | ASAP after notification |
| **Citizens Advice Bureau** | CDC Reception Registration Needs Assessment | 15 | 6 hours |
| **Maori Wardens** | General CDC Support CDC Reception Outreach activities Cordon management | Unknown | Unknown |
| **SPCA** | Animal care and rescue | Unknown numbers locally<br><br>National Response Capability | Unknown |

*Figure 8 – Capability of supporting volunteer agencies*

In addition to the above volunteer organisations a number of the welfare functions are supported by other government agencies, such as needs assessment, accommodation, care and protection of children, financial support and psychosocial support. However, these agencies have designated responsibilities under the national welfare arrangements, so their capability to support other areas of response are limited.

## What are we currently using volunteers for and what could we use them for in the HB CDEM Group to support our response?

The table on the next page (Fig. 9) shows the activities that the HB CDEM Group are currently engaging each type of volunteer in and the activities we could potentially be utilising volunteers in to support our response. This has been based on their use in previous events, how they are currently used in other groups around New Zealand and suggested uses from the EMA / EMO Focus Group and volunteer agency interviews.

| Area of CDEM | Specific Task | Spontaneous Volunteer | CDEM Volunteer | Volunteer Organisation | Community Volunteer | Corporate Volunteers |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Welfare** | Registration and Needs Assessment | | ✓ | ✓ | | |
| | Outreach Activities | | ✓ | ✓ | | |
| | Psychosocial Support | | ✓ | ✓ | | |
| | Advisory Services | ✓ | | ✓ | | ✓ |
| | Catering | | | ✓ | | ✓ |
| | CDC Reception | | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ |
| | CDC Supervisor | | ✓ | ✓ | | |
| | CDC Support | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| | Unaccompanied Minors | | | ✓ | | |
| | Helplines | | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ |
| | Care of animals | | | ✓ | | |
| | Cultural Support inc. translation | ✓ | | ✓ | | |
| **EOC / ECC** | Runners | ✓ | ✓ | | | |
| | Admin support | ✓ | | | | ✓ |
| | Function roles | | ✓ | ✓ | | |
| | PIM - Facebook | | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ |
| **Operational Response** | Evacuation support | | ✓ | ✓ | | |
| | Cordon Management | | ✓ | ✓ | | |
| | Communications | | ✓ | ✓ | | |
| | Light Rescue | | ✓ | ✓ | | |
| | Medical assistance | | ✓ | ✓ | | |
| | Distribution of goods | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| | Situational Awareness – Reporting | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ | |
| | Rapid Impact Assessment | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | |
| | Spontaneous volunteer Mgt. | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| | Info. distribution | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| | Traffic Control | | ✓ | | | |
| | Manual Activities e.g. Debris clearance | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| **Readiness Activities** | Public Education | | ✓ | ✓ | | |
| | Community Resilience | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ |
| | School programmes | | ✓ | ✓ | | |
| | Response Planning | | ✓ | ✓ | | |

*Currently volunteers for these activities*
*Could potentially use volunteers in these activities*

*Figure 9 – Current use of volunteers within the HB CDEM Group*

Hawke's Bay CDEM Group Volunteer Needs Analysis Report Version 1.2 Final     11

## How do we currently manage our volunteers?

The HB CDEM Volunteers are currently managed by two Emergency Management Officers. This is due to the historical formation of volunteering within Hawke's Bay that was linked to a territorial authority, rather than the CDEM Group. This division of responsibility has led to a differing approach to volunteer management and training, with volunteers formerly associated to the Napier City CDEM receiving higher levels of training, equipment and engagement than those of the Hastings CDEM.

As part of the volunteer survey the volunteers were asked to rate the level of support they receive from the HB CDEM Group. Figure 10 below shows the results from this question.



*Figure 10 – Volunteer survey respondents ratings for levels of support from the HB CDEM Group*

Whilst the majority of respondents felt that there was a good level of training, resourcing and recognition from the HB CDEM Group, there were still some concerning levels within the results. These included a high percentage of respondents who felt our communication with volunteers was poor and a high level of respondents who feel our training and recognition is poor to average (nearly 40% in both areas).

The discussions with the EMO's and EMA's highlighted that we utilise a vast majority of methods to communicate with our volunteers, but these are not consistent across all the different areas of volunteering. Comments from the different volunteer agency interviews indicated that there was a disconnect between HB CDEM and them, not in terms of what they would be required to do in an emergency, but in readiness activities, such as training and exercising together regularly.

## What is the current volunteering capability in the HB CDEM Group for initial response?

| Area of CDEM | CDEM Volunteer | Volunteer Organisation | Community Volunteer |
|---|---|---|---|
| Welfare | • 18 (Welfare and Team Leader Volunteers) | • 30 Salvation Army Volunteers<br>• 13 Red Cross DWRT Volunteers<br>• 15 CAB Volunteers<br>• 18 Victim Support volunteers<br>• SPCA<br>• Maori Wardens | • Approximately 100 Community Volunteers |
| Potential number of trained volunteers to support Welfare Response | | | 94 |
| Potential number of untrained community volunteers to support Welfare Response | | | 100+ |
| EOC / ECC | 2 HB CDEM Group volunteers | | 2 |
| Potential number of trained volunteers to support EOC / ECC Response | | | 2 |
| Potential number of untrained community volunteers to support EOC / ECC Response | | | 0 |
| Operational Response | • 24 HBERT Volunteers<br>• 15 Communications Volunteers (HDC and NCC) | • 13 Red Cross DWRT Volunteers<br>• 60 untrained Salvation Army volunteers<br>• Untrained Red Cross Humanitarian Volunteers<br>• Untrained Maori Wardens | • Approximately 100 Community Volunteers |
| Potential number of trained volunteers to support Operational Response | | | 52 |
| Potential number of untrained community volunteers to support Operational Response | | | 160+ |
| Readiness Activities | • 18 Welfare & Team Leader Volunteers<br>• 24 HBERT Volunteers<br>• 17 Communications volunteers | • 13 Red Cross DWRT Volunteers<br>• Untrained Red Cross Humanitarian Volunteers | • Approximately 100 Community volunteers |
| Potential number of trained volunteers to support Readiness activities | | | 72 |
| Potential number of untrained community volunteers to support Readiness activities | | | 100+ |

Whilst the table above suggests that we currently have sufficient numbers of volunteers to support an initial response, it is worth noting that in some cases a single organisation is providing support in more than one area of the response. A good example of this is the Red Cross Disaster Welfare Response Team. They are able to provide support in all areas of a response, however, they only have 13 members and would become very thinly spread if engaged in both welfare and operational activities at any one time.

## What are our current staffing requirements for CDEM activities?

In order to understand what our current volunteering needs are it is important to understand what are our requirements are as a group for staffing a response. The table on the next page outlines the staffing requirements for the identified tasks and indicates if these are also supported by other agencies, such as the Police, Fire, government agencies, or volunteer organisations.

The number of volunteers required to assist is dependent upon the scale of the emergency, with larger emergencies requiring far higher levels of resourcing. In order to establish some form of baseline for the number of trained volunteers that may be required, the minimum number required to perform an activity at any size event has been used. In some cases it is not possible to establish a minimum number, as the situation will determine the requirements.

| Area of CDEM | Specific Task | Staffing Requirements | Agency involvement | Requires trained staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Welfare | Registration and Needs Assessment (Inc. PFA) | 10 staff minimum | MSD, IRD, WINZ | ✓ |
| | Advisory Services (Financial etc) | Managed by WINZ | WINZ | ✓ |
| | Civil Defence Centre Reception | Minimum of 2 per centre (8hr shifts)* | TA's | ✓ |
| | CDC Supervisor | 3 per centre (on 8 hour shifts) | TA's | ✓ |
| | CDC Support | 4 per shift (on 8hr shifts)* | TA's | ✓ |
| | Unaccompanied Minors | Determined by Coordinating agency | CYFS, Police | ✓ |
| | Outbound calling | Minimum of 2 staff (8hr shifts) | IRD, TA's | ✓ |
| | Care of animals | Determined by Coordinating agency | SPCA / TA's | ✓ |
| | Cultural Support inc. translation | Situation dependent | TA's / TPK | ✓ |
| | Distribution of goods | Situation dependent | | |
| **Total number of trained staff required for Welfare response** | | | | **37+** |
| EOC / ECC Facilities | Function roles | 45 in ECC (3 shifts – 135 staff per 24hrs) 10 – 15 in EOC / IMT's (3 shifts x 4 centres – 120 – 180 staff per 24hrs) | TA's HBRC Other CDEM Groups | ✓ |
| | PIM - Facebook | | TA's HBRC Other CDEM Groups | ✓ |
| **Total number of trained staff required for EOC / ECC response** | | | | **315+** |
| Operational Response activities | Evacuation support | Situation dependent | FENZ / Police | ✓ |
| | Cordon Management | Situation dependent | Contractors / Police | ✓ |
| | Communications (VHF) | 4 People per shift (12 over 24hrs) | | ✓ |
| | Light Rescue | Minimum of 8 members for deployment as NZRT | FENZ | ✓ |
| | Medical assistance | 2 Per CDC | St. John | ✓ |
| | Rapid Impact Assessment | 4 People minimum per response sector (20 people for 5 sector minimum capability) | FENZ, Police | ✓ |
| | Spontaneous volunteer Management | 1 Leader per 10 volunteers | | ✓ |
| | Information distribution | Situation dependent | | |
| | Traffic Control | Situation dependent | Contractors | ✓ |
| | Manual Activities – Sandbagging, debris clearance | Situation dependent | Contractors | |
| **Total number of trained staff required for Operational response activities** | | | | **45+** |

Hawke's Bay CDEM Group Volunteer Needs Analysis Report Version 1.2 Final 14

## What options are there for volunteering in CDEM?

Throughout New Zealand each CDEM Group is using different methods to engage volunteers in response activities. There are a number who are utilising volunteers from other volunteer organisations, such as the Red Cross and Salvation Army, however, some groups are casting the net wider and utilising volunteers from organisations such as Rotary, Lions NZ and local churches. In the case of Southland CDEM Group they are actively engaging with local business to supply volunteers for response. Currently in Hawke's Bay we are utilising the volunteer organisations that have an existing relationship with CDEM and have not sought to develop relationships with volunteer organisations such as those mentioned above.

Another area that has not been fully explored in Hawke's Bay is the use of spontaneous volunteers to assist in response activities. During the response to the Christchurch earthquakes spontaneous volunteers carried out a number of task to relieve the pressure from responding organisations. The biggest impacts of spontaneous volunteers were seen within their own communities, where entire responses were led by volunteers from churches and marae that had had no formal contact with CDEM beforehand.

There is also the potential to develop our current volunteer pool to lead spontaneous volunteer groups. This would require the training and maintenance of a smaller pool of volunteers, but would place a larger requirement for assistance on the existing volunteer organisations who support us in response to provide the specialist response activities.

A final option is utilising council staff from across our authorities who are not involved in the official response (e.g. EOC / ECC facilities). Staff from these organisations could be developed to provide the additional support a response requires outside the co-ordination centres, or trained to manage a team of spontaneous volunteers.

## What are the current costs of using volunteers?

The current volunteering structure within Hawke's Bay currently costs the group approximately $50,000 per annum and involves approximately 1.1FTE to run (See Appendix 3 – Estimated FTE's for volunteering, pg. 27). The annual budget allocated to volunteers includes all training, personal protective equipment requirements and resourcing to enable the volunteers to carry out their specific tasks. A large sum of the current investment is utilised by the Emergency Response Team ($25,000 per annum) and this will be maintained into the future regardless, as this was approved as a separate investment by CEG.

Maintaining our current level of CDEM trained volunteers represents an investment of approximately $1000 per person per annum, however this is not invested equally across the volunteering areas (Communications, Welfare and Team Leaders), meaning some volunteers receive a higher level of investment than others. This also results in a mix of capability within the volunteer pool. It is also difficult to determine how much as a Group we are investing

The survey of other CDEM Groups showed that HB CDEM Group is currently at the upper end of investment into volunteers, with most investing less the $10,000 per annum and minimal FTE's into running a volunteer programme. Only 1 Group (Canterbury CDEM Group) currently invests more than Hawke's Bay CDEM Group, which is mostly as a result of having a major event within their region within the past decade. Our volunteer investment exceeds that of most other Groups, although charity status is used to supplement investment for some aspects of volunteering, such as their emergency response team, in some Groups / areas. Investment in volunteering comes solely from Group budgets.

# Themes and issues

Several themes and potential issues emerged during the compilation of the data collected. These are outlined below.

## The changing face of volunteering

Volunteering in New Zealand is undergoing a change in the demographics of those volunteering. Studies have shown that the age of volunteers is increasing and younger volunteers are less likely to be engage in long-term volunteering. This was reflected in the volunteer survey we conducted, with the large majority of our volunteers being in the 30 years to 70 years of age bracket.

Volunteers are increasingly less likely to volunteer long-term due to lives becoming busier and are looking for short-term volunteering opportunities. Work and family commitments are major barriers to some people being able to commit to volunteering consistently.

## Management of volunteers

The management of volunteers is time heavy if they are to provide real value to a response. The effectiveness of a volunteer is dependent upon the level of training they receive and the level of engagement they have with an organisation. It is essential that if we are to have effective volunteers the person responsible is given sufficient time and resources to ensure the volunteers are engaged and trained appropriately. It is also vital that volunteers are regularly communicated with and recognised for their contribution.

## Communication and engagement

Ensuring that we communicate regularly with our volunteers is important to keeping them involved and engaged. This was a common complaint of volunteers surveyed in this study, with many mentioning that the communication between the HB CDEM Group and volunteers could be greatly improved.

## Training

The training provided to volunteers needs to be planned and delivered consistently. Currently our volunteer training programme is ad-hoc and is not aligned to identified needs. We must ensure that training activities keep volunteers engaged, but also meet identified needs.

## Volunteer Organisation capability

We have a large number of organisations within Hawke's Bay that are able to support us in response. A number of these organisations have been utilised effectively in other parts of New Zealand. Currently we do not have defined response roles for a number of organisations, so it is unclear what level of support they are expected to provide.

## Health and Safety

This is an area that has caused a lot of concern across the volunteer sector. It is vital that there is a clear policy that covers the health and safety of those volunteering in a response and this is made available to all contributing organisations prior to an event to ensure they are comfortable with the provisions the HB CDEM Group has put in place for those assisting.

# Conclusions

The current capability within the HB CDEM Group is appropriate for small to medium events, but would easily become stretched should a larger event occur. There is a need for a trained volunteer pool to supplement any response capability for medium to large events, as we do not have the capacity within our supporting agencies. As a region our highest risk is from earthquakes, which have the potential to isolate the region from other parts of New Zealand, meaning there is a requirement for sufficient resources within the region to manage and respond in the first 24 – 48 hours. The scale to which the volunteer pool is maintained can only be determined by the level to which the Group feels is realistic to manage from regional resources alone.

Our current pool of CDEM volunteers is ageing and we have very few younger volunteers. Whilst this is currently not an issue, in the future there will be a need to supplement our response capability with new volunteers should we continue to keep a capability at the CDEM Group level.

## Welfare Volunteers

There is currently enough capability within our volunteer agencies to manage the initial welfare requirements of a small to medium scale event in conjunction with the government agencies that have responsibility for delivery. However, these resources are finite and would be stretched quickly in a larger emergency where more than one response location is active e.g. an earthquake or cyclone. In these events our resources would need to be replenished from outside the region. It is also worth noting that some volunteer agencies, such as Red Cross, have indicated that they can assist across a number of areas of response, yet their available local staffing level would suggest that they would become quickly under-resourced.

Our current pool of CDEM volunteers supplement the capability of the volunteer organisations and government agencies and provide redundancy should the capability not be available, particularly in establishing and running CDC's, performing outreach activities etc. Given the number of resources we currently have within our supporting agencies to staff a welfare response, these volunteers provide a supplementary resource that could allow additional CDC facilities to operate. However, key roles of these volunteers need to be established to ensure that they are meeting required gaps in capability and are not duplicating where there is sufficient resource within a supporting agency.

## Operational Volunteers

The HBERT provide the additional capability required to support the emergency services for operational activities and can be supplemented within 48 hours with staff from other NZRT's. The current capability within this team is sufficient to provide effective support to the emergency services within the first 48 hours of an event.

## EOC/ECC Volunteers

Our EOC / ECC functions are sufficiently staffed by territorial authority staff to provide an initial response that can then be supplemented with staff from other CDEM Groups. Surge capacity could easily be accommodated from council staff at all TA's who are not formally involved to assist with additional response requirements, such as admin support.

## Community Volunteers

We currently have a good number of community volunteers who could be trained to perform additional tasks, such as situation reporting, information sharing and basic triage and needs assessment. Past experience has shown that some of the best responses have been from volunteers within their own community and this could greatly reduce the requirements for more formal volunteers to respond.

## Spontaneous Volunteers

As a group we are lacking in our capability to manage and use spontaneous volunteers. We currently have no plan or resources to manage spontaneous volunteers and would struggle to manage a surge of spontaneous volunteers in an event.

There is potential to increase our pool of non-trained CDEM volunteers to assist with activities that require minimal training, such as sand bagging and debris clearance. This could be implemented through a register of interested persons that can be utilised should the need require, or encouraged through the community response planning process. This kind of volunteer is likely to occur organically and there are currently no resources or plans to liaise and support these community-led volunteer efforts.

# Recommendations

If we are to have a truly effective volunteer response capability, then we must ensure it is enabled through the following:

- The HB CDEM Group must make a clear decision on which areas or readiness, response and recovery it is willing to utilise volunteers and which areas it is not to define our need further.

- Volunteers must have clear roles and responsibilities. Resources should not be used to train volunteers in tasks they are unlikely to be used for in a response, as volunteers not being utilised for something they are trained to do can cause disengagement.

- Management of volunteers should be through a single FTE to maintain consistency of training and communication.

- The management of volunteers must be supported through appropriate resourcing, both financial and staff time.

- Volunteers must be included in the development of the capability.

- If we continue or further develop a volunteer capability, then we must utilise it whenever possible to maintain engagement.

- Volunteers must be kept engaged through regular training activities with full-time CD staff.

- We must be adaptable to ensure that we can accommodate all levels of commitment.

- Our volunteer pool must cover the entire region to ensure capability across all areas.

- Plans and resources should be developed to support spontaneous and community-led volunteers.

# Example future models

## Volunteer model 1

Cease current CDEM Volunteer programmes and rely solely on volunteer organisations and other responding agencies to provide capability

### Delivery of capability

Our capability as a group would be provided by our partner organisations, such as the Red Cross and Salvation Army. Existing CDEM volunteers would be encouraged to join other voluntary organisations to build their capability. Areas such as communications would utilise volunteers from organisations such as AREC (Amateur Radio Operators) and existing council staff. The HBERT would discontinue.

This model would still require liaison with the agencies providing the response capability to ensure that the appropriate training is delivered. This liaison could be done through existing roles such as the Group Welfare Manager and the EMA Readiness and Response. The financial costs of this model could be met through the Training and Exercising budget.

### Advantages

- Staff time can be spent on other projects
- Reduced budget needed to support

### Disadvantages

- Staff time still required to liaise with volunteer organisations
- No backup if volunteer organisations are unable to support a response

## Volunteer model 2

Continue current CDEM Volunteer programmes to supplement volunteer organisations and other responding agencies capability

### Delivery of capability

The existing capability would be maintained and managed by a single member of HB CDEM Group staff. They would be responsible for all the volunteer teams as they currently exist and the associated budgets. The management by a single role would reduce the duplicated effort currently within the group and enable consistent delivery to the volunteers. CDEM Volunteers would be re-aligned to ensure that they are trained to meet identified gaps and requirements within our current response capability.

This model would still require a large level of CDEM staff time, but would utilise the time of CDEM staff more effectively by managing the volunteers from a single role. It would require some input from other areas, such as the Welfare Manager and EMA Readiness and Response, but the vast majority of work associated with maintaining the capability would be coordinated and conducted by a single person. This model would still require the existing budget of $50,000 per annum and may need to be increased according to resourcing and training needs.

### Advantages

- Maintains a backup to the volunteer organisation capability
- Volunteers can be trained to meet potential gaps

### Disadvantages

- Requires significant staff time to maintain
- Budget requirements may increase
- No capacity to manage spontaneous volunteer programmes

**Item 13**

**Attachment 1**

## Volunteer model 3

Increase current CDEM Volunteer programmes through addition of corporate volunteers to supplement volunteer organisations and other responding agencies capability. Enhance the ability to coordinate and manage spontaneous and community-led volunteers.

### Delivery of capability

This option would operate similarly to model 2, however, more staff time would be allocated to enable an effective spontaneous and corporate volunteer capability to be developed through the development of resources and plans.

In order for this model to be effective there would need to be significant staff time devoted to managing the project. This would also require additional budget beyond the current $50,000 expenditure to be effective.

### Advantages

- Creates a high level of capacity to respond and redundancy for existing supporting agencies
- Ensures that all areas of response have sufficient resources to initiate an effective initial response

### Disadvantages

- Requires a high level of staff time to manage
- Requires a higher level of expenditure

## Volunteer model 4

Increase current CDEM Volunteer programmes to cover areas delivered by other voluntary organisations

### Delivery of capability

This model would require significant resourcing to meet and maintain the capability currently provided by other agencies. This model would require a significant resources devoted to volunteer management and would need to be supported by other roles across the group.

In order to effectively implement this model there would be a requirement for significant staff time beyond a single FTE. The budget would need to increase greatly to meet the additional training and resource requirements.

### Advantages

- Entire volunteer response would be from HB CDEM affiliated volunteers, reducing health and safety issues (responsibilities for volunteers from other agencies etc).
- Volunteers could be trained to meet exact requirements, reducing surpluses and deficits of volunteers in some areas of response

### Disadvantages

- Requires significant staff time to implement and maintain beyond single FTE
- Requires significant budget increase
- Alienates existing volunteer organisations

# Glossary

| | |
|---|---|
| CDEM | Civil Defence and Emergency Management |
| CEG | Coordinating Executive Group |
| EMO | Emergency Management Officer |
| EMA | Emergency Management Advisor |
| FENZ | Fire and Emergencies New Zealand |
| HBERT | Hawke's Bay Emergency Response Team |
| MCDEM | Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management |

# Appendices

## Appendix 1 – Volunteer survey questions

**Question 1:**

What is your age range?

| Answer choices |
| --- |
| 18 - 30 |
| 31 – 50 |
| 51 - 70 |
| 70+ |

**Question 2:**

What is your ethnicity?

| Answer choices |
| --- |
| New Zealand European / Pakeha |
| NZ Maori |
| British Irish |
| Other |
| Not Stated |

**Question 3:**

What areas of Civil Defence do you currently volunteer for?

| Answer choices |
| --- |
| Welfare Team |
| HBERT |
| Communications Team |
| Community Response Team |
| Other |

**Question 4:**

How many years have you been a volunteer with HB CDEM?

| Answer choices |
| --- |
| Less than 1 year |
| 1 – 5 years |
| 6 – 10 years |
| 11 – 15 years |
| 16 – 20 years |
| 20 years + |

**Question 5:**

What are the main reasons that you chose to volunteer for CDEM?

| Answer choices | |
| --- | --- |
| To serve my immediate community | To complement other roles I already hold |
| Have skills to offer | To feel part of a team |
| To help others / make a difference | For the social contact |
| To serve the wider Hawke's Bay communities | To improve employment prospects |
| To learn new skills | Have time to spare |
| Community standing | |

**Question 6**

What barriers are there to you volunteering?

| Answer choices |
| --- |
| Family commitments |
| Financial cost |
| Physical limitations / challenges |
| Other volunteer commitments |
| Work commitments |
| Other concern |

**Item 13**

**Attachment 1**

## Question 7:

How would you rate the support of HB CDEM Group?

| Areas | Answer choices |
|-------|----------------|
| Training | Poor |
| Equipment and resources | Average |
| Communication (e.g. emails, newsletters etc) | Good |
| Recognition | Excellent |

## Question 8:

What else would you like to be able to do in response beyond your current volunteer role?

## Question 9:

As a volunteer, are you willing to assist outside of emergency response? E.g. at community events, or with our business as usual activities such as community resilience planning

## Question 10:

What could Hawke's Bay CDEM Group do to improve your volunteer experience?

## Appendix 2 – Volunteer Organisation interview questions

| | |
|---|---|
| Organisation name | |
| Date of interview | |
| What areas of civil defence is your organisation able to assist with? | |
| | |
| How many volunteers do you currently have that could be deployed to assist in a response? | |
| | |
| What level of training do your volunteers currently have? | |
| | |
| What resources are you able to provide to a response? | |
| | |
| What are your current deployment times for an event? E.g. 0-2hours, 2-6hours etc | |
| | |
| What are your expectations for support from HB CDEM, both in readiness and in response? | |
| | |
| What other activities do your volunteers undertake as part of your organisation that could prevent them from assisting in a civil defence emergency? | |
| | |
| Does your organisation have a national capability that can be called upon? | |
| | |
| What issues do you currently have with managing volunteers? | |
| | |

Hawke's Bay CDEM Group Volunteer Needs Analysis Report Version 1.2 Final  24

**Item 13**

**Attachment 1**

## Appendix 3 – Estimated current FTE's for volunteering

| Activity | Explanation | Jae | NCC EMO | HDC EMO | CHB EMO | WDC EMO | Tee | Alison | Lisa | Jim | Michelle | External Staff | Total for task |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Admin | *Purchase orders, emails, training enquiries, volunteer management etc* | | 400 | 400 | | | | | | 16 | 80 | | 896 |
| Meetings | *Attending planning meetings with Team Leaders Ad-hoc volunteer liaison etc* | | 40 | 40 | | | | 8 | | 10 | | | 98 |
| Training | *Delivering / attending Team training* | | 110 | 110 | | | | | | 10 | | | 230 |
| Recruitment activities | *Running recruitment drive, developing materials etc* | | 30 | 30 | | | | | | | | | 60 |
| Development of SOP's etc | *Developing SOP's for the operation of the various volunteer groups* | | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | | | | | 10 | | 90 |
| Development of Volunteer Mgt. Strategy and Plan | *Creation of both documents and annual review* | | 20 | 20 | | | | | | 200 | | | 240 |
| Training development | | | 200 | | | | | | | | | | 200 |
| Exercise Development | | | 200 | | | | | | | | | | 200 |
| | | | | | | | **Total Function hours** | **2014** | | | | **FTE's** | **1.1** |

2018

**Item 13**

**Attachment 2**



# Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group

## CDEM Volunteer Strategy 2018 DRAFT

**Item 13**

**Attachment 2**

**Item 13**

**Attachment 2**



# Hawkes Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group

## CDEM Volunteer Strategy DRAFT

## April 2018

HBCDEM CDEM Volunteer Strategy 2018 v.1.3 DRAFT

# Foreword

The Hawkes Bay region has a varied and active hazard scape, which presents a significant risk to the Hawke's Bay community. Responding to a major emergency requires a huge amount of resources, often beyond the capability of the existing group members and partner agencies. In order to supplement the response capability there is a need to utilise volunteers to carry out activities in response. Volunteers can also play a significant role in strengthening the Group's capability across all four R's of emergency management.

This strategy seeks to outline how the Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management (HB CDEM) Group will engage, maintain and utilise volunteers in the future to ensure an effective volunteer capability to support activities in all four R's across the entire region.

HBCDEM CDEM Volunteer Strategy 2018 v.1.3 DRAFT

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HBCDEM CDEM Volunteer Strategy 2018 v.1.3 DRAFT

# Contents

HBCDEM CDEM Volunteer Strategy 2018 v.1.3 DRAFT

# Introduction

## Background

The HB CDEM Group has utilised volunteers in response for many years. However, this has been managed at the local level by individual territorial authorities, which has resulted in a great variance across the region with how volunteers are engaged, managed and utilised as an additional resource for use in risk reduction, readiness, response, and recovery activities.

With all Hawke's Bay emergency management staff now employed by the Group Office, an opportunity to rationalise and improve the use of volunteers and implement a consistent approach to volunteering across the entire region now exists. Whilst acknowledging there is a place for the development of volunteers under the HB CDEM Group, it is also important to acknowledge there are also external organisations, such as the Red Cross and Salvation Army, who can also provide volunteers to assist the Group. Not only may these organisation be able to assist in readiness and response activities, but they may also be able to assist with the management of spontaneous volunteers and community led responses in a major emergency event.

## Purpose of the Strategy

This strategy outlines how the HB CDEM Group will develop an effective volunteer structure within the region to support its needs in all areas of the four R's. It also outlines the ways in which the CDEM Group will engage, maintain and utilise volunteers to ensure a consistent approach across the region.

## Target audience

This document is intended for all HB CDEM Group members, key stakeholders, agencies who provide volunteers and current CDEM Group volunteers.

## Aim

The aim of this strategy is to provide a framework for the effective use of volunteers to support the HB CDEM Group in all areas of the four R's.

This aim will be achieved through ensuring a set of key principles are followed:

- Volunteers enhance the capability of the HB CDEM Group and meet identified needs

- Volunteers act as an asset for response and other activities across the four R's where appropriate

- Engagement of volunteers is innovative and flexible to provide for varying situations and;

- Volunteer management is well supported through appropriate resourcing

## Relationship with internal documents

- The HB CDEM Group Plan (Objectives REA 2,4,6, RES 6-7, VM 1-4).

## Relationship with external documents

- The CDEM Act 2002

- The National Civil Defence Emergency Management Strategy

- Volunteer Coordination in CDEM, Director's Guideline DGL15/13

- Guidance for establishing and operating New Zealand Response Teams (NZ-RT's), Director's Guideline DGL12/12

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# Understanding the current volunteer capability

Volunteering in Hawke's Bay currently occurs in four main areas:

1. Welfare Response
2. Communications
3. Emergency Response (e.g rapid reconnaissance, flood response etc)
4. Community Response

## Volunteer Needs Analysis

A needs analysis was undertaken in late 2017 to understand the Group's current volunteering capability within the region. This study sought to identify the current capability within the Group's volunteer pool and potential needs for additional skills and resources that volunteers cannot currently meet. It also sought to recommend ways in which the Group's engagement and use of volunteers could be improved in the future.

The needs analysis utilised a number of methods to help determine our current volunteer capability:

- Identification of all potential volunteer activities within the HB CDEM Group

- Literature review regarding the use of volunteers in emergencies

- Review of CDEM volunteering in other CDEM groups, including sources of volunteers, activities undertaken, training offered and associated costs / staff time required

- Survey of current volunteers

- Survey of other volunteer agencies (e.g. Red Cross / Salvation Army)

- Focus Group of HB CDEM Group staff

## Findings and Recommendations

The needs analysis determined the HB CDEM Group requires a volunteer pool to;

a) To support the activities coordinated at the EOC or GECC and;

b) To give effect to tasking at the operational level in support of the emergency services.

It found the HB CDEM Group has an appropriate level of volunteers to undertake these tasks but the organisation, training and coordination of the volunteers across the Group could be greatly improved and far more effective.

The analysis also noted not enough use is made of volunteers outside response and there is potential to develop how the HB CDEM Group utilises volunteers in the other three R's (Reduction, Readiness and Recovery).

A number of recommendations for the use of volunteers within the HB CDEM Group in the future were made following the analysis. The key recommendations were:

- The HB CDEM Group must make a clear decision on which areas of risk reduction, readiness, response and recovery it is willing to utilise volunteers and which areas it is not to define our need further.

- The volunteer pool must cover the entire region to ensure capability across all areas.

- Volunteers must have clear roles and responsibilities.

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- Training must be consistent with the identified needs of the Group.

- Volunteers must be included in the development of the capability through the identification and development of training.

- A volunteer capability must be utilised whenever possible to maintain engagement.

- The volunteer system must be adaptable to ensure it can accommodate all levels of commitment.

- Plans and resources should be developed to support spontaneous and community-led volunteers.

## Who will support us?

As part of the needs analysis process agencies who have the capacity to support us with volunteer activities were identified. These include:

| | |
|---|---|
| New Zealand Red Cross | Salvation Army |
| Māori Wardens | Victim Support |
| Government agencies e.g .IRD, WINZ etc | Volunteering HB |
| Community groups / organisations | Corporate organisations |
| SPCA | |

Engagement of other agencies should include coordination of training activities to provide a variety of opportunities to volunteers for capability development. This will also ensure a more consistent understanding of roles, tasks and processes during activations by all volunteer organisations. In order to facilitate this it is a recommended a volunteering group will be established and quarterly meeting held with all interested parties to assist in ensuring a collaborative approach to volunteering, training and exercising.

# Building our future volunteer capability

It is recommended volunteer capability within the HB CDEM Group be based around four main groupings:



**Other volunteer providers**

Full time volunteer organisations
*Red Cross*
*Salvation Army*
*Volunteering Hawke's Bay*
*Maori Wardens*

Corporate volunteers
*e.g. IRD, MSD*
*Local Businesses*

**Fully trained and deployable volunteers managed by CDEM**

HB Emergency Response Team

Rapid Response
*Scene Support*
*Rapid Recon*

Welfare Response
*CDC's and Registration*

Communications Specialists
*Radio comms & Satellite trailer*

**Community volunteers supported by CDEM**

Community Response Teams
*Basic welfare response & intelligence gathering*

*May be willing to operate outside of own community in other CDEM activities*

**Spontaneous volunteers**

Community led response activities
*Supported by CDEM*

General response support activities
*CDEM guided and managed*

Engagement in activities across all 4 R's      Engagement in response activities only

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The HB CDEM Group has previously engaged with some of these volunteer groups but this has largely been focussed around the more traditional use of volunteers in response activities only. As was seen in Christchurch and subsequent emergency events within New Zealand, volunteers can play a large part in other areas of the four R's, in particular in reduction and readiness activities.

In the future, it is recommended the HB CDEM Group develop a capability based around the effective utilisation of all four volunteer groups across all four R's. The recruitment of volunteers will be targeted according to the needs identified and will aim to integrate volunteer capability into the HB CDEM Group work wherever practicable.

The volunteer capability within the Hawke's Bay region has previously been largely based around the municipal centres of Napier and Hastings, with limited activities elsewhere within the region. The future structure must develop a volunteer capability to enable effective support to Group activities regardless of the location.

All HB CDEM volunteers will be recruited as part of the Hawke's Bay Emergency Response Team. The team will:

- Offer three streams of capability: Welfare Response, Communications Specialist and Rapid Response.
- Provide capability in areas not provided by existing volunteer agencies.
- Provide support to other emergency services to bolster their response functions.

Volunteer capability will also be developed at a community level to support activities across all four R's. This will include basic training in areas to assist a community in managing the effects of an emergency event, but will also provide a resource for gaining situational awareness during a response. This may include engaging community groups and organisations to help develop this capability.

In addition, an effective capability to manage and support spontaneous volunteering will be developed across HB CDEM volunteers and supporting volunteer organisations. The Group will also investigate the potential to collaborate or "partner" with corporate organisations to provide support for spontaneous volunteering and specialist volunteers to support a response (e.g. financial advice etc).

# Key outputs of volunteering

In order to ensure a coordinated approach to the development of a volunteer capability, lead and support roles have been identified for the key volunteer groups and agencies. Volunteers will have opportunities, and are encouraged to support reduction, readiness and recovery activities within the region. This may be supporting an HB CDEM or other organisations activity, as a community member, or as part of a community project.

| Volunteer Group / Agency | Primary Roles | Support Roles |
|---|---|---|
| **HB Emergency Response Team** | | |
| **Welfare Response** | Civil Defence Centres<br>Registration and Needs Assessment<br>Spontaneous volunteer management | Outreach activities<br>Psychosocial First Aid<br>Community engagement<br>Public Education activities |
| **Rapid Response** | Scene support<br>Rapid reconnaissance<br>Flood response<br>Logistical support<br>4x4 support<br>Spontaneous volunteer management<br>Cordon management | EOC / ECC Functions<br>Community engagement<br>First Aid support<br>Public Education activities |

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| Volunteer Group / Agency | Primary Roles | Support Roles |
|---|---|---|
|  | Traffic control |  |
| **Communications Specialist** | Communications support | Community engagement<br>Public Education activities |
| **Red Cross (Disaster Welfare Response Team & Humanitarian volunteers)** | Outreach<br>Psychological First Aid<br>Unaccompanied Minors<br>Rapid Reconnaissance<br>Community engagement<br>Public Education activities | Civil Defence Centres<br>Registration and Needs Assessment<br>Inquiry |
| **Victim Support** | Outreach<br>Psychological First Aid |  |
| **Salvation Army** | Outreach<br>Psychological First Aid | Civil Defence Centres<br>Registration and Needs Assessment<br>Community engagement |
| **Volunteering Hawke's Bay** | Spontaneous Volunteer management |  |
| **Maori Wardens** | Spontaneous Volunteer management<br>Cordon Management<br>Traffic Control | Civil Defence Centres<br>Registration and Needs Assessment<br>Rapid Reconnaissance |
| **SPCA** | Animal Welfare | Rapid Reconnaissance |
| **Community Groups** | Civil Defence Centres<br>Rapid Reconnaissance<br>Community engagement |  |
| **Corporate volunteers** | Civil Defence Centres<br>EOC / ECC Functions<br>Registration and Needs Assessment<br>Spontaneous Volunteer management | Community engagement |

Our volunteer pool must be flexible and provide the capability to perform a variety of tasks beyond their lead role and meet any identified needs during an event. This will enable resources to be deployed as needed and will require less reliance on support from other regions to meet the needs of the response.

# Engagement and retention of CDEM volunteers

A Volunteer Management Plan (VMP) will be developed for the recruitment, training and on-going engagement of volunteers within Hawke's Bay. This will also include the engagement and management of spontaneous volunteers in a response.

It is essential all volunteers engaged to conduct work for the HB CDEM Group are fit for purpose and represent the Group in a professional manner. In order to ensure this, any volunteer under the HB CDEM Group must:

- Declare all criminal convictions (HB CDEM and community volunteers must undergo a full Police check)

- Follow all health and safety regulations and codes of conduct

- Have the correct training before undertaking work behalf of the HB CDEM Group

- Present themselves in a professional manner while representing the HB CDEM Group

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In order to ensure volunteers are retained and are willing to undertake work on behalf of the HB CDEM Group, The HB CDEM Group must:

- Ensure equal opportunities for all persons wanting to volunteer

- Commit to providing all health and safety equipment as required for each task

- Provide support services to volunteers in their role

- Ensure regular training opportunities to ensure the volunteers have the correct skills to undertake work on behalf of the HB CDEM Group

- Provide opportunities for recognition of volunteers

# Training and Exercising

The HB VMP will include an annual training plan, which will align to the Group training and exercise plan to ensure that opportunities for volunteers to participate in exercises and training events with EOC and ECC staff are maximized. It will also ensure the volunteer capability is trained appropriately to meet the identified needs of the HB CDEM Group. This will be developed in conjunction with the other volunteer organisations to ensure there is opportunity to coordinate training and involve participants from other organisations. The annual training plan

# Costs and FTE

The annual budget allocated to volunteers will remain at the current level (approximately $50,000 per annum) and will be managed by the HB Group Emergency Management Office to ensure there are sufficient resources to support the volunteer capability. The establishment of a full-time volunteer management role within the HB CDEM Group will also ensure a more effective capability is developed.

# Monitoring volunteer capability

In order to ensure volunteer capability is meeting the needs of the Group a bi-annual capability review will be conducted by the Emergency Management Advisor – Volunteer Management. This will include a survey of volunteers and supporting volunteer agencies and a review of the capability within the Group against the identified needs outlined in this strategy and the objectives of the HB Group CDEM Plan.

The training and capability of the HB CDEM Group volunteers (Hawke's Bay Emergency Response Team members only) will also be monitored through the Integrated Training Management system (ITM). This is a web-based system designed to collate and store information regarding training, exercising and deployment of staff and volunteers.

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# Glossary

| | |
|---|---|
| CDEM | Civil Defence and Emergency Management |
| CEG | Coordinating Executive Group |
| EOC | Emergency Operations Centre |
| GECC | Group Emergency Coordination Centre |
| HB | Hawke's Bay |
| IRD | Inland Revenue Department |
| ITM | Integrated Training Management system |
| MCDEM | Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management |
| Four R's | Reduction, Readiness, Response, Recovery |
| SPCA | Society for the Protection and Care of Animals |
| VMP | Volunteer Management Plan |
| WINZ | Work and Income New Zealand |

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